U.S. Supreme Court
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)
Humphrey's Executor v. United States*
No. 667
Argued 1, 1935
Decided May 27, 1935
295
U.S. 602
CERTIFICATE FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS
Syllabus
1. The Federal Trade Commission Act fixes the terms of the
Commissioners and provides that any Commissioner may be removed by
the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office.
Held that Congress intended to restrict the power
of removal to one or more of those causes.
Shurtleff v. United
States, 189 U. S. 311,
distinguished. Pp.
295 U. S. 621,
295 U. S.
626.
2. This construction of the Act is confirmed by a consideration
of the character of the Commission -- an independent, nonpartisan
body of experts, charged with duties neither political nor
executive, but predominantly
quasi-judicial and
quasi-legislative, and by the legislative history of the
Act. P.
295 U. S.
624.
3. When Congress provides for the appointment of officers whose
functions, like those of the Federal Trade Commissioners, are of
Legislative and judicial quality, rather than executive, and limits
the grounds upon which they may be removed from office, the
President has no constitutional power to remove them for reasons
other than those so specified.
Myers v. United States,
272 U. S. 52,
limited, and expressions in that opinion in part disapproved. Pp.
295 U. S. 626,
295 U. S.
627.
Page 295 U. S. 603
The
Myers case dealt with the removal of a postmaster,
an executive officer restricted to executive functions and charged
with no duty at all related to either the legislative or the
judicial power. The actual decision in the
Myers case
finds support in the theory that such an officer is merely one of
the units in the executive department, and, hence, inherently
subject to the exclusive and illimitable power of removal by the
Chief Executive, whose subordinate he is. That decision goes no
farther than to include purely executive officers. The Federal
Trade Commission, in contrast, is an administrative body created by
Congress to carry into effect legislative policies embodied in the
statute in accordance with the legislative standard therein
prescribed, and to perform other specified duties as a legislative
or as a judicial aid. Such a body cannot in any proper sense be
characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive. Its duties are
performed without executive leave, and, in the contemplation of the
statute, must be free from executive control. To the extent that it
exercises any executive function -- as distinguished from executive
power in the constitutional sense -- it does so in the discharge
and effectuation of its
quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial powers, or as an agency of the legislative
or judicial departments of the Government. Pp.
295 U. S.
627-628.
4. The authority of Congress, in creating
quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial agencies, to
require them to act in discharge of their duties independently of
executive control cannot well be doubted, and that authority
includes, as an appropriate incident, power to fix the period
during which they shall continue in office, and to forbid their
removal except for cause in the meantime. P.
295 U.S. 629.
5. The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three
general departments of government entirely free from the control or
coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others has
often been stressed, and is hardly open to serious question. So
much is implied in the very fact of the separation of the powers of
these departments by the Constitution, and in the rule which
recognizes their essential coequality. P.
295 U.S. 629.
6. Whether the power of the President to remove an officer shall
prevail over the authority of Congress to condition the power by
fixing a definite term and precluding a removal except for cause
will depend upon the character of the office. To the extent that,
between the decision in the
Myers case, which sustains the
unrestrictable power of the President to remove purely executive
officers, and the present decision that such power does not extend
to an office
Page 295 U. S. 604
such as that here involved there shall remain a field of doubt,
such cases as may fall within it are left for future consideration
and determination as they may arise. P.
295 U. S.
631.
7. While the general rule preclude the use of congressional
debates to explain the meaning of the words of a statute, they may
be considered as reflecting light upon its general purposes and the
evils which it sought to remedy. P.
295 U. S.
625.
8. Expressions in an opinion which are beyond the point involved
do not come within the rule of
stare decisis. P.
295 U. S.
626.
CERTIFICATE from the Court of Claims, propounding questions
arising on a claim for the salary withheld from the plaintiff's
testator, from the time when the President undertook to remove him
from office to the time of his death.
Page 295 U. S. 618
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiff brought suit in the Court of Claims against the United
States to recover a sum of money alleged to be due the deceased for
salary as a Federal Trade Commissioner from October 8, 1933, when
the President undertook to remove him from office, to the time of
his death on February 14, 1934. The court below has certified to
this court two questions (Act of February 13, 1925, §
3(a), c. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 939; 28 U.S.C. § 288) in
respect of the power of the President to make the removal. The
material facts which give rise to the questions are as follows:
William E. Humphrey, the decedent, on December 10, 1931, was
nominated by President Hoover to succeed himself as a member of the
Federal Trade Commission, and was confirmed by the United States
Senate. He was duly commissioned for a term of seven years expiring
September 25, 1938; and, after taking the required oath of office,
entered upon his duties. On July 25, 1933, President Roosevelt
addressed a letter to the commissioner asking for his resignation,
on the ground
"that the aims and purposes of the Administration with respect
to the work of the Commission can be carried out most effectively
with personnel of my own selection,"
but disclaiming any reflection upon the commissioner personally
or upon his services. The commissioner replied, asking time to
consult
Page 295 U. S. 619
his friends. After some further correspondence upon the subject,
the President, on August 31, 1933, wrote the commissioner
expressing the hope that the resignation would be forthcoming, and
saying:
"You will, I know, realize that I do not feel that your mind and
my mind go along together on either the policies or the
administering of the Federal Trade Commission, and, frankly, I
think it is best for the people of this country that I should have
a full confidence."
The commissioner declined to resign, and on October 7, 1933, the
President wrote him:
"Effective as of this date, you are hereby removed from the
office of Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission."
Humphrey never acquiesced in this action, but continued
thereafter to insist that he was still a member of the commission,
entitled to perform its duties and receive the compensation
provided by law at the rate of $10,000 per annum. Upon these and
other facts set forth in the certificate, which we deem it
unnecessary to recite, the following questions are certified:
"1. Do the provisions of section 1 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, stating that 'any commissioner may be removed by
the President for inefficiency, neglect of duly, or malfeasance in
office,' restrict or limit the power of the President to remove a
commissioner except upon one or more of the causes named?"
"If the foregoing question is answered in the affirmative, then
-- "
"2. If the power of the President to remove a commissioner is
restricted or limited as shown by the foregoing interrogatory and
the answer made thereto, is such a restriction or limitation valid
under the Constitution of the United States?"
The Federal Trade Commission Act, c. 311, 38 Stat. 717; 15
U.S.C. §§ 41, 42, creates a commission of
five
Page 295 U. S. 620
members to be appointed by the President by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, and § 1 provides:
"Not more than three of the commissioners shall be members of
the same political party. The first commissioners appointed shall
continue in office for terms of three, four, five, six, and seven
years, respectively, from the date of the taking effect of this
Act, the term of each to be designated by the President, but their
successors shall be appointed for terms of seven years, except that
any person chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only for the
unexpired term of the commissioner whom he shall succeed. The
commission shall choose a chairman from its own membership. No
commissioner shall engage in any other business, vocation, or
employment. Any commissioner may be removed by the President for
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. . . ."
Section 5 of the act in part provides:
"That unfair methods of competition in commerce are hereby
declared unlawful."
"The commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent
persons, partnerships, or corporations, except banks, and common
carriers subject to the Acts to regulate commerce, from using
unfair methods of competition in commerce."
In exercising this power, the commission must issue a complaint
stating its charges and giving notice of hearing upon a day to be
fixed. A person, partnership, or corporation proceeded against is
given the right to appear at the time and place fixed and show
cause why an order to cease and desist should not be issued. There
is provision for intervention by others interested. If the
commission finds the method of competition is one prohibited by the
act, it is directed to make a report in writing stating its
findings as to the facts, and to issue and cause to be served a
cease and desist order. If the order is disobeyed, the commission
may apply to the appropriate circuit court of
Page 295 U. S. 621
appeals for its enforcement. The party subject to the order may
seek and obtain a review in the circuit court of appeals in a
manner provided by the act.
Section 6, among other things, gives the commission wide powers
of investigation in respect of certain corporations subject to the
act and in respect of other matters, upon which it must report to
Congress with recommendations. Many such investigations have been
made, and some have served as the basis of congressional
legislation.
Section 7 provides:
"That in any suit in equity brought by or under the direction of
the Attorney General as provided in the antitrust Acts, the court
may, upon the conclusion of the testimony therein, if it shall be
then of opinion that the complainant is entitled to relief, refer
said suit to the commission, as a master in chancery, to ascertain
and report an appropriate form of decree therein. The commission
shall proceed upon such notice to the parties and under such rules
of procedure as the court may prescribe, and upon the coming in of
such report such exceptions may be filed and such proceedings had
in relation thereto as upon the report of a master in other equity
causes, but the court may adopt or reject such report, in whole or
in part, and enter such decree as the nature of the case may in its
judgment require."
First. The question first to be considered is whether,
by the provisions of § 1 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, already quoted, the President's power is limited to
removal for the specific causes enumerated therein. The negative
contention of the government is based principally upon the decision
of this court in
Shrutleff v. United States, 189 U.
S. 311. That case involved the power of the President to
remove a general appraiser of merchandise appointed under the Act
of June 10, 1890, 26 Stat. 131. Section 12 of the act provided for
the appointment by the President, by and with the advice and
consent
Page 295 U. S. 622
of the Senate, of nine general appraisers of merchandise, who
"may be removed from office at any time by the President for
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." The
President removed Shurtleff without assigning any cause therefor.
The Court of Claims dismissed plaintiff's petition to recover
salary, upholding the President's power to remove for causes other
than those stated. In this court, Shurtleff relied upon the maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, but this court held
that, while the rule expressed in the maxim was a very proper one,
and founded upon justifiable reasoning in many instances, it
"should not be accorded controlling weight when to do so would
involve the alteration of the universal practice of the government
for over a century and the consequent curtailment of the powers of
the executive in such an unusual manner."
What the court meant by this expression appears from a reading
of the opinion. That opinion -- after saying that no term of office
was fixed by the act and that, with the exception of judicial
officers provided for by the Constitution, no civil officer had
ever held office by life tenure since the foundation of the
government -- points out that to construe the statute as contended
for by Shurtleff would give the appraiser the right to hold office
during his life or until found guilty of some act specified in the
statute, the result of which would be a complete revolution in
respect of the general tenure of office, effected by implication
with regard to that particular office only.
"We think it quite inadmissible," the court said (pp.
189 U. S. 316,
189 U. S.
318),
"to attribute an intention on the part of Congress to make such
an extraordinary change in the usual rule governing the tenure of
office, and one which is to be applied to this particular office
only, without stating such intention in plain and explicit
language, instead of leaving it to be implied from doubtful
inferences. . . . We cannot bring ourselves to the belief that
Congress ever
Page 295 U. S. 623
intended this result while omitting to use language which would
put that intention beyond doubt."
These circumstances, which led the court to reject the maxim as
inapplicable, are exceptional. In the face of the unbroken
precedent against life tenure, except in the case of the judiciary,
the conclusion that Congress intended that, from among all other
civil officers, appraisers alone should be selected to hold office
for life was so extreme as to forbid, in the opinion of the court,
any ruling which would produce that result if it reasonably could
be avoided. The situation here presented is plainly and wholly
different. The statute fixes a term of office, in accordance with
many precedents. The first commissioners appointed are to continue
in office for terms of three, four, five, six, and seven years,
respectively, and their successors are to be appointed for terms of
seven years -- any commissioner being subject to removal by the
President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office. The words of the act are definite and unambiguous.
The government says the phrase "continue in office" is of no
legal significance, and, moreover, applies only to the first
commissioners. We think it has significance. It may be that,
literally, its application is restricted as suggested; but it
nevertheless lends support to a view contrary to that of the
government as to the meaning of the entire requirement in respect
of tenure; for it is not easy to suppose that Congress intended to
secure the first commissioners against removal except for the
causes specified, and deny like security to their successors.
Putting this phrase aside, however, the fixing of a definite term
subject to removal for cause, unless there be some countervailing
provision or circumstance indicating the contrary, which here we
are unable to find, is enough to establish the legislative intent
that the term is not to be curtailed in the absence of such cause.
But if the intention of
Page 295 U. S. 624
Congress that no removal should be made during the specified
term except for one or more of the enumerated causes were not clear
upon the face of the statute, as we think it is, it would be made
clear by a consideration of the character of the commission and the
legislative history which accompanied and preceded the passage of
the act. The commission is to be nonpartisan, and it must, from the
very nature of its duties, act with entire impartiality. It is
charged with the enforcement of no policy except the policy of the
law. Its duties are neither political nor executive, but
predominantly
quasi-judicial and
quasi-legislative. Like the Interstate Commerce
Commission, its members are called upon to exercise the trained
judgment of a body of experts "appointed by law and informed by
experience."
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Comm'n, 206 U. S. 441,
206 U. S. 454;
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.
S. 235,
283 U. S.
238-239. The legislative reports in both houses of
Congress clearly reflect the view that a fixed term was necessary
to the effective and fair administration of the law. In the report
to the Senate (No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 10-11) the Senate
Committee on Interstate Commerce, in support of the bill which
afterwards became the act in question, after referring to the
provision fixing the term of office at seven years, so arranged
that the membership would not be subject to complete change at any
one time, said:
"The work of this commission will be of a most exacting and
difficult character, demanding persons who have experience in the
problems to be met -- that is, a proper knowledge of both the
public requirements and the practical affairs of industry. It is
manifestly desirable that the terms of the commissioners shall be
long enough to give them an opportunity to acquire the expertness
in dealing with these special questions concerning industry that
comes from experience. "
Page 295 U. S. 625
The report declares that one advantage which the commission
possessed over the Bureau of Corporations (an executive subdivision
in the Department of Commerce which was abolished by the act) lay
in the fact of its independence, and that it was essential that the
commission should not be open to the suspicion of partisan
direction. The report quotes (p. 22) a statement to the committee
by Senator Newlands, who reported the bill, that the tribunal
should be of high character and
"independent of any department of the government . . . a board
or commission of dignity, permanence, and ability, independent of
executive authority, except in its selection, and independent in
character."
The debates in both houses demonstrate that the prevailing view
was that the commission was not to be "subject to anybody in the
government, but . . . only to the people of the United States";
free from "political domination or control" or the "probability or
possibility of such a thing"; to be "separate and apart from any
existing department of the government -- not subject to the orders
of the President."
More to the same effect appears in the debates, which were long
and thorough, and contain nothing to the contrary. While the
general rule precludes the use of these debates to explain the
meaning of the words of the statute, they may be considered as
reflecting light upon its general purposes and the evils which it
sought to remedy.
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Co.,
283 U. S. 643,
283 U. S.
650.
Thus, the language of the act, the legislative reports, and the
general purposes of the legislation as reflected by the debates all
combine to demonstrate the Congressional intent to create a body of
experts who shall gain experience by length of service -- a body
which shall be independent of executive authority
except in its
selection, and free to exercise its judgment without the leave
or hindrance
Page 295 U. S. 626
of any other official or any department of the government. To
the accomplishment of these purposes it is clear that Congress was
of opinion that length and certainty of tenure would vitally
contribute. And to hold that, nevertheless, the members of the
commission continue in office at the mere will of the President
might be to thwart, in large measure, the very ends which Congress
sought to realize by definitely fixing the term of office.
We conclude that the intent of the act is to limit the executive
power of removal to the causes enumerated, the existence of none of
which is claimed here, and we pass to the second question.
Second. To support its contention that the removal
provision of § 1, as we have just construed it, is an
unconstitutional interference with the executive power of the
President, the government's chief reliance is
Myers v. United
States, 272 U. S. 52. That
case has been so recently decided, and the prevailing and
dissenting opinions so fully review the general subject of the
power of executive removal, that further discussion would add
little of value to the wealth of material there collected. These
opinions examine at length the historical, legislative and judicial
data bearing upon the question, beginning with what is called "the
decision of 1789" in the first Congress and coming down almost to
the day when the opinions were delivered. They occupy 243 pages of
the volume in which they are printed. Nevertheless, the narrow
point actually decided was only that the President had power to
remove a postmaster of the first class without the advice and
consent of the Senate as required by act of Congress. In the course
of the opinion of the court, expressions occur which tend to
sustain the government's contention, but these are beyond the point
involved, and, therefore do not come within the rule of
stare
decisis. Insofar as they are out of harmony with the views
here set forth, these expressions are disapproved. A like situation
was
Page 295 U. S. 627
presented in the case of
Cohens v.
Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264,
19 U. S. 399,
in respect of certain general expressions in the opinion in
Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137. Chief Justice Marshall, who
delivered the opinion in the
Marbury case, speaking again
for the court in the
Cohens case, said:
"It is a maxim not to be disregarded that general expressions,
in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in
which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they
may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a
subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision. The
reason of this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the
Court is investigated with care, and considered in its full extent.
Other principles which may serve to illustrate it are considered in
their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on
all other cases is seldom completely investigated."
And he added that these general expressions in the case of
Marbury v. Madison were to be understood with the
limitations put upon them by the opinion in the
Cohens
case.
See also Carroll v. Lessee of
Carroll, 16 How. 275,
57 U. S.
286-287;
O'Donoghue v. United States,
289 U. S. 516,
289 U. S.
550.
The office of a postmaster is so essentially unlike the office
now involved that the decision in the
Myers case cannot be
accepted as controlling our decision here. A postmaster is an
executive officer restricted to the performance of executive
functions. He is charged with no duty at all related to either the
legislative or judicial power. The actual decision in the
Myers case finds support in the theory that such an
officer is merely one of the units in the executive department,
and, hence, inherently subject to the exclusive and illimitable
power of removal by the Chief Executive, whose subordinate and aid
he is. Putting aside dicta, which may be followed if sufficiently
persuasive but which are not controlling, the necessary reach of
the decision goes far enough to include
Page 295 U. S. 628
all purely executive officers. It goes no farther; much less
does it include an officer who occupies no place in the executive
department, and who exercises no part of the executive power vested
by the Constitution in the President.
The Federal Trade Commission is an administrative body created
by Congress to carry into effect legislative policies embodied in
the statute in accordance with the legislative standard therein
prescribed, and to perform other specified duties as a legislative
or as a judicial aid. Such a body cannot in any proper sense be
characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive. Its duties are
performed without executive leave, and, in the contemplation of the
statute, must be free from executive control. In administering the
provisions of the statute in respect of "unfair methods of
competition" -- that is to say, in filling in and administering the
details embodied by that general standard -- the commission acts in
part
quasi-legislatively and in part
quasi-judicially. In making investigations and reports
thereon for the information of Congress under 6, in aid of the
legislative power, it acts as a legislative agency. Under
§ 7, which authorizes the commission to act as a master
in chancery under rules prescribed by the court, it acts as an
agency of the judiciary. To the extent that it exercises any
executive function -- as distinguished from executive power in the
constitutional sense -- it does so in the discharge and
effectuation of its
quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial powers, or as an agency of the legislative
or judicial departments of the government.*
Page 295 U. S. 629
If Congress is without authority to prescribe causes for removal
of members of the trade commission and limit executive power of
removal accordingly, that power at once becomes practically
all-inclusive in respect of civil officers with the exception of
the judiciary provided for by the Constitution. The Solicitor
General, at the bar, apparently recognizing this to be true, with
commendable candor, agreed that his view in respect of the
removability of members of the Federal Trade Commission
necessitated a like view in respect of the Interstate Commerce
Commission and the Court of Claims. We are thus confronted with the
serious question whether not only the members of these
quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial bodies, but
the judges of the legislative Court of Claims, exercising judicial
power (
Williams v. United States, 289 U.
S. 553,
289 U. S.
565-567), continue in office only at the pleasure of the
President.
We think it plain under the Constitution that illimitable power
of removal is not possessed by the President in respect of officers
of the character of those just named. The authority of Congress, in
creating
quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial
agencies, to require them to act in discharge of their duties
independently of executive control cannot well be doubted, and that
authority includes, as an appropriate incident, power to fix the
period during which they shall continue in office, and to forbid
their removal except for cause in the meantime. For it is quite
evident that one who holds his office only during the pleasure of
another cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of
independence against the latter's will.
The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three
general departments of government entirely free from the control or
coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others has
often been stressed, and is hardly open to serious question. So
much is implied in
Page 295 U. S. 630
the very fact of the separation of the powers of these
departments by the Constitution, and in the rule which recognizes
their essential coequality. The sound application of a principle
that makes one master in his own house precludes him from imposing
his control in the house of another who is master there. James
Wilson, one of the framers of the Constitution and a former justice
of this court, said that the independence of each department
required that its proceedings "should be free from the remotest
influence, direct or indirect, of either of the other two powers."
Andrews, The Works of James Wilson (1896), vol. 1, p. 367. And Mr.
Justice Story, in the first volume of his work on the Constitution,
4th ed., § 530, citing No. 48 of the Federalist, said
that neither of the departments in reference to each other "ought
to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence in the
administration of their respective powers."
And see O'Donoghue
v. United States, supra., at pp.
289 U. S.
530-531.
The power of removal here claimed for the President falls within
this principle, since its coercive influence threatens the
independence of a commission which is not only wholly disconnected
from the executive department, but which, as already fully appears,
was created by Congress as a means of carrying into operation
legislative and judicial powers, and as an agency of the
legislative and judicial departments.
In the light of the question now under consideration, we have
reexamined the precedents referred to in the
Myers case,
and find nothing in them to justify a conclusion contrary to that
which we have reached. The so-called "decision of 1789" had
relation to a bill proposed by Mr. Madison to establish an
executive Department of Foreign Affairs. The bill provided that the
principal officer was "to be removable from office by the President
of the United States." This clause was changed to read "whenever
the principal officer shall be removed
Page 295 U. S. 631
from office by the President of the United States," certain
things should follow, thereby, in connection with the debates,
recognizing and confirming, as the court thought in the
Myers case, the sole power of the President in the matter.
We shall not discuss the subject further, since it is so fully
covered by the opinions in the
Myers case, except to say
that the office under consideration by Congress was not only purely
executive, but the officer one who was responsible to the
President, and to him alone, in a very definite sense. A reading of
the debates shows that the President's illimitable power of removal
was not considered in respect of other than executive officers. And
it is pertinent to observe that, when, at a later time, the tenure
of office for the Comptroller of the Treasury was under
consideration, Mr. Madison quite evidently thought that, since the
duties of that office were not purely of an executive nature, but
partook of the judiciary quality as well, a different rule in
respect of executive removal might well apply. 1 Annals of
Congress, cols. 611-612.
In
Marbury v. Madison, supra, pp.
5 U. S. 162,
5 U. S. 165-166,
it is made clear that Chief Justice Marshall was of opinion that a
justice of the peace for the District of Columbia was not removable
at the will of the President, and that there was a distinction
between such an officer and officers appointed to aid the President
in the performance of his constitutional duties. In the latter
case, the distinction he saw was that "their acts are his acts,"
and his will, therefore, controls; and, by way of illustration, he
adverted to the act establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs,
which was the subject of the "decision of 1789."
The result of what we now have said is this: whether the power
of the President to remove an officer shall prevail over the
authority of Congress to condition the power by fixing a definite
term and precluding a removal except for cause will depend upon the
character of the office; the
Myers decision, affirming the
power of the President
Page 295 U. S. 632
alone to make the removal, is confined to purely executive
officers, and, as to officers of the kind here under consideration,
we hold that no removal can be made during the prescribed term for
which the officer is appointed except for one or more of the causes
named in the applicable statute. To the extent that, between the
decision in the
Myers case, which sustains the
unrestrictable power of the President to remove purely executive
officers, and our present decision that such power does not extend
to an office such as that here involved, there shall remain a field
of doubt, we leave such cases as may fall within it for future
consideration and determination as they may arise. In accordance
with the foregoing, the questions submitted are answered.
Question No. 1, Yes. Question No. 2, Yes.
* The docket title of this case is:
Rathbun, Executor v.
United States.
* The provision of § 6(d) of the act which
authorizes the President to direct an investigation and report by
the commission in relation to alleged violations of the antitrust
acts is so obviously collateral to the main design of the act as
not to detract from the force of this general statement as to the
character of that body.