The rule that the term "employee" in the Employers' Liability
Act does not embrace one who entered the service of a railroad
company by means of a fraudulent imposture in evasion of its health
rules, which he was physically unable to pass,
held
inapplicable to the facts of the present case, where the plaintiff,
in applying for employment, falsely gave his age below the age
limit set by the rules respecting hiring, but where the actual
difference of age had no relation to his physical fitness; where
the false representation was not shown to have deceived the company
or to constitute under its rules a ground for discharge, and where
the plaintiff at the time of his injury had worked for the company
seven years and was still well under the age fixed by its rules for
retirements.
Minneapolis, St.P. & S.S. M. Ry. Co. v.
Rock, 279 U. S. 410,
distinguished. P.
286 U. S. 451.
184 Minn. 126, 238 N.W. 4, affirmed.
Certiorari, 284 U.S. 615, to review the affirmance of a judgment
on an award in an action under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act.
MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
In October, 1921, petitioner accepted respondent's application
for work as a switchman, and the latter, in December, 1928, was
injured while employed in interstate
Page 286 U. S. 448
transportation. He brought this action in the District Court of
Hennepin county to recover damages under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act (45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59), and, after issue was
joined, the parties made an agreement for arbitration under a
statute of Minnesota (Gen. St.1923, §§ 9513-9519)
pursuant to which the company paid plaintiff $12,500 to be retained
by him in any event. And it was agreed that, if the arbitrators
found for plaintiff on the merits, the award should be $12,500 in
addition to the amount so paid. The arbitrators made findings of
fact, and held that plaintiff's injuries were caused by defendant's
negligence, and that he was entitled to recover the stipulated
amount. A motion made by defendant to vacate having been denied,
the district court entered judgment for plaintiff in accordance
with the award, and the Supreme Court affirmed. 184 Minn. 126, 238
N.W. 4.
Defendant's contention here is that the state court erred in
sustaining the finding that plaintiff was an employee within the
meaning of the Act as construed in
Minneapolis, St.P. &
S.S.M. Ry. Co. v. Rock, 279 U. S. 410.
Plaintiff made application in writing to defendant for
employment as switchman. Then, and continuously thereafter while
plaintiff worked for it, defendant had a rule, No. 16, promulgated
to promote safety and efficiency in the operation of its railroad,
which declared that no person over 45 years should be taken into
the service. Another rule, No. 22, was to the effect that
applications for employment in the yard service not rejected within
30 days would be considered accepted. And there was one, No. 4(A),
stating that all employees who attain the age of 65 will be
retired.
When plaintiff made his application, he was 49 years old, and
understood that defendant had a rule against accepting men over 45
to work in its train service. He falsely stated in his application
that he was 38 years old, and,
Page 286 U. S. 449
when submitting to a physical examination required of applicants
for employment, he again so misrepresented his age. This statement
was relied upon by the examining surgeon, and was in part the basis
of his finding and report that plaintiff was in good health and
acceptable physical condition. It was a general practice of men
over the age specified in the rule, when applying for such work on
the railroads of defendant and other carriers in the Northwest,
falsely to represent their ages to be within the specified limit,
and that practice was known to the defendant. The arbitrators were
unable to find whether defendant knew plaintiff was over 45 years.
They did not find, nor does the evidence require a finding, that
defendant was deceived by plaintiff's false statements or that it
accepted his application because of or in reliance upon them. The
application was not rejected within 30 days, and, under rule 22,
must be deemed to have been finally accepted. Under the terms of
the contract of hiring, defendant did not, without more, have the
right to remove plaintiff from its service on account of such
misrepresentation. Plaintiff worked for defendant as a switchman
for about 7 years, and, when injured, was well under the age for
retirement. His work was satisfactory. Neither his age nor his
physical condition contributed to cause his injury.
In
Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Rock, supra, this Court
held that one who obtained employment as a switchman for an
interstate carrier by railroad by fraudulently evading the
company's rule requiring applicants to submit to a physical
examination and who suffered injury in the course of employment in
interstate transportation, while the company remained unaware of
the deception, was not, as of right, an employee within the
meaning, or entitled to the protection, of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, and could not maintain an action for injury under
that statute.
Page 286 U. S. 450
Rock was an imposter. He applied for work under his true name
and was rejected upon examination because his physical condition
was found unacceptable under the carrier's reasonable rule and
practice. Later, representing that he had not theretofore made
application, he applied again, but under a different name, and
procured another man to impersonate him and in his place to submit
to the required physical examination. And, by means of the
surgeon's report upon that man's condition, Rock deceived the
company, and thereby secured the employment in which, about a year
later, he suffered injury. The court said (p.
279 U. S.
414):
"The deception . . . set at naught the carrier's reasonable rule
and practice established to promote the safety of employees and to
protect commerce. It was directly opposed to the public interest,
because calculated to embarrass and hinder the carrier in the
performance of its duties and to defeat important purposes sought
to be advanced by the act. . . . [P.
279 U. S.
415.] While his physical condition was not a cause of
his injuries, it did have direct relation to the propriety of
admitting him to such employment. It was at all times his duty to
disclose his identity and physical condition to petitioner. His
failure so to do was a continuing wrong in the nature of a cheat.
The misrepresentation and injury may not be regarded as unrelated
contemporary facts. As a result of his concealment, his status was
at all times wrongful, a fraud upon the petitioner, and a peril to
its patrons and its other employees. Right to recover may not
justly or reasonably be rested on a foundation so abhorrent to
public policy."
Here, defendant could not have regarded the difference between
plaintiff's actual age and that stated in his application as having
any material bearing upon the physical condition it required. The
arbitrators did not find, and the evidence does not show, that
plaintiff's false statement
Page 286 U. S. 451
of his age substantially affected the examining surgeon's
conclusion that he was in good health and acceptable physical
condition, or that, if he had given his real age, the surgeon would
have found otherwise. Indeed, the surgeon's testimony shows that,
save in exceptional cases, defendant, in accordance with its
established rules, permits its switchmen to continue in the service
until they are 65 years old without any physical examination after
they are employed. Plaintiff's physical condition was not shown to
be such as to make his employment inconsistent with the defendant's
proper policy or its reasonable rules to insure discharge of its
duty to select fit employees. The evidence indicates that, under
its own interpretation of rule 22, together with the schedule
constituting the agreement between defendant and its switchmen,
defendant, after the final acceptance of plaintiff's application,
was not free to discharge him on account of the false statement as
to his age.
It is clear that the facts found, when taken in connection with
those shown by uncontradicted evidence, are not sufficient to bring
this case within the rule applied in
Minneapolis, St.P. &
S.S.M. Ry. Co. v. Rock, supra, or the reasons upon which that
decision rests.
Judgment affirmed.