1. Review by this Court of a judgment of the Court of Claims
against the United States in a suit for infringement of a patent,
brought under the Act of June 25, 1910, as amended, is limited to
questions of law. P.
303 U. S.
28.
2. In a patent case in the Court of Claims under the Act of
1910, the questions of validity and infringement are questions of
fact. P.
303 U. S.
29.
3. The duty of the Court of Claims to find the ultimate facts,
requires that it resolve conflicting inferences and draw the
necessary factual conclusions from the evidence.
Id.
4. The Court of Claims made elaborate circumstantial findings
preceding its two ultimate findings that the patent sued on was
valid and infringed by the United States. Its opinion disclosed
that there was contradictory testimony by experts for the claimant
and for the United States, but the evidence was not, and could not
properly be, incorporated in the record before this Court.
Held that, while this Court could inquire whether the
ultimate findings were necessarily overborne by the subordinate
ones, thus showing that the judgment against the United States was
not sustainable in point of law, it could not take up the patents
set forth in the findings and, in the absence of the explanatory
and construing testimony of the expert witnesses, attempt to pass
upon the various questions involved, and upon such a necessarily
limited consideration overrule the conclusions of fact reached by
the Court of Claims upon the entire record. P.
303 U. S.
30.
84 Ct.Cls. 625 affirmed.
Certiorari, 302 U.S. 668, to review a judgment against the
United States on a claim of patent infringement.
See s.c.
299 U. S. 299 U.S.
201.
Page 303 U. S. 27
PER CURIAM.
Respondent brought this suit to recover compensation for the use
and manufacture by and for the United States of a device alleged to
be covered by respondent's patent No. 1,115,795 for an invention
for the control of the equilibrium of airplanes. On the first
hearing, the Court of Claims made special findings of fact and
decided as a conclusion of law that respondent's patent was valid
and had been infringed by the United States, and that respondent
was entitled to compensation. Judgment was entered accordingly. 81
Ct.Cls. 785. On review by writ of certiorari, this Court held that
validity and infringement were ultimate facts to be found by the
Court of Claims and, as these facts had not been found, the
judgment was vacated and the case was remanded to that court with
instructions to find specifically whether respondent's patent was
valid, and, if so, whether it had been infringed.
United States
v. Esnault-Pelterie, 299 U. S. 201.
The parties then moved in the Court of Claims for additional
findings, and that court amended its special findings by adding the
following findings of fact:
"XLVIII. Claims 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the Esnault-Pelterie
patent in suit are valid."
"XLIX. The three alleged infringing airplanes of the defendant
all possess the single vertical lever movable in every direction
for controlling the lateral or longitudinal equilibrium of the
airplane, connected to equivalent controlling surfaces having the
same functional effects as those disclosed in the patent."
"Claims 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the Esnault-Pelterie patent in
suit are infringed by defendant. "
Page 303 U. S. 28
The court then entered an interlocutory judgment holding
respondent entitled to compensation and directing that the court's
previous findings, as amended, together with its opinion as
theretofore announced, should stand. 84 Ct.Cls. 625. Certiorari was
granted.
Without its consent, the United States may not be sued for
infringement of a patent.
Crozier v. Fried Krupp,
224 U. S. 290. The
Congress has determined the conditions upon which the United States
consents to be sued. By the applicable statute, Congress has
permitted suit to be brought in the Court of Claims for reasonable
compensation for the infringing use or manufacture. Act of June 25,
1910, 36 Stat. 851, as amended by Act of July 1, 1918, 40 Stat.
705, 35 U.S.C. § 68. Review by this Court of the judgment in
such a suit is thus subject to the rules which have been
established for the review of the judgments of the Court of Claims.
That review is limited to questions of law.
The Act of March 3, 1863, c. 92, 12 Stat. 765, providing for
suits against the United States in the Court of Claims, authorized
appeals to this Court under such regulations as this Court should
direct.
See also Act of March 3, 1887, c. 359, § 4,
24 Stat. 505, 506, 28 U.S.C. § 761. The rules first adopted
provided for the finding of the facts by the Court of Claims, and
directed that
"The facts so found are to be the ultimate facts or propositions
which the evidence shall establish, in the nature of a special
verdict, and not the evidence on which the ultimate facts are
founded."
Rule 1, 3 Wall. VII. The present rule, under section 3(b) of the
Act of February 13, 1925, c. 229, 43 Stat. 936, governing review
upon certiorari, is to the same effect. Rule 41, par. 3. This
established practice was thus described in
Luckenbach S.S. Co.
v. United States, 272 U. S. 533,
272 U. S.
538-539:
"This Court uniformly has regarded the legislation and rules as
confining the review to questions of law shown by
Page 303 U. S. 29
the record when made up as the rules direct. Bills of exception
are not recognized in either the legislation or the rules; nor is
there other provision for bringing the evidence into the record or
including therein the various rulings involved in applying to the
evidence presented the rules which mark the line between when
properly may be considered and what must be rejected. As long ago
as
Mahan
v. United States, 14 Wall. 109,
81 U. S.
111, this Court said of the rules that they could not be
examined"
"without seeing that the purpose was to bring nothing here for
review but questions of law, leaving the Court of Claims to
exercise the functions of a jury in finding facts, equivalent to a
special verdict, and with like effect.
*"
In a patent case in the Court of Claims under the act of 1910,
the questions of validity and infringement are questions of fact.
We have said that, for the purposes of our review in such a case,
the findings of the Court of Claims
"are to be treated like the verdict of a jury, and we are not at
liberty to refer to the evidence, any more than to the opinion, for
the purpose of eking out, controlling, or modifying their
scope."
Brothers v. United States, 250 U. S.
88,
250 U. S. 93;
Stilz v. United States, 269 U. S. 144,
269 U. S.
147-148;
United States v. Esnault-Pelterie,
supra. The requirement that the Court of Claims should find
the ultimate facts which are controlling places upon that court the
duty of resolving conflicting inferences, and to draw from the
evidence the necessary conclusions of fact.
United
States v. Adams, 6 Wall. 101,
73 U. S. 112. Even
though the finding determines a mixed question of law and fact, the
finding is conclusive unless the court is able "to so separate the
question as to see clearly what and where the mistake of law is."
Ross v. Day, 232 U. S. 110,
232 U. S. 117;
Page 303 U. S. 30
United States v. Omaha Tribe of Indians, 253 U.
S. 275,
253 U. S. 281;
Stilz v. United States, supra; United States v. Swift &
Co., 270 U. S. 124,
270 U. S.
138.
In the instant case, as pointed out in our previous opinion,
there are 47 findings of fact preceding the findings of the
ultimate facts, as now made, and by reference there are included 28
exhibits on 266 pages. These references cover a number of patents
claimed to be in analogous arts. From these, the Government seeks
to establish that the device in question was not patentable over
prior disclosures. But this is not a case where the Court of Claims
has presented in its findings all the evidence upon which the
ultimate facts are based, so that it appears on the face of the
findings that the judgment is necessarily wrong as matter of law.
United States v. Clark, 96 U. S. 37,
96 U. S. 40.
Compare United States v. Berdan Firearms Mfg. Co.,
156 U. S. 552,
156 U. S. 573;
Stone v. United States, 164 U. S. 380,
164 U. S. 383. The
opinion of the Court of Claims contains an elaborate review of the
patents to which reference is made, and it discloses that there was
"considerable contradictory testimony" by the various experts for
the plaintiff and the defendant. That testimony is not here, and
would not appropriately form part of the record brought to this
Court, as it was the duty of the court below, and is not ours, to
deal with the conflicts of statement or inferences to which it
might give rise. We are not unmindful of the rule that where, with
all the evidence before the court, it appears that no substantial
dispute of fact is presented, and that the case may be determined
by a mere comparison of structures and extrinsic evidence is not
needed for purposes of explanation, or evaluation of prior art, or
to resolve questions of the application of descriptions to subject
matter, the questions of invention and infringement may be
determined as questions of law.
Heald v. Rice,
104 U. S. 737,
104 U. S. 749;
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Cramer, 192 U.
S. 265,
192 U. S. 275;
Sanitary
Page 303 U. S. 31
Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U. S.
30,
280 U. S. 36.
But we do not think that rule is applicable where we are unable to
examine the testimony which was heard by the court below and we
cannot say that it was of no importance or determine its value in
the light of the disputes revealed. We should not be justified in
taking up the patents set forth in the findings and, in the absence
of the explanatory and construing testimony of the expert witnesses
with respect to the pertinent fact situations, in attempting to
pass upon the various questions, whether of a scientific nature or
otherwise, that are involved, and upon such a necessarily limited
consideration, in overruling the conclusions of fact reached by the
Court of Claims upon the entire record.
Compare 76 U.
S. Wethered, 9 Wall. 812,
76 U. S.
815-816;
Royer v. Schultz Belting Co.,
135 U. S. 319,
135 U. S. 325;
St. Paul Plow Works v. Starling, 140 U.
S. 184,
140 U. S.
196-197;
Coupe v. Royer, 155 U.
S. 565,
155 U. S.
577-580.
We may, of course, inquire whether the subordinate or
circumstantial findings made by the court below necessarily
override its ultimate findings of fact and show that the judgment,
in point of law, is not sustainable. But we have no such case here.
Nor is the case like that of a review by a Circuit Court of Appeals
of decisions of boards, such as the Board of Tax Appeals, where the
evidence is before the appellate court and the question is whether
there was substantial evidence before the Board to support the
findings made.
Compare Phillips v. Commissioner,
283 U. S. 589,
283 U. S. 600;
Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U. S. 123,
295 U. S. 131;
Helvering v. Tex-Penn. Co., 300 U.
S. 481,
300 U. S. 491.
We must take the findings of fact as made below. If, in the instant
case, the subordinate findings had required a decree in favor of
the government, the case would not have been remanded.
United
States v. Esnault-Pelterie, supra, p.
299 U. S. 206;
Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.
S. 282,
278 U. S. 290;
United States v. Wells, 283 U. S. 102,
283 U. S. 120.
And it cannot be said that the ultimate findings, now made, as
Page 303 U. S. 32
to validity and infringement are necessarily overborne by the
subordinate findings.
The argument that the government is precluded from obtaining the
sort of review which is permissible in this Court, when there is a
conflict between circuit courts of appeals as to validity and
infringement of patents, and the questions are submitted upon the
evidence taken in the District Court, is unavailing, for the result
is due to the procedure which has been established by the Congress
for the determination of claims against the United States.
The judgment is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK is of the opinion that the findings do not
show infringement of any valid patent, or that appellee invented
either a vertical lever or a universal joint or the combined use of
a vertical lever and a universal joint to control airplanes or
machinery; he believes the findings show that such means of control
were in general use long before appellee -- five years after his
original application for a patent -- filed an amendment asserting
this claim. For these reasons, he believes the judgment should be
reversed.
MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO took no part in the consideration and
decision of this case.
*
See also United States v. Smith, 94 U. S.
214;
Stone v. United States, 164 U.
S. 380,
164 U. S. 383;
Collier v. United States, 173 U. S.
79;
Crocker v. United States, 240 U. S.
74;
Niles Bement Pond Co. v. United States,
281 U. S. 357,
281 U. S.
358-360.