1. Competing producers of bituminous coal formed a corporation
to act as their selling agent, with authority to set the prices.
The industry was in grave distress because of overexpansion,
relatively diminishing consumption, organized buying, and injurious
marketing practices within itself, and the members of the
combination sought, through the agent, to escape those practices,
promote the sale of their coal in fair competition, and sell as
much of it as possible. Although they controlled a large proportion
(73%) of the commercial production in the immediate region where
they mined, the great bulk of their output was marketed in another
and highly competitive region, and in view of the vast volume of
other coal actually and potentially available, the conditions of
production, and transportation facilities, there was no basis for
concluding that competition anywhere could be injuriously affected
by the operation of their plan.
Held that there is no
present reason for an injunction under the Sherman Act.
Page 288 U. S. 345
2. The purpose of the Sherman Act is to maintain the freedom of
interstate commerce in the public interest; its restrictions are
not mechanical or artificial, but are to be construed by the
essential standard of reasonableness. P.
288 U. S.
359.
3. The Act does not seek to establish a delusive liberty of
interstate commerce by making normal and fair expansion impossible;
it does not prevent those engaged in that commerce from adopting
reasonable measures to protect it from injurious and destructive
practices and to promote competition upon a sound basis. P.
288 U. S.
360.
4. The mere fact that the parties to a combination eliminate
competition among themselves is not enough to condemn it. The
question is one of intent and effect, not to be determined by
arbitrary assumptions, but by close and objective scrutiny of the
particular conditions and purposes in each case. Pp.
288 U. S. 360,
288 U.S. 375.
5. Good intentions will not save a plan otherwise objectionable
under the Sherman Act, but knowledge of actual intent is an aid in
the interpretation of facts and prediction of consequences. P.
288 U. S.
372.
6. A cooperative enterprise is not to be condemned as an undue
restraint because it may effect a change in market conditions,
where the change would be in mitigation of recognized evils and
would not impair, but rather would foster, fair competitive
opportunities. P.
288 U. S.
373.
7. A cooperative plan of competing producers cannot be held
illegal merely because they do not integrate their properties in a
single corporation, but keep their plants independent. In either
case, the test is the same: is there an unreasonable restraint of
trade or an attempt to monopolize? P.
288 U. S.
374.
8. A suit under the Sherman Act to enjoin a combination is
governed by the principles of equitable relief, and to warrant an
injunction, there must be a definite factual showing of illegality.
P.
288 U. S.
377.
9. Where a trade agreement was attacked and sustained under the
Sherman Act before it was put in operation, the case being decided
upon the purposes of the participants and the probable consequences
of their plan, the decree directed the District Court to dismiss
the bill without prejudice, but to retain jurisdiction to the end
that, should results of the plan, in actual operation, prove
contrary to the Act, the case might be reopened by that court for
further proceedings by the government and the voluminous testimony
already taken remain available in that event. P.
288 U. S. 378.
1 F. Supp.
339, reversed.
Appeal from a decree of the District Court composed of three
circuit judges granting an injunction against a combination of
producers of bituminous coal, in a suit by the Government under the
Sherman Antitrust Act.
Page 288 U. S. 356
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit was brought to enjoin a combination alleged to be in
restraint of interstate commerce in bituminous coal and in
attempted monopolization of part of that commerce, in violation of
§§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 Stat. 209.
The District Court, composed of three Circuit Judges, made detailed
findings of fact and entered final decree granting the injunction.
1 F. Supp.
339. The case comes here on appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 380.
Defendants, other than Appalachian Coals, Inc., are 137
producers of bituminous coal in eight districts (called for
Page 288 U. S. 357
convenience Appalachian territory) lying in Virginia, West
Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee. These districts, described as
the Southern High Volatile Field, form part of the coal bearing
area stretching from central and western Pennsylvania through
eastern Ohio, western Maryland, West Virginia, southwestern
Virginia, eastern Kentucky, eastern Tennessee, and northeastern
Alabama. In 1929 (the last year for which complete statistics were
available), the total production of bituminous coal east of the
Mississippi River was 484,786,000 tons, of which defendants mined
58,011,367 tons, or 11.96 percent. In the so-called Appalachian
territory and the immediately surrounding area, the total
production was 107,008,209 tons, of which defendants' production
was 54.21 percent, or 64 percent if the output of "captive" mines
(16,455,001 tons) be deducted. [
Footnote 1] With a further deduction of 12,000,000 tons of
coal produced in the immediately surrounding territory, which,
however, is not essentially different from the particular area
described in these proceedings as Appalachian territory,
defendants' production in the latter region was found to amount to
74.4 percent. [
Footnote 2]
The challenged combination lies in the creation by the defendant
producers of an exclusive selling agency. This agency is the
defendant Appalachian Coals, Inc., which may be designated as the
Company. Defendant producers own all its capital stock, their
holdings being in
Page 288 U. S. 358
proportion to their production. The majority of the common
stock, which has exclusive voting right, is held by seventeen
defendants. By uniform contracts, separately made, each defendant
producer constitutes the Company an exclusive agent for the sale of
all coal (with certain exceptions) which the producer mines in
Appalachian territory. [
Footnote
3] The Company agrees to establish standard classifications, to
sell all the coal of all its principals at the best prices
obtainable and, if all cannot be sold, to apportion orders upon a
stated basis. The plan contemplates that prices are to be fixed by
the officers of the Company at its central office, save that, upon
contracts calling for future deliveries after sixty days, the
Company must obtain the producer's consent. The Company is to be
paid a commission of 10 percent of the gross selling prices f.o.b.
at the mines, and guarantees accounts. In order to preserve their
existing sales outlets, the producers may designate subagents,
according to a agreed form of contract, who are to sell upon the
terms and prices established by the Company and are to be allowed
by the Company commissions of eight percent. The Company has not
yet begun to operate as selling agent; the contracts with it run to
April 1, 1935, and from year to year thereafter unless terminated
by either party on six months' notice.
The Government's contention, which the district court sustained,
is that the plan violates the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in the view
that it eliminates competition among the defendants themselves and
also gives the selling agency power substantially to affect and
control the price of bituminous coal in many interstate markets. On
the latter point, the district court made the general finding that
this elimination of competition and concerted
Page 288 U. S. 359
action will affect market conditions, and have a tendency to
stabilize prices and to raise prices to a higher level than would
prevail under conditions of free competition. The court added that
the selling agency will not have monopoly control of any market,
nor the power to fix monopoly prices.
Defendants insist that the primary purpose of the formation of
the selling agency was to increase the sale, and thus the
production, of Appalachian coal through better methods of
distribution, intensive advertising and research, to achieve
economics in marketing, and to eliminate abnormal, deceptive, and
destructive trade practices. They disclaim any intent to restrain
or monopolize interstate commerce, and, in justification of their
design, they point to the statement of the district court that
"it is but due to defendants to say that the evidence in the
case clearly shows that they have been acting fairly and openly, in
an attempt to organize the coal industry and to relieve the
deplorable conditions resulting from overexpansion, destructive
competition, wasteful trade practices, and the inroads of competing
industries."
1 F.Supp. p. 341. Defendants contend that the evidence
establishes that the selling agency will not have the power to
dominate or fix the price of coal in any consuming market; that the
price of coal will continue to be set in an open competitive
market, and that their plan by increasing the sale of bituminous
coal from Appalachian territory will promote, rather than restrain,
interstate commerce.
First. There is no question as to the test to be
applied in determining the legality of the defendants' conduct. The
purpose of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act is to prevent undue
restraints of interstate commerce, to maintain its appropriate
freedom in the public interest, to afford protection from the
subversive or coercive influences of monopolistic endeavor. As a
charter of freedom, the Act
Page 288 U. S. 360
has a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be
desirable in constitutional provisions. It does not go into
detailed definitions which might either work injury to legitimate
enterprise or, through particularization, defeat its purposes by
providing loopholes for escape. The restrictions the Act imposes
are not mechanical or artificial. Its general phrases, interpreted
to attain its fundamental objects, set up the essential standard of
reasonableness. They call for vigilance in the detection and
frustration of all efforts unduly to restrain the free course of
interstate commerce, but they do not seek to establish a mere
delusive liberty either by making impossible the normal and fair
expansion of that commerce or the adoption of reasonable measures
to protect it from injurious and destructive practices and to
promote competition upon a sound basis. The decisions establish,
said this Court in
Nash v. United States, 229 U.
S. 373,
229 U. S.
376,
"that only such contracts and combinations are within the Act
as, by reason of intent or the inherent nature of the contemplated
acts, prejudice the public interests by unduly restricting
competition or unduly obstructing the course of trade."
See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S.
1;
United States v. American Tobacco Co.,
221 U. S. 106;
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.
S. 231,
246 U. S. 238;
Window Glass Manufacturers v. United States, 263 U.
S. 403,
263 U. S. 412;
Maple Flooring Association v. United States, 268 U.
S. 563,
268 U. S.
583-584;
Paramount Famous Corp. v. United
States, 282 U. S. 30,
282 U. S. 43;
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.
S. 163,
283 U. S.
169.
In applying this test, a close and objective scrutiny of
particular conditions and purposes is necessary in each case.
Realities must dominate the judgment. The mere fact that the
parties to an agreement eliminate competition between themselves is
not enough to condemn it.
"The legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined
by so simple a test as whether it restrains
Page 288 U. S. 361
competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation
of trade, restrains."
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, supra. The
familiar illustrations of partnerships, and enterprises fairly
integrated in the interest of the promotion of commerce at once
occur. The question of the application of the statute is one of
intent and effect, and is not to be determined by arbitrary
assumptions. It is therefore necessary in this instance to consider
the economic conditions peculiar to the coal industry, the
practices which have obtained, the nature of defendant's plan of
making sales, the reasons which led to its adoption, and the
probable consequences of the carrying out of that plan in relation
to market prices and other matters affecting the public interest in
interstate commerce in bituminous coal.
Second. The findings of the district court, upon
abundant evidence, leave no room for doubt as to the economic
condition of the coal industry. That condition, as the district
court states, "for many years has been indeed deplorable." Due
largely to the expansion under the stimulus of the Great War, "the
bituminous mines of the country have a developed capacity exceeding
700,000,000 tons" to meet a demand "of less than 500,000,000 tons."
In connection with this increase in surplus production, the
consumption of coal in all the industries which are its largest
users has shown a substantial relative decline. The actual decrease
is partly due to the industrial condition, but the relative
decrease is progressing due entirely to other causes. Coal has been
losing markets to oil, natural gas, and water power, and has also
been losing ground due to greater efficiency in the use of coal.
The change has been more rapid during the last few years by reason
of the developments of both oil and gas fields. The court below
found that, based upon the assumption that bituminous coal would
have maintained the upward trend prevailing between 1900 and 1915
in percentage of total
Page 288 U. S. 362
energy supply in the United States, the total substitution
between 1915 and 1930 has been equal to more than 200,000,000 tons
per year. [
Footnote 4] While
proper allowance must be made for differences in consumption in
different parts of the country, [
Footnote 5] the adverse influence upon the coal industry,
including the branch of it under review, of the use of substitute
fuels and of improved methods is apparent.
This unfavorable condition has been aggravated by particular
practices. One of these relates to what is called "distress coal."
The greater part of the demand is for particular sizes of coal such
as nut and slack, stove coal, egg coal, and lump coal. Any one size
cannot be prepared without making several sizes. According to the
finding of the court below, one of the chief problems of
Page 288 U. S. 363
the industry is thus involved in the practice of producing
different sizes of coal even though orders are on hand for only one
size, and the necessity of marketing all sizes. Usually there are
no storage facilities at the mines, and the different sizes
produced are placed in cars on the producer's tracks, which may
become so congested that either production must be stopped or the
cars must be moved regardless of demand. This leads to the practice
of shipping unsold coal to billing points or on consignment to the
producer or his agent in the consuming territory. If the coal is
not sold by the time it reaches its destination, and is not
unloaded promptly, it becomes subject to demurrage charges which
may exceed the amount obtainable for the coal unless it is sold
quickly. The court found that this type of "distress coal" presses
on the market at all times, includes all sizes and grades, and the
total amount from all causes is of substantial quantity.
"Pyramiding" of coal is another "destructive practice." It
occurs when a producer authorizes several persons to sell the same
coal, and they may in turn offer it for sale to other dealers. In
consequence, "the coal competes with itself, thereby resulting in
abnormal and destructive competition which depresses the price for
all coals in the market." Again, there is misrepresentation by some
producers in selling one size of coal and shipping another size
which they happen to have on hand. "The lack of standardization of
sizes and the misrepresentation as to sizes" are found to have been
injurious to the coal industry as a whole. The court added,
however, that the evidence did not show the existence of any trade
war or widespread fraudulent conduct. The industry also suffers
through "credit losses," which are due to the lack of agencies for
the collection of comprehensive data with respect to the credits
that can safely be extended.
In addition to these factors, the district court found that
organized buying agencies, and large consumers
Page 288 U. S. 364
purchasing substantial tonnages, "constitute unfavorable
forces."
"The highly organized and concentrated buying power which they
control and the great abundance of coal available have contributed
to make the market for coal a buyers' market for many years
past."
It also appears that the "unprofitable condition" of the
industry has existed particularly in the Appalachian territory,
where there is little local consumption, as the region is not
industrialized.
"The great bulk of the coal there produced is sold in the highly
competitive region east of the Mississippi River and north of the
Ohio River under an adverse freight rate which imposes an
unfavorable differential from 35 cents to 50 cents per ton.
[
Footnote 6]"
And, in a graphic summary of the economic situation, the court
found that
"numerous producing companies have gone into bankruptcy or into
the hands of receivers, many mines have been shut down, the number
of days of operation per week have been greatly curtailed, wages to
labor have been substantially lessened, and the states in which
coal producing companies are located have found it increasingly
difficult to collect taxes."
Third. The findings also fully disclose the proceedings
of the defendants in formulating their plan and the reasons for its
adoption. The serious economic conditions had led to discussions
among coal operators and state and national officials seeking
improvement of the industry. Governors of states had held meetings
with coal producers. The limits of official authority were
apparent. A general meeting of producers, sales agents, and
attorneys was held in New York in October, 1931, a committee was
appointed, and various suggestions were considered. At a second
general meeting in December, 1931, there was further discussion,
and a report which recommended
Page 288 U. S. 365
the organization of regional sales agencies, and was supported
by the opinion of counsel as to the legality of proposed forms of
contract, was approved. Committees to present the plan to producers
were constituted for eighteen producing districts, including the
eight districts in Appalachian territory. Meetings of the
representatives of the latter districts resulted in the
organization of defendant Appalachian Coals, Inc. It was agreed
that a minimum of 70 percent and a maximum of 80 percent of the
commercial tonnage of the territory should be secured before the
plan should become effective. Approximately 73 percent was
obtained. A resolution to fix the maximum at 90 percent was
defeated. The maximum of 80 percent was adopted because a majority
of the producers felt that an organization with a greater degree of
control might unduly restrict competition in local markets. The
minimum of 70 percent was fixed because it was agreed that the
organization would not be effective without this degree of control.
The court below also found that it was the expectation that similar
agencies would be organized in other producing districts, including
those which were competitive with Appalachian coal, and that it
was
"the particular purpose of the defendants in the Appalachian
territory to secure such degree of control therein as would
eliminate competition among the 73 percent of the commercial
production."
But the court added:
"However, the formation of Appalachian Coals was not made
dependent upon the formation of other regional selling agencies,
and there is no evidence of a purpose, understanding, or agreement
among the defendants that, in the event of the formation of other
similar regional sales agencies, there would be any understanding
or agreement, direct or indirect, to divide the market territory
between them or to limit production or to fix the price of coal in
any market or to cooperate in any way."
When, in January, 1932, the Department of Justice
Page 288 U. S. 366
announced its adverse opinion, the producers outside Appalachian
territory decided to hold their plans in abeyance pending the
determination of the question by the courts. The district court
found that
"the evidence tended to show that other selling agencies with a
control of at least 70 percent of the production in their
respective districts will be organized if the petition in this case
is dismissed,"
that, in that event,
"that will result an organization in most of the districts whose
coal is or may be competitive with Appalachian coal, but the
testimony tends to show that there will still be substantial active
competition in the sale of coal in all markets in which Appalachian
coal is sold."
Defendants refer to the statement of purposes in their published
plan of organization -- that it was intended to bring about
"a better and more orderly marketing of the coals from the
region to be served by this company (the selling agency) and better
to enable the producers in this region, through the larger and more
economic facilities of such selling agency, more equally to compete
in the general markets for a fair share of the available coal
business."
The district court found that, among their purposes, defendants
sought to remedy
"the destructive practice of shipping coal on consignment
without prior orders for the sale thereof, which results in the
dumping of coal on the market irrespective of the demand,"
"to eliminate the pyramiding of offers for the sale of coal," to
promote
"the systematic study of the marketing and distribution of coal,
the demand the the consumption and the kinds and grades of coal
made and available for shipment by each producer in order to
improve conditions,"
to maintain an inspection and engineering department which would
keep in constant contact with customers "in order to demonstrate
the advantages and suitability of Appalachian coal in comparison
with other competitive coals," to promote an extensive
advertising
Page 288 U. S. 367
campaign which would show "the advantages of using coal as a
fuel and the advantages of Appalachian coal particularly," to
provide a research department employing combustion engineers which
would demonstrate "proper and efficient methods of burning coal in
factories and in homes," and thus aid producers in their
competition with substitute fuels, and to operate a credit
department which would build up a record with respect to the
"reliability of purchasers." The court also found that
"defendants believe that the result of all these activities
would be the more economical sale of coal, and the economics would
be more fully realized as the organization of the selling agent is
perfected and developed."
But, in view of the designation of subagents, economics in
selling expenses would be attained "only after a year or so of
operation."
No attempt was made to limit production. The producers decided
that it could not legally be limited and, in any event, it could
not be limited practically. The finding is that "it was designed
that the producer should produce and the selling agent should sell
as much coal as possible." The importance of increasing sales is
said to lie in the fact that the cost of production is directly
related to the actual running time of the mines.
Fourth. Voluminous evidence was received with respect
to the effect of defendants' plan upon market prices. As the plan
has not gone into operation, there are no actual results upon which
to base conclusions. The question is necessarily one of prediction.
The court below found that, as between defendants themselves,
competition would be eliminated. This was deemed to be the
necessary consequence of a common selling agency with power to fix
the prices at which it would make sales for its principals.
Defendants insist that the finding is too broad, and that the
differences in grades of coal of the same sizes and the market
demands at different times
Page 288 U. S. 368
would induce competition between the coals sold by the agency
"depending upon the use and the quality of the coals."
The more serious question relates to the effect of the plan upon
competition between defendants and other producers. As already
noted, the district court found that "the great bulk" of the coal
produced in Appalachian territory is sold "in the highly
competitive region east of the Mississippi River and north of the
Ohio River under an adverse freight rate." Elaborate statistics
were introduced with respect to the production and distribution of
bituminous coal and the transportation rates from the different
producing sections to the consuming markets, as bearing upon
defendants' competitive position, together with evidence as to the
requirements of various sections and consumers and the relative
advantages possessed by reason of the different qualities and uses
of the coals produced. It would be impossible to make even a
condensed statement of this evidence (which has been carefully
analyzed by both parties), but an examination of it fails to
disclose an adequate basis for the conclusion that the operation of
the defendants' plan would produce an injurious effect upon
competitive conditions, in view of the vast volume of coal
available, the conditions of production, and the network of
transportation facilities at immediate command. While strikes and
interruptions of transportation may create temporary and abnormal
dislocations, the bituminous coal industry, under normal
conditions, affords most exceptional competitive opportunities.
Figures as to developed and potential productive capacity are
impressive. The court below found upon this point that the capacity
of the mines in the Appalachian region operated by others than
defendants is 82,660,760 tons, as against the capacity of
defendants' mines of 86,628,880 tons, while the present yearly
capacity of all mines in southern West Virginia, Virginia, Eastern
Kentucky, and Tennessee is 245,233,560 tons, based upon an
eight-hour working day.
Page 288 U. S. 369
"This excess capacity over actual production," the court said,
"could be brought into production at moderate expense and with
reasonable promptness." As to potential, undeveloped capacity in
Appalachian territory, the court found that in the eight districts
in this region not held by any operating, or by any captive,
company, there are approximately 760,000 acres containing more than
4,300,000,000 tons of recoverable coal. In addition, in the same
territory "owned by captive companies and not being operated, or
owned by operating companies who are using only a very small
proportion of their holdings," there is an additional 860,000
acres, containing more than 4,600,000,000 tons of coal. Within the
twenty-four counties in which defendants' mines are located, and
immediately adjacent to them, on railroads already operating, "with
the exception of short, feeder extensions," there are over
1,620,000 acres of coal bearing land, containing approximately
9,000,000,000 net tons of recoverable coal "comparable both in
quality and mining conditions with the coal now being mined in that
region."
"The opening up of this acreage would involve only the extension
of short branch lines from the railroads and the building of mining
plants. The price of these lands at the present time would be less
than half of the value of two or three years ago, and considerably
less on a royalty basis. Coal produced from these districts is
available for any market in which Appalachian coal is sold.
Conditions in the coal industry are such that new companies are
free to enter the business of producing and marketing coal in
competition with existing companies."
In connection with this proof of developed and potential
capacity, the "highly organized and concentrated buying power" that
can be exerted must also have appropriate consideration. [
Footnote 7]
Page 288 U. S. 370
Consumers testified that defendants' plan will be a benefit to
the coal industry, and will not restrain competition. Testimony to
that effect was given by representatives of the Louisville &
Nashville Railroad, the Norfolk & Western Railroad, and the
Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad, "the largest railroad users of coal
operating in the Appalachian region," and by representatives of
large utility companies and manufacturing concerns. [
Footnote 8] There
Page 288 U. S. 371
was similar testimony by wholesale and retail dealers in coal.
There are 130 producers of coal other than defendants in
Appalachian territory who sell coal commercially. There are also "a
large number of mines that have been shut down and could be opened
up by the owners on short notice." Competing producers testified
that the operation of the selling agency, as proposed by
defendants, would not restrain competition, and would not hurt
their business. Producers in western Pennsylvania, Alabama, Ohio,
and Illinois testified to like effect. Referring to this testimony,
the court below added,
"The small coal producer can, to some extent, and for the
purpose of producing and marketing coal, produce coal more cheaply
than many of the larger companies, and is not prevented by higher
cost of operation from being a competitor in the market."
The Government criticizes the "opinion testimony" introduced by
defendants as relating to a competitive situation not within the
experience of the witnesses, and also animadverts upon their
connections and interests, but the Government did not offer
testimony of opposing opinions as to the effect upon prices of the
operation of the selling agency. Consumers who testified for the
Government explained their dependence upon coal from Appalachian
territory.
The district court commented upon the testimony of officers of
the selling agency to the effect
"that the organization would not be able to fix prices in an
arbitrary way but, by the elimination of certain abuses, and by
better advertising and sale organization, the producers would get
more in the aggregate for their coal."
"Other witnesses for the defendants," said the court
"indicated that there would be some tendency to raise the price,
but
Page 288 U. S. 372
that the degree of increase would be affected by other
competitors in the coal industry and by producers of coal
substitutes."
Fifth. We think that the evidence requires the
following conclusions:
(1) With respect to defendant's purposes, we find no warrant for
determining that they were other than those they declared. Good
intentions will not save a plan otherwise objectionable, but
knowledge of actual intent is an aid in the interpretation of facts
and prediction of consequences.
Chicago Board of Trade v.
United States, supra. The evidence leaves no doubt of the
existence of the evils at which defendants' plan was aimed. The
industry was in distress. It suffered from overexpansion and from a
serious relative decline through the growing use of substitute
fuels. It was afflicted by injurious practices within itself --
practices which demanded correction. If evil conditions could not
be entirely cured, they at least might be alleviated. The
unfortunate state of the industry would not justify any attempt
unduly to restrain competition or to monopolize, but the existing
situation prompted defendants to make, and the statute did not
preclude them from making, an honest effort to remove abuses, to
make competition fairer, and thus to promote the essential
interests of commerce. The interests of producers and consumers are
interlinked. When industry is greviously hurt, when producing
concerns fail, when unemployment mounts and communities dependent
upon profitable production are prostrated, the wells of commerce go
dry. So far as actual purposes are concerned, the conclusion of the
court below was amply supported that defendants were engaged in a
fair and open endeavor to aid the industry in a measurable recovery
from its plight. The inquiry, then, must be whether, despite this
objective, the inherent nature of their plan was such as to create
an undue restraint upon interstate commerce.
Page 288 U. S. 373
2. The question thus presented chiefly concerns the effect upon
prices. The evidence as to the conditions of the production and
distribution of bituminous coal, the available facilities for its
transportation, the extent of developed mining capacity, and the
vast potential undeveloped capacity, makes it impossible to
conclude that defendants, through the operation of their plan, will
be able to fix the price of coal in the consuming markets. The
ultimate finding of the district court is that the defendants "will
not have monopoly control of any market, nor the power to fix
monopoly prices," and, in its opinion, the court stated that "the
selling agency will not be able, we think, to fix the market price
of coal." Defendants' coal will continue to be subject to active
competition. In addition to the coal actually produced and seeking
markets in competition with defendants' coal, enormous additional
quantities will be within reach, and can readily be turned into the
channels of trade if an advance of price invites that course. While
conditions are more favorable to the position of defendants' group
in some markets than in others, we think that the proof clearly
shows that, wherever their selling agency operates, it will find
itself confronted by effective competition backed by virtually
inexhaustive sources of supply, and will also be compelled to cope
with the organized buying power of large consumers. The plan cannot
be said either to contemplate or to involve the fixing of market
prices.
The contention is, and the court below found, that, while
defendants could not fix market prices, the concerted action would
"affect" them -- that is, that it would have a tendency to
stabilize market prices and to raise them to a higher level than
would otherwise obtain. But the facts found do not establish, and
the evidence fails to show, that any effect will be produced which,
in the circumstances of this industry, will be detrimental to fair
competition. A cooperative enterprise, otherwise free
Page 288 U. S. 374
from objection, which carries with it no monopolistic menace, is
not to be condemned as an undue restraint merely because it may
effect a change in market conditions, where the change would be in
mitigation of recognized evils and would not impair, but rather
foster, fair competitive opportunities. Voluntary action to rescue
and preserve these opportunities, and thus to aid in relieving a
depressed industry and in reviving commerce by placing competition
upon a sounder basis, may be more efficacious than an attempt to
provide remedies through legal processes. The fact that the
correction of abuses may tend to stabilize a business, or to
produce fairer price levels, does not mean that the abuses should
go uncorrected, or that cooperative endeavor to correct them
necessarily constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade. The
intelligent conduct of commerce through the acquisition of full
information of all relevant facts may properly be sought by the
cooperation of those engaged in trade, although stabilization of
trade and more reasonable prices may be the result.
Maple
Flooring Association v. United States, supra; Cement Manufacturers'
Association v. United States, 268 U.
S. 588,
268 U. S. 604.
Putting an end to injurious practices, and the consequent
improvement of the competitive position of a group of producers, is
not a less worthy aim, and may be entirely consonant with the
public interest, where the group must still meet effective
competition in a fair market and neither seeks nor is able to
effect a domination of prices.
Decisions cited in support of a contrary view were addressed to
very different circumstances from those presented here. They dealt
with combinations which, on the particular facts, were found to
impose unreasonable restraints through the suppression of
competition, and, in actual operation, had that effect.
American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States,
257 U. S. 377;
United
States
Page 288 U. S. 375
v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.
S. 371.
Compare Maple Flooring Association v. United
States, supra, at pp.
268 U. S. 579-582. In
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.
v. United States, 175 U. S. 211, the
combination was effected by those who were in a position to
deprive, and who sought to deprive, the public in a large territory
of the advantages of fair competition, and was for the actual
purpose, and had the result, of enhancing prices -- which which in
fact had been unreasonably increased.
Id., pp.
175 U. S.
237-238. In
United States v. Trenton Potteries
Co., 273 U. S. 392,
defendants, who controlled 82 percent of the business of
manufacturing and distributing vitreous pottery in the United
States, had combined to fix prices. It was found that they had the
power to do this, and had exerted it. The defense that the prices
were reasonable was overruled, as the Court held that the power to
fix prices involved "power to control the market and to fix
arbitrary and unreasonable prices," and that, in such a case, the
difference between legal and illegal conduct could not "depend upon
so uncertain a test" as whether the prices actually fixed were
reasonable, a determination which could "be satisfactorily made
only after a complete survey of our economic organization and a
choice between rival philosophies."
See United States v. L.
Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81. In
the instant case, there is, as we have seen, no intent or power to
fix prices, abundant competitive opportunities will exist in all
markets where defendants' coal is sold, and nothing has been shown
to warrant the conclusion that defendants' plan will have an
injurious effect upon competition in these markets.
3. The question remains whether, despite the foregoing
conclusions, the fact that the defendants' plan eliminates
competition between themselves is alone sufficient to condemn it.
Emphasis is placed upon defendants' control of about 73 percent of
the commercial production
Page 288 U. S. 376
in Appalachian territory. But only a small percentage of that
production is sold in that territory. The finding of the court
below is that "these coals are mined in a region where there is
very little consumption." Defendants must go elsewhere to dispose
of their products, and the extent of their production is to be
considered in the light of the market conditions already described.
Even in Appalachian territory, it appears that the developed and
potential capacity of other producers will afford effective
competition. [
Footnote 9]
Defendants insist that, on the evidence adduced as to their
competitive position in the consuming markets, and in the absence
of proof of actual operations showing an injurious effect upon
competition, either through possession or abuse of power, no valid
objection could have been interposed under the Sherman Act if the
defendants had eliminated competition between themselves by a
complete integration of their mining properties in a single
ownership.
United States v. United States Steel Corp.,
251 U. S. 417;
United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.
S. 693. We agree that there is no ground for holding
defendants' plan illegal merely because they have not integrated
their properties and have chosen to maintain their independent
plants, seeking not to limit, but rather to facilitate production.
We know of no public policy, and none is suggested by the terms of
the Sherman Act, that, in order to comply with the law, those
engaged in industry should be driven to unify their properties and
businesses in order to correct abuses which may be corrected by
less drastic measures. Public policy might indeed be deemed to
point in a different direction. If the mere size of a single
embracing entity is not enough to bring a combination in corporate
form within the statutory inhibition, the mere number and extent of
the production of those engaged in a cooperative endeavor to
Page 288 U. S. 377
remedy evils which may exist in an industry, and to improve
competitive conditions, should not be regarded as producing
illegality. The argument that integration may be considered a
normal expansion of business, while a combination of independent
producers in a common selling agency should be treated as abnormal
-- that one is a legitimate enterprise and the other is not --
makes but an artificial distinction. The Anti-Trust Act aims at
substance. Nothing in theory or experience indicates that the
selection of a common selling agency to represent a number of
producers should be deemed to be more abnormal than the formation
of a huge corporation bringing various independent units into one
ownership. Either may be prompted by business exigencies, and the
statute gives to neither a special privilege. The question in
either case is whether there is an unreasonable restraint of trade
or an attempt to monopolize. If there is, the combination cannot
escape because it has chosen corporate form, and, if there is not,
it is not to be condemned because of the absence of corporate
integration. As we stated at the outset, the question under the Act
is not simply whether the parties have restrained competition
between themselves, but as to the nature and effect of that
restraint.
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, supra;
United States v. Terminal Association, 224 U.
S. 383;
Window Glass Manufacturers v. United States,
supra; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.
S. 163,
283 U. S. 169,
283 U. S.
179.
The fact that the suit is brought under the Sherman Act does not
change the principles which govern the granting of equitable
relief. There must be "a definite factual showing of illegality."
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. p.
283 U. S. 179.
We think that the government has failed to show adequate grounds
for an injunction in this case. We recognize, however, that the
case has been tried in advance of the operation of defendants'
plan, and that it has been necessary to test that plan with
Page 288 U. S. 378
reference to purposes and anticipated consequences without the
advantage of the demonstrations of experience. If, in actual
operation, it should prove to be an undue restraint upon interstate
commerce, if it should appear that the plan is used to the
impairment of fair competitive opportunities, the decision upon the
present record should not preclude the government from seeking the
remedy which would be suited to such a state of facts. We think
also that, in the event of future controversy arising from the
actual operation of the plan, the results of the labor of both
parties in this litigation in presenting the voluminous evidence as
to the industry, market conditions, and transportation facilities
and rates should continue to be available without the necessity of
reproducing that evidence.
The decree will be reversed, and the cause will be remanded to
the district court with instructions to enter a decree dismissing
the bill of complaint without prejudice and with the provision that
the court shall retain jurisdiction of the cause any may set aside
the decree and take further proceedings if future developments
justify that course in the appropriate enforcement of the
Anti-Trust Act.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS thinks that the court below reached the
proper conclusion, and that its decree should be affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
"Captive" mines are thus designated as they produce chiefly for
the consumption of the owners.
[
Footnote 2]
Defendants contend that, in calculating their position upon a
percentage basis, surrounding territory should be included, and
that their percentage thus lies "somewhere between 54.21 and 64
percent." The district court found:
"The coal produced in the surrounding territory is the same kind
of coal as that produced in the Appalachian territory, and is
suitable for the same purposes and available to the same markets,
generally on the same freight rates, and, for all practical
purposes, might have been included in the territory described as
Appalachian territory."
[
Footnote 3]
Exception is made of deliveries on contracts then outstanding
and of coal used in the operations of defendant's mines or sold to
its employees.
[
Footnote 4]
The findings show that:
"The number of domestic oil burners in use has increased more
than sixty fold . . . from 1921 to 1931. . . . About fifty percent
of all oil burners, both domestic and commercial, are in the
markets in which Appalachian coals are sold. The railroads have
improved combustion methods and reduced their fuel consumption from
1916 to 1929 by 32,000,000 tons. In freight service, their
consumption of coal per thousand freight ton miles dropped from 164
pounds in 1919 to 125 pounds in 1929. The electric industries
decreased consumption of coal per kilowatt hour from approximately
3.2 pounds to 1.6 pounds, and thereby reduced their requirements
for coal in excess of 47,000,000 tons. Efficiency in the smelting
of pig iron decreased the consumption of coal in relation to the
pig iron made by 10,000,000 tons. The saving in byproduct coke
manufacturers over the bee hive system amounted to 12,000,000
tons."
[
Footnote 5]
The court below points out that the use of natural gas and fuel
oil is limited to certain areas. Gas is not available to all
sections of the country, and the great centers of fuel oil
consumption are California, the southwest, the midcontinent field,
and the Atlantic seaboard. Moreover, in the states in which
Appalachian coal is chiefly marketed, the substitute fuels combined
supply only about 10 percent of the total energy consumption. In
the year 1929, about 50 percent of defendants' coal, other than
railroad fuel, went into the states of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, and
Illinois. In these states, the percentage of total energy
consumption derived from bituminous coal in 1929 ranged from 88.7
percent to 92.7 percent
[
Footnote 6]
Defendants insist that "the real spread is from 25 cents to
$1.84 per ton."
[
Footnote 7]
J. M. Dewberry, general coal and coke agent of the Louisville
& Nashville Railroad, a large consumer of Appalachian coal,
testified:
"It is a well known fact today that the buying power of these
large consumers of coal is more intelligent, more forceful, more
far-reaching than ever before in the history of the industry. And
it just sounds to me like a joke for somebody to talk about
Appalachian Coals or somebody else dictating the price that they
are going to pay. They dictate their own price. The purchaser makes
it. And he makes it because of the tremendous force and influence
of his buying power. Why, it is nothing these days for one interest
or one concern to buy several million tons of coal."
[
Footnote 8]
The district court, in its findings, after referring to the
railroads above mentioned, continues:
"A representative of a large public utility company [with
extensive power lines in the middle west and on the Atlantic
seaboard] consuming annually approximately 2,485,000 tons of coal
has stated that the organization and operation of Appalachian
Coals, Inc., will not affect competition in the markets in which
his company buys coal, and that it will have a beneficial effect on
the coal industry. A representative of a power company operating
throughout the state of Georgia . . . using from 30,000 to 125,000
tons of coal annually, has stated that the organization and
operation of Appalachian Coals, Inc., will not restrain competition
in the markets in which his company buys coal. A representative of
the Carbide & Carbon Corporation, which uses annually about
250,000 tons of bituminous coal, 100,000 tons of coke made from
bituminous coal, and 40,000 to 50,000 tons of petroleum coke, and
operating plants that consume coal at South Charleston, West
Virginia, Niagara Falls, New York, Cleveland, Ohio, Sault Ste.
Marie, Michigan, Indianapolis, Indiana, and Fremont and Fostoria,
Ohio, has stated that the organization of Appalachian Coals, Inc.,
will have a beneficial effect in the coal industry and will not
restrain competition in the markets in which his company buys coal.
The largest purchaser of coal in the states of North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, and eastern Tennessee who purchases
approximately 600,000 tons of coal annually under normal conditions
for use by textile mills located in those states has stated that
the organization and operation of Appalachian Coals, Inc., will not
control or dominate the price in the markets in which he purchases
coal, and that he will be able to purchase coal in an open and
competitive market."
[
Footnote 9]
Supra, pp. 10, 11.