Under § 20 of the first Cummins Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 20(11),
an action against a carrier for damage to an interstate shipment
due to negligence in loading or unloading or in transit need not be
preceded by notice or filing of the claim, and any provision of the
contract requiring such notice or filing as a condition precedent
would be void. P.
290 U. S.
578.
162 Okla. 194,
19 P.2d 337,
affirmed.
Certiorari to review the affirmance of a judgment against the
Railroad Company in an action by a shipper for damage to a
consignment of cattle.
MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondents brought this action in the district court of Rogers
County to enforce a claim for damages against the railroad company.
May 4, 1927, they shipped seven carloads of cattle from stations in
Arkansas to themselves at Delaware, Oklahoma. They delivered five
loads
Page 290 U. S. 577
directly to defendant and the other loads to connecting carriers
that delivered them to defendant. It hauled all from Little Rock to
destination. The shipments moved under uniform livestock contracts
[
Footnote 1] issued by the
initial carriers. They contain the following clauses:
"Section 2. (c) Claims for loss, damage, or injury to livestock
must be made in writing to the originating or delivering carrier or
carriers issuing this bill of lading within six months after the
delivery of the livestock . . . provided, that, if such loss,
damage or injury was due to delay or damage while being loaded or
unloaded, or damaged in transit by carelessness or negligence, then
no notice of claim nor filing of claim shall be required as a
condition precedent to recovery."
"
* * * *"
"Section 4. (c) Before the livestock is removed from the
possession of the carrier or mingled with other livestock, the
shipper, owner, consignee, or agent thereof shall inform in writing
the delivering carrier of any visible or manifest injury to the
livestock."
Plaintiffs did not sue until after the expiration of the time
specified in the contract for notice or filing of claim, and they
did not, before suit, give notice of or make any claim against
defendant or any of the carriers for the loss or damage sued for, §
2(c), or give defendant the information specified in § 4(c). Their
petition alleges that some of the cattle were killed and others
injured by defendant's negligence in handling the cars in which the
shipments moved over its line. The answer denied negligence and
alleged that plaintiffs had not complied with the quoted contract
provisions. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs, and the
trial court gave them
Page 290 U. S. 578
judgment thereon. The Supreme Court affirmed. 162 Okl.194,
19 P.2d
337.
The first Cummins Amendment to § 20 of the Act to Regulate
Commerce, 49 U.S.C. § 20(11), concerning the duty of carriers to
issue receipts or bills of lading for interstate freight and their
liability for loss or damage, declares,
"That it shall be unlawful for any such common carrier to
provide by rule, contract, regulation, or otherwise a shorter
period for giving notice of claims than ninety days, for the filing
of claims than four months, and for the institution of suits than
two years,"
and, as here construed, [
Footnote 2] the proviso reads
"That if the loss, damage, or injury complained of was due to
delay or damage while being loaded or unloaded, or damage in
transit by carelessness or negligence, then no notice of claim nor
filing of claim shall be required as a condition precedent to
recovery."
The phrase "carelessness or negligence" relates to each case of
loss, damage, or injury mentioned in the proviso, and in such cases
carriers are not permitted to require notice or filing of claim.
Barrett v. Van Pelt, 268 U. S. 85,
268 U. S. 87,
268 U. S. 91;
Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Thompson Mfg. Co.,
270 U. S. 416,
270 U. S.
422.
Section 2(c) of the livestock contract includes the language of
the proviso, and evidently is not intended to require notice of
claim for any loss, damage, or injury caused by the carrier's
negligence. Section 4(c) of the contract does not purport to make
compliance with it a condition precedent to suit, and we need not
decide whether, in any case it could be so read. It does not
expressly apply to loss or injuries caused by the carrier's
negligence. If construed to cover such cases, the section would
conflict with the proviso of the first Cummins Amendment.
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Prescribed by Domestic Bill of Lading and Live Stock Contract,
64 I.C.C. 357, October 21, 1921, before our decision, April 13,
1925, in
Barrett v. Van Pelt, 268 U. S.
85.
See Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Porter,
273 U. S. 341,
273 U. S. 343
et seq.; Louis Ilfeld Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 48 F.2d
1056, 1057.
[
Footnote 2]
Barrett v. Van Pelt, 268 U. S. 85;
Davis v. Roper Lumber Co., 269 U.
S. 158;
Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Thompson Mfg.
Co., 270 U. S. 416.