The Act of June 21, 1906, provides: "All restrictions as to sale
and incumbrance of all lands, inherited and otherwise, of all adult
Kickapoo Indians, and of all Shawnee" and other named Indians
"who have heretofore been or are now known as Indians of said
tribes, affiliating with said Kickapoo Indians now or hereafter
nonresident in the United States, who have been allotted land in
Oklahoma or Indian Territory are hereby removed."
Then follow provisos that "any such Indian allottee who is a
nonresident of the United States may lease his allotment without
restriction for a period not exceeding five years," and that the
parent or next of kin having care and custody of a minor allottee
may lease his allotment, etc.
Held:
1. The Act does not remove the restriction on alienation from an
allotment during the life of the allottee. P.
290 U. S.
38.
2. The qualifying phrase "now or hereafter nonresident in the
United States" applies to the Kickapoos as well as to the other
Indians named. P.
290 U. S.
39.
3. Where a direct allottee died a nonresident and the land
descended to her son, who, though formerly a nonresident, resided
at the time of her death and thereafter in the United States with
the people of his tribe, the restriction on alienation of the
inherited land was not removed by the Act; for at no time did the
heir's nonresidence and his ownership of the land coincide. P.
290 U. S.
40.
62 F.2d 621 reversed.
Certiorari, 289 U.S. 721, to review the affirmance of a decree
dismissing a bill brought by the United States to enjoin the
respondent Reily from trespassing upon an Indian's inherited
allotment, and from disturbing lessees in possession, under color
of a deed from the Indian owner, and from prosecuting the lessees
and certain federal administrative officials by certain civil
proceedings in a state court.
Page 290 U. S. 34
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit was brought by the United States to enforce its rights
and regulations in respect of allotted Indian land held under a
so-called trust patent. The land was allotted, and the trust patent
issued, with the express restriction that the land should be
inalienable for a designated period, which the President might
extend, and that any alienation contrary to the restriction should
be absolutely void. [
Footnote
1] After the allottee's death and during the period of
restriction, as extended by the President, the heir conveyed part
of the land to the defendant.
The defendant prevailed in both courts below, 62 F.2d 621, and
the United States petitioned for certiorari, which this Court
granted.
It is settled, and is conceded, that a restriction on alienation
such as is here shown is not personal to the allottee, but runs
with the lands and operates upon the heir the same as upon the
allottee. [
Footnote 2] So it is
apparent the heir's conveyance was void, unless in some way the
restriction was removed before the conveyance was made.
The real question is whether the restriction was removed by
Congress by the Act of June 21, 1906, [
Footnote 3] which will be set forth later on.
The material findings of the District Court stand unchallenged,
and are to the following effect: the allottee, a
Page 290 U. S. 35
Kickapoo Indian woman, and her infant son were members of the
Kickapoo tribe of Oklahoma whose lands were allotted in severalty
among its members in 1894. Both were then living with the tribe in
Oklahoma, and each received an allotment from the tribal lands. In
1903, the mother, taking the son with her, moved into the Republic
of Mexico and established a residence in a Mexican community or
tribe of Kickapoos to be described later on. She continuously
maintained that residence and affiliated with that tribe until
1929, when she died intestate, leaving the son as her only heir.
The son resided in Mexico until 1920, and then gave up that
residence and returned to the Kickapoo Reservation in Oklahoma.
Continuously thereafter he made the latter place his residence and
home. He was residing there in 1929 when his mother died, in 1930
when he made the conveyance to the defendant, and in 1931 when this
suit was begun.
In turning to the Act of June 21, 1906, it will be helpful to
have in mind the conditions existing when it was enacted. At one
time, the Kickapoos were a single tribe occupying a treaty
reservation in Kansas, [
Footnote
4] but, through dissensions and migrations, they had come in
1906 to comprise three separate communities or tribes having
distinct places of abode. One tribe was still located on the old
treaty reservation in Kansas, and had been given allotments there.
[
Footnote 5] Another was
located in the Republic of Mexico on a reservation set apart for
them by that government. In the main, this tribe comprised
Kickapoos who had separated from the Kansas tribe and settled in
Mexico, some in 1852 and others in 1863. [
Footnote 6] There were also later accessions, as will
appear presently. A third tribe
Page 290 U. S. 36
was located in Oklahoma and chiefly comprised Kickapoos who had
left the Mexican tribe and returned to the United States, mostly in
1873. [
Footnote 7] A
reservation in Oklahoma (then the Indian Territory) was established
for them by executive order in 1883. [
Footnote 8] The lands in this reservation were allotted
among the members of this tribe in 1894, [
Footnote 9] the allotment to which this suit relates
being one which was made then. Some of the allottees on this
reservation removed to Mexico and established a residence with the
Mexican tribe, and some of the allottees of neighboring Oklahoma
tribes, such as Shawnees, Delawares, Caddos, and Wichitas, did
likewise. Not infrequently, allottees who had gone to the Mexican
tribe gave up their residence there and returned to Oklahoma. The
migration to and from the Mexican tribe, while intermittent, was
continuing when the Act of June 21, 1906 (34 Stat. 363), was
passed. The part of that act which is material here reads as
follows:
"All restrictions as to sale and incumbrance of all lands,
inherited and otherwise, of all adult Kickapoo Indians, and of all
Shawnee, Delaware, Caddo, and Wichita Indians who have heretofore
been or are now known as Indians of said tribes, affiliating with
said Kickapoo Indians now or hereafter nonresident in the United
States, who have been allotted land in Oklahoma or Indian Territory
are hereby removed:
Provided, That any such Indian
allottee who is a nonresident of the United States may lease his
allotment without restriction for a period not exceeding five
years:
Provided further, That the parent or the person
next of kin having the care and custody of a minor allottee may
lease the allotment of said
Page 290 U. S. 37
minor as herein provided, except that no such lease shall extend
beyond the minority of said allottee."
In any view of the act, its words are not happily chosen. They
are wanting in clarity, and lend themselves to ambiguity. Both
administrative officers and courts have found need for resorting to
interpretation and construction when applying the act.
In
Johnson v. United States, 283 F. 954, 955, many
conveyances -- some by original allottees and some by heirs of such
allottees -- were assailed by the United States as made in
violation of the restriction on alienation, and the defendant
relied upon the act as having removed the restriction. Because of
the varying facts relating to the several conveyances, the act was
considered from different angles. The principal question, common to
all of the conveyances, was whether the main provision and the two
provisos were inconsistent and mutually destructive. The District
Court had held that they were, and therefore that the act was
ineffective. But the Circuit Court of Appeals disapproved that view
and, after observing that, if reasonably possible, the act should
be so construed that the main provision and the provisos could
stand together, came to the following conclusion:
"The purview discloses plainly and clearly a legislative
intention to remove restrictions under given conditions; . . . when
the whole paragraph is read with a view of sustaining it in all its
parts the word 'otherwise,' in the second line, seems to be in
contradistinction to allotment, so that it was clearly intended
that all restrictions as to sale and incumbrance of lands,
inherited or otherwise acquired (except allotments of surviving
allottees), were removed under the conditions named."
In other words, that court construed the main provision removing
restrictions under given conditions as not relating to lands
acquired by direct personal allotment but only to those acquired in
other ways, such as inheritance,
Page 290 U. S. 38
devise, etc., and construed the provisos permitting limited
leases as relating only to lands acquired by direct personal
allotments. On that basis, the court proceeded to determine whether
the facts shown brought any of the conveyances within the
conditions named. As to the conveyances described in eleven out of
fifty-four counts, the court found that the lands were inherited
and the grantors were heirs who came within the classes and
conditions fixed in the act. In that connection, the court
said:
"And the counts each allege that the deceased ancestor was an
absentee Shawnee allottee, a member of the absentee Shawnee tribe
of Indians, that the grantor was his heir and conveyed his
inherited interest in his ancestor's allotment, and the stipulation
shows that each grantor was an absentee Shawnee Indian and had been
allotted lands in his own right. We think it also fairly inferable
from the record that the grantors had been allotted lands in
Oklahoma or Indian Territory, and that they and their ancestors
were affiliated with nonresident Kickapoos."
On these findings, the conveyances described in the eleven
courts were held valid, and the decree of the District Court as to
them was reversed. Of the conveyances described in the other
counts, the court briefly said that the facts obtained from the
record did not support the claim of a removal of restrictions, and
so the decree of the District Court cancelling those conveyances
was affirmed.
Both parties acquiesce in and place some reliance on that
decision. It is pertinent insofar as it holds that the Act of 1906
did not remove the restriction on alienation from an allotment
during the life of the allottee. Under that holding, with which we
are in accord, the allotment in question remained subject to the
restriction throughout the life of the mother, the original
allottee.
On other points, the facts in the
Johnson case and
those in this are not alike. In that case, none of the
heir-grantors
Page 290 U. S. 39
was a Kickapoo. All were absentee Shawnees affiliated with the
Kickapoos in Mexico. Here, the heir-grantor was a Kickapoo
permanently residing with the Kickapoos in Oklahoma when he
inherited from his mother and continuously thereafter.
The defendant insists that the Act of 1906 makes a distinction
between Kickapoos and Shawnees, etc., in that it removes the
restriction on alienation as to the former regardless of their
residence and as to the latter only where they reside outside the
United States. No reason for making such a distinction is
suggested, nor is any perceived by us. The relation of all these
Indians to the United States was the same. All were emerging from
the old Indian life -- the Kickapoos not in advance of the others.
Some of each of the designated tribes had migrated to Mexico, and
others of each were inclined to do so. It was this migration,
accomplished and prospective, which led to the act. In short, the
circumstances were such as to suggest that a line of distinction be
drawn at residence in or out of the United States, and not at
membership in one or another of the designated tribes. This we
think is what was intended. Although inartificially framed, the
act, taken as a whole, comports with this view quite as well if not
better than with the other, and due regard for the status and
interests of the Indians affected, which always are to be
considered in construing such laws, [
Footnote 10] requires that it be preferred and given
effect. Therefore we conclude that the qualifying phrase "now or
hereafter nonresident of the United States" applies to the
Kickapoos as well as to the Shawnees, etc.
In
United States v. Estill, 62 F.2d 620, 621, the
Circuit Court of Appeals applied the act as we construe it. That
suit involved a conveyance by heirs of a Kickapoo who
Page 290 U. S. 40
had received an allotment in the Oklahoma reservation in 1894
and had died in Mexico in 1905. The heirs were Kickapoos who had
received allotments in the same reservation in their own right. The
court deemed their residence material, and gave the matter
particular attention. It said:
"The lower court also found, and the proof sustains it, that
I-nesh-kin and Nah-she-pe-eth [the heirs] 'were adults and residing
in the Republic of Mexico on the twenty-first day of June, 1906,
and thereafter.'"
The conveyance was made on a later date. Thus, the heirs'
inherited ownership and their residence in Mexico coincided before
the conveyance was made. On the facts recited, the court ruled that
the case came within the act, and accordingly sustained the
conveyance.
That court disposed of the present case in the belief that its
facts "are not substantially different from the facts in
United
States v. Estill." Whether this belief was occasioned by some
inadvertence does not appear. But the real fact shown by the
evidence, found by the District Court, and not questioned by the
defendant, is that the son, although at an earlier time a resident
of Mexico, became an actual resident of the Kickapoo reservation in
Oklahoma in 1920, and resided there continuously thereafter. The
mother, the allottee, died in 1929. Then, and not before, the son
became her heir and inherited the land. At no time with him did
ownership of the land and nonresidence in the United States
coincide. That he had been a nonresident for several years ending
nine years before the mother died is not material. During that
period, he had no right in the land, and the restriction was of no
concern to him. When later on he inherited the land nonresidence,
the chief condition on which the act made removal of the
restriction to depend was wanting. He was then and thereafter an
Indian, resident in the United States among the people of his
tribe, and holding the land under the restricted trust patent given
to his
Page 290 U. S. 41
mother. In our opinion, such a situation was not within, but
outside, the act, and the heir's conveyance to the defendant was
void.
Apparently the act has been a source of much trouble, [
Footnote 11] and recently it has
been repealed, but with saving clauses protecting rights lawfully
acquired under it. [
Footnote
12]
Decree reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Acts Feb. 8, 1887, c. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388; March 3,
1893, c. 203, Art. IV, 27 Stat. 557, 558.
[
Footnote 2]
Bowling v. United States, 233 U.
S. 528,
233 U. S. 535;
United States v. Noble, 237 U. S. 74,
237 U. S.
80.
[
Footnote 3]
C. 3504, 34 Stat. 325, 363.
[
Footnote 4]
Treaties of Oct. 24, 1832, 7 Stat. 391; May 18, 1854, 10 Stat.
1078.
[
Footnote 5]
Treaty of June 28, 1862, 13 Stat. 623.
[
Footnote 6]
Handbook of American Indians, Hodge, Vol. 1, pp. 684, 685; Art.
X of Treaty of 1862 just cited; Annual Report of Commissioner of
Indian Affairs 1872, title "Kansas," subtitle "Kickapoos."
[
Footnote 7]
Annual Report Commissioner of Indian Affairs 1874, title
"Kansas," subtitle "Kickapoos."
[
Footnote 8]
Kapler Indian Laws and Treaties, 2d ed., Vol. 1, 844; Annual
Report of Commissioner of Indian Affairs 1883, p. 45.
[
Footnote 9]
Act March 3, 1893, c. 203, 27 Stat. 557.
[
Footnote 10]
Jones v. Meehan, 175 U. S. 1,
175 U. S. 10, 11;
Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373,
185 U. S. 402;
United States v. Celestine, 215 U.
S. 278,
215 U. S. 290;
Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665,
224 U. S. 675;
Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363,
280 U. S.
367.
[
Footnote 11]
Annual Reports Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1906, title
"Kickapoos;" 1911, title "Mexican Kickapoo Indians;" Senate
Reports, Vol. A, No. 5, 60 Cong., 1st Sess.; Senate Report No. 710,
72 Cong., 1st Sess.; House Report No.1901, 72 Cong., 2d Sess.
[
Footnote 12]
Act February 17, 1933, c. 97, 47 Stat. 819.