1. A suit in the District Court to recover on a War Risk
insurance policy, the procedure in which is the same as that
provided in §§ 5 and 6 of the Tucker Act, was not brought
in time to toll the statute of limitations where the complaint was
not filed with the clerk of the court before the period of
limitations expired. P.
303 U. S.
39.
To commence the suit in accordance with §§ 5 and 6 of
the Tucker Act, it was not enough to serve a copy of the summons
upon the District Attorney and mail another to the Attorney
General.
Page 303 U. S. 37
2. Suits against the United States can be maintained only by
permission, in the manner prescribed and subject to the
restrictions imposed. The Conformity Act cannot be relied upon to
change any of these. P.
303 U. S. 41.
3. A District Attorney has no power to waive conditions or
limitations imposed by statute in respect of suits against the
United States.
Id.
89 F.2d 614 affirmed.
Certiorari, 302 U.S. 668, to review the reversal of a judgment
against the United States in a suit on a War Risk Insurance
claim.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Certiorari was granted because of conflicting views in the lower
courts.
Claiming to be permanently and totally disabled, petitioner
instituted an action in the United States District Court, Western
District of New York, to recover under a War Risk Insurance Policy.
10 F. Supp. 412. He was honorably discharged in 1919.
Before the cause came on for trial, respondents moved for
dismissal because the action was not brought within
Page 303 U. S. 38
the time prescribed by §19, World War Veterans' Act 1924,
as amended by Act July 3, 1930, 46 Stat. 992, copied in the margin.
* This motion was
overruled. Whether properly so is the matter for our
consideration.
Page 303 U. S. 39
By concession, it was necessary to bring suit not later than
July 1, 1933.
March 16, 1933, a praecipe for issuance of summons was filed
with the clerk of the District Court; on the same day, copy of the
summons was served upon the United States attorney in Buffalo, and
another mailed to the Attorney General at Washington; no copy of
the complaint was served upon the United States attorney until July
26, 1933; the original complaint was not filed with the clerk until
April 23, 1936.
February 15, 1934, the United States attorney filed an answer
without questioning the timeliness of the suit; a year later, he
moved to dismiss. The cause was heard in April, 1936; judgment went
for the assured July 29, 1936.
In following the above-described procedure, petitioner's counsel
acted upon information given by the assistant United States
attorney, who declared that service of summons would suffice to
give jurisdiction and toll the statute; that complaint might be
served thereafter.
Two points are presented. Did procuring the summons, serving one
copy on the United States attorney and sending another to the
Attorney General, begin the
Page 303 U. S. 40
suit within the requirement of the statute? If not, do the
circumstances establish waiver of the defense that suit was out of
time.
Section 19, Act of 1924, permits an action on a war risk policy
to be brought in the United States District Court for the district
in which the claimant resides. Also directs, "The procedure in such
suits shall be the same as that provided in sections 5 and 6"
(§§ 762 and 763, Title 28, U.S.C.) of the Tucker Act of
March 3, 1887, "and Section 10 thereof (§ 765, Title 28,
U.S.C.) insofar as applicable." Sec. 5 of the Tucker Act provides
that the plaintiff "shall file a petition" with the clerk of the
court containing a succinct statement of the facts upon which the
claim is based; Sec. 6 that he shall cause one copy of this to be
served upon the district attorney and mail another to the Attorney
General. These requirements were not complied with prior to July 1,
1933.
The Circuit Court of Appeals held the suit was not brought in
time to toll the statute, and with this conclusion we agree. The
opinion there adequately refers to the sundry opinions which have
considered the subject, discloses the claims of the parties, and
reasons for the judgment.
Affirmation here, upon authority of
United States v.
Larkin, 208 U. S. 333, of
the District Court's judgment in
United States v. Mill Creek,
etc., and two similar causes (Nos. 103, 104, 105, Oct. Term
1919), 251 U.S. 539, cannot properly be regarded as authority for a
view contrary to the one we now approve. Those causes came up under
a statute which permitted direct appeals from District Courts
solely upon questions of jurisdiction. We determined only that the
District Court had power to hear and rule upon the questions
presented to it -- among them, whether the suits were brought in
time. The merits of the controversy -- whether, in reality the
suits were in time -- we did not consider. Examination of the
opinion
Page 303 U. S. 41
in
Larkin's case and the statute then in force will
make this clear enough.
Suits against the United States can be maintained only by
permission, in the manner prescribed and subject to the
restrictions imposed.
Reid v. United States, 211 U.
S. 529,
211 U. S. 538.
The Conformity Act cannot be relied upon to change any of
these.
The district attorney had no power to waive conditions or
limitations imposed by statute in respect of suits against the
United States.
Finn v. United States, 123 U.
S. 227,
123 U. S. 233.
Judgment against them is not permissible if first sought after
expiration of the time allowed.
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO took no part in the consideration and
decision of this case.
* Act of July 3, 1930, c. 849, 46 Stat. 992.
"Sec.19. In the event of disagreement as to claim, including
claim for refund of premiums, under a contract of insurance between
the bureau and any person or persons claiming thereunder, an action
on the claim may be brought against the United States either in the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia or in the district court
of the United States in and for the district in which such persons
or any one of them resides, and jurisdiction is hereby conferred
upon such courts to hear and determine all such controversies. The
procedure in such suits shall be the same as that provided in
sections 5 and 6 of the Act entitled 'An Act to provide for the
bringing of suits against the Government of the United States,'
approved March 3, 1887, and section 10 thereof so far as
applicable. . . ."
"No suit on yearly renewable term insurance shall be allowed
under this section unless the same shall have been brought within
six years after the right accrued for which the claim is made or
within one year after the date of approval of this amendatory Act,
whichever is the later date, and no suit on United States
Government life (converted) insurance shall be allowed under this
section unless the same shall have been brought within six years
after the right accrued for which the claim is made:
Provided, That for the purposes of this section it shall
be deemed that the right accrued on the happening of the
contingency on which the claim is founded:
Provided
further, That this limitation is suspended for the period
elapsing between the filing in the bureau of the claim sued upon
and the denial of said claim by the director."
Tucker Act, March 3, 1887, c. 359, 24 Stat. 506.
Sec. 5; U.S.C. Title 28, § 762.
"
Petition in suit against United States. The plaintiff
in any suit brought under the provisions of section 41, paragraph
20, of this title shall file a petition, duly verified with the
clerk of the respective court having jurisdiction of the case, and
in the district where the plaintiff resides. Such petition shall
set forth the full name and residence of the plaintiff, the nature
of his claim, and a succinct statement of the facts upon which the
claim is based, the money or any other thing claimed, or the
damages sought to be recovered, and praying the court for a
judgment or decree upon the facts and law."
"Sec. 6; U.S.C. Title 28, § 763."
"
Service; appearance by district attorney. The
plaintiff shall cause a copy of his petition filed under section
762 of this title to be served upon the district attorney of the
United States in the district wherein suit is brought, and shall
mail a copy of the same, by registered letter, to the Attorney
General of the United States, and shall thereupon cause to be filed
with the clerk of the court wherein suit is instituted an affidavit
of such service and the mailing of such letter. It shall be the
duty of the district attorney upon whom service of petition is made
as aforesaid to appear and defend the interests of the Government
in the suit, and within sixty days after the service of petition
upon him, unless the time should be extended by order of the court
made in the case to file a plea, answer, or demurrer on the part of
the Government."