1. In an accounting to a patent owner by an infringer who acted
in good faith, factory losses incurred by the infringer as a
necessary or normal incident to the completion of sales effected at
a gain are deducted from the profits. P.
298 U. S.
452.
2. In reckoning the profits made by the infringers in this case
from sales of patented shatter-proof glass, allowance was properly
made for the cost of labor and material wasted without fault in the
manufacturing process, but no allowance should have been made for
the cost of labor and material that entered into the manufacture of
glass that was returned by customers for defects discovered after
sale.
Crosby Valve Co. v. Safety Valve Co., 141 U.
S. 441, considered. Pp.
298 U. S. 453,
298 U. S.
455.
3. In such an accounting, fabricated materials sold by one
infringer to another and used by the other in completing the
infringing product should be set down at cost of manufacture. So
held where the contributing infringer could not have sold
the materials in his business, and allowance of a higher value
would have meant a profit to him from his own wrongdoing. P.
298 U. S.
456.
4. In such an accounting, an infringer cannot have compensation,
in the nature of royalties, for savings effected by use of his own
patented devices in manufacturing the infringing product. P.
298 U. S.
457.
Page 298 U. S. 449
5. Where some sales of a patented product by an infringer result
in profit and others in loss, the patent owner is entitled to the
profit undiminished by the loss. Pp.
298 U. S. 452,
298 U. S.
458.
6. Upon such an accounting, where it is impracticable to
ascertain the specific costs of operation attributable to sales
made by the infringers at known prices, average cost is to be
compare with the specific prices, not the average cost with average
prices. P.
298 U. S.
458.
7. Where damages for infringements of patent are awarded upon
the reasonable royalty basis, interest, as a general rule, should
run from the date when the damages are liquidated, rather than the
date of the last infringement. P.
298 U. S.
458.
81 F.2d 352
aff'd with modifications.
Certiorari, 297 U.S. 702, to review two decrees entered by the
Circuit Court of Appeals on cross-appeals taken from a decree of
the District Court upon an accounting following an injunction
against infringements of the respondent's patent. The opinions of
both courts on the question of infringement are reported in 42
F.2d, pp. 737 and 739. For the opinion of the District Court on the
issue of the accounting,
see 10 F. Supp. 420.
MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO delivered the opinion of the court.
The subject of this controversy is the measure of petitioners'
liability for damages and profits under a decree for an accounting
by infringers of a patent.
Respondent, complainant below, is the owner of a patent, No.
1,182,739, for the making of laminated glass, which will crack, but
not shatter. The product is better known as "safety" or
"shatterproof" glass, and is
Page 298 U. S. 450
used very largely in the making of automobiles. In the process
of manufacture, a sheet of pyralin or celluloid is sandwiched
between two thin sheets of plate glass, each one-eighth of an inch
thick, the pyralin being cemented to the opposite glass sheets by a
film of gelatin. The heat and pressure necessary to induce adhesion
are applied to the "sandwiches" in a receptacle known as an
autoclave, a steel boiler of large size. At the end of the process,
the glass and the pyralin are firmly joined together with the
appearance of a single sheet. For users of motorcars, the risk of
injury from flying glass is greatly reduced, if not removed
altogether.
Complainant had a decree against the Duplate Corporation, one of
the petitioners here, for an infringement of this patent. 42 F.2d
737; 42 F.2d 739. Later, a supplemental decree was entered against
the other petitioner, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, the owner of
50 percent of the stock of Duplate. Pittsburgh was a contributory
infringer, supplying Duplate, its subsidiary, with the glass, which
was then wrought into the finished product. An accounting followed
before a master. The defendants satisfied the master that they were
not conscious or deliberate infringers. The finding by the master
in that regard was approved by the District Court and later by the
Court of Appeals. It will be accepted as a datum here. The account
is to be stated on the assumption that the defendants, though
infringers, have acted in good faith.
Cf. R.S.
§§ 4919, 4921; 35 U.S.C. §§ 67, 70;
Larson,
Co. v. Wrigley Co., 277 U. S. 97.
The controversy as to the measure of liability divides itself
into two branches, one concerned with the defendants' profits, the
other with the complainant's damages. In reckoning the profits, the
master made allowance to the defendants for the cost of labor and
material wasted without fault in the manufacturing process.
This
Page 298 U. S. 451
amounted to $1,192,264.32 ($435,207.52 for loss of glass;
$219,036.93 for loss of pyralin; $538,019.87 for loss of labor and
material other than glass or pyralin). The master made allowance
also for the cost of labor and material that entered into
merchandise returned by the defendants' customers for defects
afterwards discovered. This amounted to $504,137.45. He refused to
make allowance for more than the manufacturing cost of the material
bought by one defendant from the other, but did allow the saving
effected by the use of patented devices. He found himself unable to
ascertain the specific costs of operation to be attributed to sales
that had been made at known prices, and refused, in stating the
account, to compare specific prices with average costs of
operation, and fix the liability accordingly. Instead, he treated
the business as one continuous infringement, a unitary transaction,
comparing average costs with average prices. Through this method of
computation, he arrived at the conclusion that, during the period
covered by the accounting, the defendants had operated at a net
loss of $276,857.47 in the sale of the infringing product. That
being so, there was nothing owing on the score of profits.
"In patent nomenclature, what the infringer makes is
profits;' what the owner of the patent loses by such
infringement is `damages.'" Diamond Stone-Sawing Machine Co. v.
Brown, 166 F. 306. The master found the evidence insufficient
to show the extent of the sales that the complaint could have made
if the defendants had not infringed, or what the sales would have
netted even if they had been made. He did find, however, that the
effect of the infringement had been to drive the complainant out of
business, and that a few sales which had been made were at greatly
reduced prices, with a loss of $2,807.89 as a result of the
enforced reduction. The diverted sales, if any, and their value
being not susceptible of proof, the master held that general
damages should be
Page 298 U. S. 452
awarded on the basis of a reasonable royalty to be paid by the
defendants upon their sales of the infringing product, whether
gainful or the opposite.
Cf. McKee Glass Co. v. H. C. Fry Glass
Co., 248 F. 125, 129. This royalty was ascertained to be
$414,120.70. Nothing was said by the master as to an award of
interest.
The District Court modified the report by striking out the item
of damages by reason of price reductions ($2,807.89), and confirmed
it as thus modified, adding, however, interest on $414,120.70, the
award of general damages from the date of the last infringement
(May 31, 1930). 10 F. Supp. 420. There were cross-appeals to the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. On the appeal by
the defendants, the decree was affirmed. On the appeal by the
complainant, there were far-reaching modifications. All allowances
for factory losses and for customer's returns were rejected. These
amounted altogether to $1,696,401.77. There was also a rejection of
the savings effected by the use of patents. They had been fixed by
the master at $1,108,692.73. The method of stating the account was
recast by directing a comparison between average costs and specific
prices instead of average costs and average prices. The cause was
remanded with instructions to restate the account in conformity
with the principles laid down in the opinion. 81 F.2d 352. To
settle important questions as to the liability of infringers, writs
of certiorari were granted by this Court.
1.
Factory losses incurred as a necessary or normal incident
to the completion of sales effected at a gain.
A sale resulting in a loss may not be offset by an infringer
against another and independent sale resulting in a gain for the
purpose of extinguishing or reducing a liability for profits.
Crosby Steam Gage & Valve Co. v. Consolidated Safety Valve
Co., 141 U. S. 441,
141 U. S. 457.
On the other hand, the extent of the gain resulting from a sale is
not susceptible of ascertainment
Page 298 U. S. 453
without the deduction and allowance of the incidental costs.
MacBeth Evans Glass Co. v. L. E. Smith Glass Co., 21 F.2d
553, 555;
Canda Bros. v. Michigan Malleable Iron Co., 152
F. 178, 180;
Levin Bros. v. Davis Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 163,
165, 166;
Stromberg Motor Devices Co. v. Detroit Trust
Co., 44 F.2d 958, 963, 964. To make the product of a factory
ready for the market labor and material must be consumed by the
seller-manufacturer. The cost of such consumption does not cease to
be a charge against the proceeds because, viewed in isolation, it
may be classified as waste. If the waste is unavoidable or even
fairly to be expected in the normal course of such a business,
there is a diminution of the profit for an infringer, as for
others.
Cf. 76 U. S. v.
Goodyear, 9 Wall. 788,
76 U. S.
804.
"Losses occurring concurrently with the gaining of profits
should be taken into account if they resulted from the particular
transaction on which the profits are allowed."
MacBeth Evans Glass Co. v. L. E. Smith Glass Co., supra;
Canda Bros. v. Michigan Malleable Iron Co., supra. They are
the charges that must be known before profits can be estimated.
Adherence to that principle sustains the ruling of the master
that, in measuring the gain from particular transactions, the
defendants should have allowance for the expense of incidental
wastage, unless the wastage is so great as to overpass the bounds
of reason.
Cf. Continuous Glass Press Co. v. Schmertz Wire
Glass Co., 219 F. 199, 203. No such excess may be imputed to
the manufacturing defendant, as is evident from the testimony and
the findings of the master. The causes of waste are many.
Inevitably, a certain amount of glass is lost in the cutting. Grit
and dust clinging to the pyralin even in minute particles produce
defects destructive of the product as a merchantable commodity. A
like result will follow from the intrusion of a hair. To make the
situation worse, a sheet of pyralin is charged with static
electricity which
Page 298 U. S. 454
acts as an attractive force to bring loose particles together.
There is also chipping of the glass, as well as other damage in the
course of transportation from one department to another. Even more
destructive is the damage to the sheets under pressure in the
autoclave, the crimping of the edges opening a channel into which
water tends to seep. Most of this wastage is unavoidable, though
extraordinary precautions have been taken to overcome it. To some
extent, however, the loss has been diminished by improved methods
of manufacture, unknown to the business in its infancy but
progressively developed as the outcome of experience. Thus, to
purify the atmosphere and dispel dust or other particles, a
separate room has been built supplied with filtered air.
Experiments carefully made have been followed by improvements that
reduce the risk of damage when the sheets are under pressure. At
all times, the business has been conducted with a high degree of
care. Even when glass has been chipped or broken in being moved
from place to place, there is no evidence that appropriate
precautions were omitted to make the loss as small as possible.
Some percentage of breakage is a normal, indeed a necessary,
incident to the handling by human instruments of so fragile a
commodity. The situation is tersely summarized in the findings of
the master.
"The Master is satisfied from the evidence that a considerable
amount of the finished product had to be turned out only to be
rejected or returned in order that a certain volume of perfect
specimens might be sold. It was also established by the evidence
that even the Ford Motor Company, in making laminated glass under
its agreement with the plaintiff, was required to produce five
million windshields in order to obtain four million good ones --
and it appears as self-evident to the Master that, in the case of
Ford, as in the case at bar, the cost of producing the good ones
necessarily included the cost of producing the million had ones,
but for which the good ones could not have been produced. "
Page 298 U. S. 455
In the light of these findings and others to the same effect,
the distinction becomes evident between the situation in this case
and that in the case of the Crosby valves.
Crosby Steam Gage
& Valve Co. v. Consolidated Safety Valve Co., 141 U.
S. 441,
141 U. S. 454,
141 U. S. 457.
Metal valves had been manufactured as the result of a process of
experiment (
ibid., p.
141 U. S.
454), and had been destroyed when returned or when found
to be defective.
"The defendants were not charged on valves which were
subsequently destroyed, or, if so, they were not charged upon the
new valves which replaced them."
Id., p.
141 U. S. 457.
They asked, however, for something more. They contended that the
valves so destroyed "ought to form a credit against the profits
actually realized . . . on other valves." This contention was
rejected. The valves discarded or returned were experimental only,
as the opinion of the court informs us.
Ibid., p.
141 U. S. 454.
Cf. Union Electric Welding Co. v. Curry, 279 F. 465, 467;
Page Machine Co. v. Dow, Jones & Co., 238 F. 369, 374.
The record does not indicate that the defects were necessary or
normal incidents to producing the infringing article. Credit will
be allowed for the cost of abortive effort when cost has been
incurred as an unavoidable or reasonable preliminary to the
particular transaction on which profits are recovered.
MacBeth
Evans Glass Co. v. L. E. Smith Glass Co., supra. Credit will
be refused when this nexus is not established. We have no thought
to impugn the correctness of the decision in the case of the
defective valves, either as applied to its own facts or in cognate
situations. We are unwilling to extend it to the costs in
controversy here.
The ruling of the master as to the i ems here considered is
accordingly approved.
2.
The allowance of the cost of glass sold by Duplate to its
customers, and returned by the customers for defects afterwards
discovered.
These sales were mere futilities. They did not yield a profit
for which the sellers have been charged. They
Page 298 U. S. 456
were not preliminary to other sales refilling the same orders.
At least there is nothing in the record to imprint that quality
upon them. They have no place in the account at all. By the ruling
of the master, the cost of these futilities was allowed to the
infringers. This, we think, was error. The infringers, being
relieved of any charge by reason of such transactions, are not
entitled to a credit. The case of the
Crosby Steam Gage &
Valve Co. v. Consolidated Safety Valve Co., 141 U.
S. 441,
141 U. S. 457,
gives the applicable rule. The very equities that exact the
allowance of a credit where costs are but a means to realizing a
profit, exact a different conclusion where profit is
impossible.
3.
The measure of the allowance for glass fabricated by one
infringer and furnished to the other.
Duplate bought its glass in sheets one-eighth of an inch thick
from its contributory infringer, Pittsburgh. In the computation of
the profits, allowance has been made for the material so furnished
on the basis of manufacturing cost. The defendants now insist that
the basis should be market value. The acceptance of such a measure
would enable the infringers to profit by their wrong. There was no
use in the automobile industry for glass so thin as this except in
connection with the process described in the complainant's patent.
Cf. Cuplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 42 F.2d
739, 741. If there had been no infringing business, the large
amount of glass that went into the infringing product would never
have been sold at all. True, glass of that thickness was used in
other industries, in train windows and toilet mirrors. The master
finds, however, that Pittsburgh had been able, while supplying
glass to Duplate, to respond to all demands that came from other
users, the railroads, and the glaziers. If, as part of this
accounting, it is given credit for the glass at a price above the
cost, it will thereby have enlarged its market to an equivalent
extent and reaped a profit as infringer. Equity forbids that this
result should be attained. We
Page 298 U. S. 457
are referred by the defendants to
Barber Asphalt Paving Co.
v. Standard Asphalt & Rubber Co., 30 F.2d 281, 284, as
well as other cases. They were well decided on their facts, or so
we now assume. The facts do not suggest the inference that the
effect of the infringement was to open up a market that would
otherwise have been lost.
4.
The allowance of the saving effected by the use of
patented devices.
Pittsburgh was the owner of twenty-six patents which it used for
its own benefit in the making of its glass. The claim is made that,
if the glass is not to be taken on the basis of market value, there
must at least be an allowance of a reasonable royalty as
compensation for the economics effected through the patented
devices. But this is to misconceive utterly the position of an
infringer accounting for illicit profits.
"An infringer cannot be heard to say that his superior skill or
intelligence enabled him to realize profits by his infringement
which a person of less skill might not have realized."
Lawther v. Hamilton, 64 F. 221, 224.
Cf.
Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Electric & Mfg.
Co., 225 U. S. 604,
225 U. S. 614;
Carborundum Co. v. Electric Smelting & Aluminum Co.,
203 F. 976, 982;
Conroy v. Penn Electrical & Mfg. Co.,
199 F. 427, 430;
Armstrong v. Belding Bros. & Co., 297
F. 728, 732. He will be heard with no more patience in an endeavor
to diminish liability by ascribing his profits to the capacity
indwelling in a patent. Whatever is at his call in the service of
the enterprise -- brawn and intelligence, factories and lands,
patents and machinery -- will be viewed upon an accounting as if
held upon a
quasi trust to contribute what it can to the
profits of the business. The wrongdoer must yield the gains
begotten of his wrong.
5.
The method to be employed in stating an account.
Sales of the infringing product were not made at a level price.
At times, the price was high; at others, it was low.
Page 298 U. S. 458
The owner of the patent, in holding the infringers to an
accounting, is not confined to all or nothing. There may be an
acceptance of transactions resulting in a gain with a rejection of
transactions resulting in a loss. Upon a statement of an account, a
patentee is not looked upon as a "
quasi-partner of the
infringers," under a duty to contribute to the cost of the
infringing business as a whole.
McKee Glass Co. v. H. C. Fry
Glass Co., 248 F. 125, 128. He is the victim of a tort, free
at his own election to adopt what will help and discard what will
harm.
Crosby Steam Gage & Valve Co. v. Consolidated Safety
Valve Co., supra; Permutit Co. v. Refinite Co., 27 F.2d 695,
698;
Starr Piano Co. v. Auto Pneumatic Action Co., 12 F.2d
586, 589;
Canda Bros. v. Michigan Malleable Iron Co., supra;
cf. 44 U. S.
Piatt, 3 How. 333,
44 U. S. 401;
Buffum v. Peter Barceloux Co., 289 U.
S. 227,
289 U. S. 236;
King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76, 91.
The privilege of election is not contested by the defendants if
costs as well as prices can be ascertained with precision. They
take the ground, however, that if such precision is unattainable,
the privilege must fail. But the master has found, and the parties
are agreed, that in a business of this order, there is no method of
accounting, not impracticably burdensome, whereby the costs of
operation can be apportioned and distributed except upon an average
basis. At all events, if such a method was available, the
defendants did not use it. They kept their books upon the basis of
the method they decry, and measured loss or gain accordingly.
Average cost, even if not identical with actual cost, is the best
approximation known to accountants.
Cf. Norfolk & Western
Ry. Co. v. North Carolina, 297 U. S. 682. The
defendants will not be suffered to charge the complainant with the
losses of unprofitable transactions because the gains of the
profitable ones cannot be reckoned to a nicety. The wrongdoer bears
the burden in cases of confusion.
Westinghouse Electric &
Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Electric & Mfg. Co., supra, at pp.
225 U. S.
618-620.
Page 298 U. S. 459
6.
Damages, interest and an inspection of the
books.
The master advised an award of damages measured by a reasonable
royalty on the amount of the defendants' sales. R.S. § 4921;
35 U.S.C. § 70. This was done on the assumption that the
complainant had been unable to make proof of actual damages by
reason of diverted sales, and that the defendants were not
accountable for profits for the reason that the business had been
conducted at a loss. Much of the discussion of this subject in the
briefs and at the bar may be discovered to be moot when the account
has been restated in accordance with the principles laid down in
this opinion.
If, however, an award of damages upon the basis of a reasonable
royalty becomes appropriate again, we think that interest should
run from the date when the damages are liquidated, and not, as by
the present decree, from the date of the last infringement.
Crosby Steam Gage & Valve Co. v. Consolidated Safety Valve
Co., supra, at pp.
141 U. S.
457-458;
Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.
S. 136,
125 U. S.
160-161;
Mowry v.
Whitney, 14 Wall. 620,
81 U. S. 653. There
are no exceptional circumstances justifying a departure from what
is at least the general rule.
A word is needed in conclusion as to the asserted right of the
defendants to examine the complainant's books. The defendants
insist that, with the aid of an inspection, they can show that
actual damages were suffered by reason of diverted sales, and
damages so substantial as to forbid the award of a reasonable
royalty, a substituted method of assessment to be used if other
standards fail. It is not easy to see how the diversion of
business, a negative condition, will be made apparent by the books.
As we interpret the record, the defendants did not so contend when
they asked for an inspection at the hearing before the master.
Their position then was that "the damage to the plaintiff arising
out of its alleged loss of sales was inconsiderable in amount." If,
however, it shall appear upon the restatement of the account that,
in
Page 298 U. S. 460
the belief of the defendants, reasonably entertained, an
inspection of the books is still material and necessary, the
propriety of such a remedy may be reconsidered by the master and
the court in the light of the entire situation developed at that
time.
The decree should be modified in accordance with this opinion,
and, as modified, affirmed.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case.