1. Where it is claimed that a contractual right was created by a
state statute and impaired by a later one, this Court will give
much weight to the construction put upon the earlier statute by the
state court, though not bound by it. P.
300 U. S.
322.
2. The provisions of c. 243, New Jersey Laws, 1909, forbidding
removal of public school teachers who have served three years, or
reduction of their salaries, except for causes specified and after
notice and hearing, did not create contracts with individual
teachers, but was merely a limitation upon the authority of the
boards of education with respect to the tenure and salaries of
teachers. P.
300 U. S.
323.
3. The stipulated facts of this case do not show contracts
between the boards of education and teachers for service of the
teachers beyond the current year. P.
300 U. S.
323.
4. No arbitrary discrimination, violative of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, is attributable to a
method of reducing the salaries of school teachers by dividing the
salaries into several groups in order of amounts, and applying
reduction percentages, ascending from the lowest group to the
highest, although it result in some instances that a teacher
receiving the lowest salary in his group will have his salary
reduced to a figure lower than the reduced compensation of one
receiving the highest compensation in the next lower group. P.
300 U. S.
323.
116 N.J.L. 412, 185 Atl. 8; 116 N.J.L. 416, 184 Atl. 737,
affirmed.
Appeals from the affirmance by the court below of Judgments of
the Supreme Court of New Jersey (115 N.J.L. 310; 180 Atl. 220),
which had affirmed, on certiorari, the action of the State Board of
Education in a
Page 300 U. S. 320
controversy over reductions in the pay of principals, teachers,
and clerks employed in the public schools.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The people of New Jersey have ordained by their Constitution
that the Legislature "shall provide for the maintenance and support
of a thorough and efficient system of the public schools."
[
Footnote 1] In fulfillment of
this command, a comprehensive school law was adopted in 1903 by
which boards of education were set up for cities, towns, and school
districts throughout the state. [
Footnote 2] Section 106 empowered these boards to make
rules and regulations governing engagement and employment of
teachers and principals, terms and tenure of such employment,
promotion, and dismissal, salaries and their time and mode of
payment, and to change and repeal such rules and regulations from
time to time. [
Footnote 3] This
general school law was amended by the Act of April 21, 1909,
[
Footnote 4] § 1 of which
provides (4 N.J.Comp.St.1910, p. 4763, § 106a):
"The service of all teachers, principals, supervising principals
of the public schools in any school district of this state shall be
during good behavior and efficiency, after the expiration of a
period of employment of three consecutive years in that district,
unless a shorter period is fixed by the employing board. . . . No
principal or
Page 300 U. S. 321
teacher shall be dismissed or subjected to reduction of salary
in said school district except for inefficiency, incapacity,
conduct unbecoming a teacher or other just cause, and after a
written charge of the cause or causes shall have been preferred
against him or her, . . . and after the charge shall have been
examined into and found true in fact by said board of education,
upon reasonable notice to the person charged, who may be
represented by counsel at the hearing."
An Act of February 4, 1933, [
Footnote 5] premising that existing economic conditions
require that boards of education be enabled to fix and determine
the amount of salary to be paid to persons holding positions in the
respective school districts, authorizes each board to fix and
determine salaries to be paid officers and employees for the period
July 1, 1933, to July 1, 1934, "notwithstanding any such person be
under tenure;" prohibits increase of salaries within the period
named; forbids discrimination between individuals in the same class
of service in the fixing of salaries or compensation, and sets a
minimum beyond which boards may not go in the reduction of
salaries. June 23, 1933, the board adopted a resolution reducing
salaries for the school year July 1, 1933, to July 1, 1934, by a
percentage of the existing salaries graded upward in steps as the
salaries increased in amount, except with respect to clerks, the
compensation of each of whom was reduced to a named amount.
Appellants, who were principals, teachers, and clerks employed
by the appellee, petitioned the Department of Public Instruction,
in accordance with the school law, praying that the action of the
board be set aside. The Commissioner of Education dismissed the
petition and, upon appeal from his action, the State Board of
Education affirmed the decision. The appellants applied for
certiorari from the Supreme Court, assigning, among other
Page 300 U. S. 322
reasons, that the decision violated Art. I, § 10, and
§ 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, of the Federal Constitution.
The writs [
Footnote 6] issued,
and, after hearing, the court affirmed the action of the
administrative tribunal. [
Footnote
7] The Court of Errors and Appeals affirmed the judgment upon
the opinion of the Supreme Court. [
Footnote 8]
The position of the appellants is that, by virtue of the Act of
1909, three years of service under contract confer upon an employee
of a school district a contractual status indefinite in duration
which the legislature is powerless to alter or to authorize the
board of education to alter. The Supreme Court holds that the Act
of 1909
"established a legislative status for teachers, but we fail to
see that it established a contractual one that the Legislature may
not modify. . . . The status of tenure teachers, while in one sense
perhaps contractual, is, in essence, dependent on a statute, like
that of the incumbent of a statutory office, which the Legislature
at will may abolish, or whose emoluments it may change."
This Court is not bound by the decision of a state court as to
the existence and terms of a contract, the obligation of which is
asserted to be impaired, but, where a statute is claimed to create
a contractual right, we give weight to the construction of the
statute by the courts of the state. [
Footnote 9] Here, those courts have concurred in holding
that the act of 1909 did not amount to a legislative contract
Page 300 U. S. 323
with the teachers of the state, and did not become a term of the
contracts entered into with employees by boards of education.
Unless these views are palpably erroneous, we should accept
them.
It appears from a stipulation of facts submitted in lieu of
evidence that, after a teacher has served in a school district
under yearly contracts for three years, it has not been customary
to enter into further formal contracts with such teacher. From time
to time, however, promotions were granted and salary raised for the
ensuing year by action of the board. In the case of many of the
appellants, there have been several such increases in salary.
Although, after the expiration of the first three years of
service, the employee continued in his then position and at his
then compensation unless and until promoted or given an increase in
salary for a succeeding year, we find nothing in the record to
indicate that the board was bound by contract with the teacher for
more than the current year. The employee assumed no binding
obligation to remain in service beyond that term. Although the act
of 1909 prohibited the board, a creature of the state, from
reducing the teacher's salary or discharging him without cause, we
agree with the courts below that this was but a regulation of the
conduct of the board, and not a term of a continuing contract of
indefinite duration with the individual teacher.
The resolution of June 23, 1933, grouped the existing salaries
paid by the board into six classes, the lowest of which comprised
salaries between $1,200 and $1,999, and the highest included
salaries ranging between $4,000 and $5,600. The reduction in the
lowest class for the coming year was 10 percent, that in the
highest class 15 percent. Salaries in the intermediate classes were
reduced 11,
Page 300 U. S. 324
12, 13, and 14 percent. It resulted that, in some instances, a
teacher receiving the lowest salary in a given bracket would have
his compensation reduced to a figure lower than the reduced
compensation of one receiving the highest salary in the next lower
bracket. From this circumstance, it is argued that the board's
action arbitrarily discriminated between the employees, and so
denied them the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
We think it was reasonable and proper that the teachers employed
by the board should be divided into classes for the application of
the percentage reduction. All in a given class were treated alike.
Incidental individual inequality resulting in some instances from
the operation of the plan does not condemn it as an unreasonable or
arbitrary method of dealing with the problem of general salary
reductions, or deny the equality guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Judgments affirmed.
* Together with No. 455,
Askam et al. v. Board of Education
of West New York et al. Appeal from the Court of Errors and
Appeals of New Jersey.
[
Footnote 1]
Art. IV, § 7, par. 6, 1 N.J.Comp.St.1910, p. lxxv.
[
Footnote 2]
Act of Oct.19, 1903, Laws of N.J.1904, 5; 4 N.J.Comp.St. 4724
.
[
Footnote 3]
4 N.J.Comp.St.1910 4762.
[
Footnote 4]
Chap. 243, N.J.Laws 1909, Pamph. L. p. 398, 4 N.J.Comp.St. 4763,
4764.
[
Footnote 5]
Chap. 12, N.J.Laws 1933, Pamph. L. p. 24.
[
Footnote 6]
Two writs were issued. The only difference between the two
cases, which were heard as one, is that, in the
Phelps
case, the employee refused to accept the reduced salary. In the
case of
Askam, et al., the employees took the reduced
salary under protest.
[
Footnote 7]
115 N.J.Law, 310, 180 A. 220.
[
Footnote 8]
116 N.J.Law, 412, 185 A. 8; 116 N.J.Law, 416, 184 A. 737.
[
Footnote 9]
Freeport Water Co. v. Freeport, 180 U.
S. 587,
180 U. S. 595;
Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Tampa, 199 U.
S. 241,
199 U. S. 243;
Milwaukee Elec. R. & L. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,
238 U. S. 174,
238 U. S. 184;
Seton Hall College v. South Orange, 242 U.
S. 100,
242 U. S. 103;
Coombes v. Getz, 285 U. S. 434,
285 U. S.
441.