Where, from the language of a policy of life insurance, it is
doubtful whether provisions for disability benefits were excepted
from the "incontestable" clause, the doubt will be resolved in
favor of the insured. Pp.
300 U. S.
439-440.
6 F.2d 47 reversed.
District Court affirmed.
Certiorari,
post, p. 646, to review a decree reversing
a decree dismissing the bill. The suit was by the insurance company
to cancel the disability benefits provisions of a policy upon the
ground of fraud, alleged to have been practiced by the insured in
obtaining the insurance. The District Court at first refused to
dismiss the bill,
6 F. Supp.
953, but later ruled the other way when the motion was renewed
after the bill had been amended.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
By a policy dated June 30, 1930, respondent insurance company, a
New York corporation, agreed to pay the
Page 300 U. S. 436
named beneficiary $40,000 upon death of Carl F. Stroehmann, the
insured. Or to pay $80,000 if his death results from accidental
bodily injury,
"all upon the conditions set forth in Section 1. . . . And if
the Insured is totally and presumably permanently disabled before
age 60, will pay to the Insured $400.00 monthly during such
disability, increasing after five and ten years continuous
disability, besides waiving premium payments, all upon the
conditions set forth in Section 3."
The policy is a long and complicated document. It incorporates
the application and the medical examiner's report.
Section 1 (two printed pages) relates to the "Double Indemnity"
obligation. It defines the injury to which the insurance applies,
specifies the necessary proof, optional modes of settlement,
etc.
Section 3 -- "Benefits in Event of Total and Permanent
Disability before Age 60," is in the margin.
* It defines
Page 300 U. S. 437
total and permanent disability; states when benefits will become
effective; what they shall be; when premiums will be waived. Also
specifies what will be considered permanent disability, when proofs
may be demanded, etc.
Page 300 U. S. 438
And provides:
"Disability Benefits shall not be granted if disability is the
result of self-inflicted injury. The provision for Disability
Benefits shall automatically terminate if the Insured shall at any
time, voluntarily or involuntarily, engage in military or naval
service in time of war outside of the continental limits of the
United States of America and the Dominion of Canada."
Other provisions relate to termination of such benefits,
reduction of premiums thereafter, etc.
Neither § 1 nor § 3 contains anything relative to
fraud in obtaining the policy or the effect of false statements in
the application.
Section 14 -- "Miscellaneous Provisions" (two pages) contains
the following paragraph:
"Incontestability. -- Except for nonpayment of premiums and
except for the restrictions and provisions applying to the Double
Indemnity and Disability Benefits as provided in Sections 1 and 3,
respectively, this Policy shall be incontestable after one year
from its date of issue unless the Insured dies in such year, in
which event it shall be incontestable after two years from its date
of issue."
In October, 1932, respondent filed a bill (afterwards amended)
against Stroehmann, the insured, and the beneficiary in the United
States District Court, Middle District, Pennsylvania. It alleged
that the policy had been obtained upon false and fraudulent
misrepresentations and concealments material to the risk. It
asked
Page 300 U. S. 439
that the disability benefits provisions be cancelled, also for
an injunction against suit at law upon them.
Relying upon the incontestability clause, the petitioner moved
that the bill be dismissed. The trial court sustained the motion,
holding that, as more than a year had elapsed since the policy took
effect, the limitation was applicable and controlling. The Circuit
Court of Appeals thought otherwise, and reversed the challenged
decree.
The matter is here by certiorari limited to the question of the
application and effect of the incontestability clause.
No reason appears to doubt the power of the insurer to except
from the ordinary incontestability clause all policy provisions
relating to disability benefits. Ch. 28, Laws N.Y. (1923);
Steinberg v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 263 N.Y. 45, 188 N.E.
152. But the petitioner maintains that the words used in the policy
before us are inadequate definitely to disclose a purpose so to do.
And we think the point is well taken.
In
Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Hurni Packing
Co., 263 U. S. 167,
263 U. S. 174,
this Court said:
"The rule is settled that, in case of ambiguity, that
construction of the policy will be adopted which is most favorable
to the insured. The language employed is that of the company, and
it is consistent with both reason and justice that any fair doubt
as to the meaning of its own words should be resolved against
it."
See Royal Insurance Co. v. Martin, 192 U.
S. 149,
192 U. S. 162,
192 U. S. 165;
Bergholm v. Peoria Life Ins. Co., 284 U.
S. 489,
284 U. S.
492.
Examination of the words relied upon to show an exception to the
incontestability clause of the policy discloses ample cause for
doubt concerning their meaning. The arguments of counsel have
emphasized the uncertainty. The District Court and the Circuit
Court of Appeals reached different conclusions, and elsewhere there
is diversity of opinion.
Page 300 U. S. 440
The District Court accepted the view approved in
Ness v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 70 F.2d 59, and
Mutual Life Ins. Co.
of New York v. Markowitz, 78 F.2d 396, which presented for
interpretation language identical with that now before us. The
Circuit Court of Appeals followed its earlier opinion in
N.Y.
Life Ins. Co. v. Gatti, (Oct. 6, 1936), where the company
employed different language. Certain life companies undertake to
make exceptions to the incontestability clause by words more
precise than those now under consideration, and opinions in cases
arising upon their policies must be appraised accordingly.
Without difficulty, respondent could have expressed in plain
words the exception for which it now contends. It has failed, we
think, so to do. And, applying the settled rule, the insured is
entitled to the benefit of the resulting doubt.
The decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals must be reversed. The
decree of the District Court is affirmed.
Reversed.
*
"Section 3. -- Benefits in Event of Total and Permanent
Disability before Age 60."
"Total Disability. -- Disability shall be considered total when
there is any impairment of mind or body which continuously renders
it impossible for the Insured to follow a gainful occupation."
"Permanent Disability. -- Total disability shall, during its
continuance, be presumed to be permanent;"
"(a) If such disability is the result of conditions which render
it reasonably certain that such disability will continue during the
remaining lifetime of the Insured; or,"
"(b) If such disability has existed continuously for ninety
days."
"When Benefits become Effective. -- If, before attaining the age
of sixty years and while no premium on this Policy is in default,
the Insured shall furnish to the Company due proof that he is
totally and permanently disabled, as defined above, the Company
will grant the following benefits during the remaining lifetime of
the Insured so long as such disability continues."
"Benefits. (a) Increasing Income. -- The Company will pay a
monthly income to the Insured of the amount stated on the first
page hereof ($10 per $1,000 face amount of Policy), beginning upon
receipt of due proof of such disability and increasing after sixty
consecutive monthly payments have been made to one and one-half
times such amount and after sixty further consecutive monthly
payments have been made to twice such amount, at which it shall
remain while total and permanent disability continues."
"(b) Waiver of Premium. -- The Company will also, after receipt
of such due proof, waive payment of each premium as it thereafter
becomes due during such disability."
"Specified Disabilities. -- The entire and irrecoverable loss of
the sight of both eyes, or of the use of both hands or both feet or
one hand and one foot, will be considered total and permanent
disability."
"General Provisions. -- The Company may, before making any
income payment or waiving any premium, require due proof of the
continuance of total and permanent disability, but such proof shall
not be required oftener than once a year after such disability has
continued for two years. If such proof is not furnished on demand,
or if it shall appear to the Company that the Insured is no longer
totally and permanently disabled, no further income payments will
be made or premiums waived."
"Neither the dividends nor the amount payable in any settlement
hereof shall be decreased because of Disability Benefits
granted."
"If the Insured shall at any time so recover that the payment of
Disability Benefits terminates and later shall furnish due proof
that he has again become totally and permanently disabled,
Disability Benefits shall be the same in amount and subject to the
same conditions as if no prior disability had existed."
"If the disability of the Insured shall be the result of
insanity, income payments shall be payable to the beneficiary, if
any, instead of to the Insured."
"Any disability income payment which may become payable and
which is unpaid at the death of the Insured shall be paid to the
beneficiary."
"Disability Benefits shall not be granted if disability is the
result of self-inflicted injury."
"The provision for Disability Benefits shall automatically
terminate if the Insured shall at any time, voluntarily or
involuntarily, engage in military or naval service in time of war
outside of the continental limits of the United States of America
and the Dominion of Canada."
"If requested in writing by the Insured, the Company will
terminate the provision for Disability Benefits by endorsement on
this Policy."
"If the Insured attains the age of sixty years or if the
provision for Disability Benefits terminates, the premiums payable
after such age or such termination shall be reduced by the premium
for such benefits."