1. The general principle underlying the income tax statutes ever
since the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment has been the
computation of gains and losses on the basis of an annual
accounting for the transactions of the year. P.
286 U. S.
326.
2. A taxpayer who seeks an allowance for losses suffered in an
earlier year, must be able to point to a specific provision of the
statute permitting the deduction, and must bring himself within its
terms.
Id.
3. The popular or received import of words furnishes the general
rule for the interpretation of public laws. P.
286 U. S.
327.
4. A construction that would engender mischief should be
avoided. P.
286 U. S.
329.
5. Section 206(b) of the Revenue Act of 1926, permitted any
taxpayer who sustained a net loss in one year to deduct it in
computing his net income for the next year and, if it exceeded that
net income (computed without such deduction), to deduct the excess
in computing the net income for the next succeeding ("third") year.
By other provisions of the same Act, § 240(a) and (b)
affiliated corporations could make consolidated returns of net
income upon the basis of which the tax was to be computed as a unit
and then be assessed to the respective corporations in such
proportions as they might agree upon or, if they did not agree,
then on the basis of the net income properly assignable to
each.
Held:
(1) Where one of two corporations which became affiliated in
1927 had no net income that year, its net losses for 1925 and 1926
were not deductible in their consolidated return of net income for
1927. P.
286 U. S.
326.
(2) Each of the corporations joined in a consolidated return is
nonetheless a taxpayer. The deduction of net loss is not
permitted
Page 286 U. S. 320
by § 206(b) except from the net income of the corporation
suffering the loss, and if there would be no net income for the
current year though the earlier loss were to be excluded, there is
nothing from which a deduction can be made.
Id.
53 F.2d 821 affirmed.
Certiorari, 284 U.S. 615, to review the affirmance of a
judgment, 44 F.2d 856, sustaining a demurrer to the petition in an
action to recover money paid as income taxes.
Page 286 U. S. 324
MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner and Piedmont Savings Company are separate
corporations organized in Georgia. They became affiliated in 1927,
when the petitioner became the owner of 96 percent of the Piedmont
stock. In March, 1928, the two corporations
Page 286 U. S. 325
filed a consolidated income tax return for 1927 under § 240
of the Revenue Act of 1926. Revenue Act of 1926, c. 27, 44 Stat. 9,
46. During 1927, the petitioner had a net taxable income of
$36,587.62, and Piedmont had suffered during the same year a net
loss of $453.80. Before its affiliation with the petitioner, it had
suffered other and greater losses. Its net loss in 1925 was
$43,478.25, and in 1926, $410.82, a total for the two years of
$43,889.07. In the assessment of the tax for 1927, the Commissioner
deducted from the petitioner's net income for that year the loss of
$453.80 suffered by its affiliated corporation in the course of the
same year. The consolidated net taxable income as thus adjusted was
$36,133.82, on which a tax of $5,026.22 was assessed and paid. On
the other hand, the Commissioner refused to deduct the Piedmont
losses suffered in 1925 and 1926 before the year of affiliation.
The deductions, if allowed, would have wiped out the tax. A refund
having been refused, the petitioner brought this suit against the
collector to recover the moneys paid. The District Court sustained
a demurrer to the petition, 44 F.2d 856, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed, 53 F.2d 821. The case is here on certiorari.
Section 240(a) of the Revenue Act of 1926 provides that
"corporations which are affiliated within the meaning of this
section may, for any taxable year, make separate returns or, under
regulations prescribed by the Commissioner with the approval of the
Secretary, make a consolidated return of net income for the purpose
of this chapter, in which case the taxes thereunder shall be
computed and determined upon the basis of such return."
Section 240(b) provides that,
"in any case in which a tax is assessed upon the basis of a
consolidated return, the total tax shall be computed in the first
instance as a unit, and shall then be assessed upon the respective
affiliated corporations in such proportions as may be agreed upon
among them, or, in the absence of any such agreement,
Page 286 U. S. 326
then on the basis of the net income properly assignable to each.
. . ."
The general principal underlying the income tax statutes, ever
since the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment, has been the
computation of gains and losses on the basis of an annual
accounting for the transactions of the year.
Burnet v. Sanford
& Brooks Co., 282 U. S. 359,
282 U. S. 363.
A taxpayer who seeks an allowance for losses suffered in an earlier
year must be able to point to a specific provision of the statute
permitting the deduction, and must bring himself within its terms.
Unless he can do this, the operations of the current year must be
the measure of his burden.
The only section of the Revenue Act that made allowance in 1927
for the losses of earlier years was § 206(b), upon which this
controversy hinges. Its provisions are as follows:
"If, for any taxable year, it appears upon the production of
evidence satisfactory to the commissioner that any taxpayer has
sustained a net loss, the amount thereof shall be allowed as a
deduction in computing the net income of the taxpayer for the
succeeding taxable year (hereinafter in this section called 'second
year'), and if such net loss is in excess of such net income
(computed without such deduction), the amount of such excess shall
be allowed as a deduction in computing the net income for the next
succeeding taxable year (hereinafter in this section called 'third
year'), the deduction in all cases to be made under regulations
prescribed by the commissioner with the approval of the
Secretary."
Under that section of the statute, the losses suffered by the
Piedmont Company in 1925 might have been deducted from its net
income in 1926, and might thereafter, if not extinguished, have
been deducted to the extent of the excess from its net income in
1927, the year in which its shares were acquired by the petitioner.
But
Page 286 U. S. 327
the Piedmont Company did not have any net income in 1927. Its
operations for that year resulted in a loss. There was therefore
nothing from which earlier losses could be deducted, for the net
income without any such deductions was still a minus quantity. The
tax for the year was nothing, and the losses of other years could
not serve to make it less. The petitioner would have us hold that
the minus quantities for all the years should be added together,
and the total turned over by the company suffering the loss as an
allowance to be made to the company realizing the gain. In that
view of the statute, a net loss for a taxable year becomes, for the
purpose of determining the burdens of affiliated corporations,
though not for any other, the equivalent of a net income, and
deductions which the statute has said shall be made only from net
income may nonetheless, by some process of legerdemain, be
subtracted from the loss.
There are two fundamental objections to this method of
computation. In the first place, an interpretation of net income by
which it is also a net loss involves the reading of the words of
the statute in a strained and unnatural sense. The metamorphosis is
too great to be viewed without a shock. Certainly the average man
suffering a net loss from the operations of his business would
learn with surprise that, within the meaning of the Congress, the
amount of his net loss was also the amount of his net income. "The
popular or received import of words furnishes the general rule for
the interpretation of public laws."
Maillard
v.Lawrence, 16 How. 251,
57 U. S. 261;
Old Colony R. Co. v. Commissioner, 284 U.
S. 552,
284 U. S. 560.
In the second place, the statute has given notice to the taxpayer
that the aggregate of minus quantities is not to be turned over as
a credit to an affiliated company, but is to be used in another
way. If the loss for the first year is more than the income for the
second, the excess is to be carried over to a third year, and
deducted from the net
Page 286 U. S. 328
income, if any, returnable for that year at which time the
process of carrying over is to end.
Cf. Report of Senate
Committee in charge of the Revenue Act of 1924, Senate Report No.
398, 68th Congress, 1st Session, p. 20. Obviously, the direction to
apply the excess against the income of a later year is inconsistent
with a purpose to allow it to an affiliated company as an immediate
deduction from income of the current year. Adherence to the one
practice excludes adherence to the other.
Cf. Treasury
Regulations 69 promulgated under the Act of 1926, Arts. 634, 635,
1622. The fact is not to be ignored that each of two or more
corporations joining (under § 240) in a consolidated return is
nonetheless a taxpayer.
Commissioner v. Ginsburg Co., 54
F.2d 238, 239. By the express terms of the statute, § 240(b),
the tax, when computed, is to be assessed, in the absence of
agreement to the contrary, upon the respective affiliated
corporations "on the basis of the net income properly assignable to
each." "The term
taxpayer' includes any person . . . subject to
a tax imposed by this Act." Revenue Act of 1921, § 2(9), 42
Stat. 227. A corporation does not cease to be such a person by
affiliating with another.
The petitioner insists that a construction of 206(b), excluding
the allowance of past losses except as a set-off against the income
of the company sustaining them, is inconsistent with the accepted
construction of § 234 of the same act whereby the deductions
there enumerated are made from the net income exhibited by the
consolidated return without reference to their origin in the
business of one company or another. Section 234 provides that, in
computing the net income of corporations subject to a tax, there
shall be allowed as deductions:
"(1) All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. . . .
(2) All interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on its
indebtedness. . . . (3) Taxes paid
Page 286 U. S. 329
or accrued within the taxable year. . . (4) Losses sustained
during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or
otherwise. . . (5) Debts ascertained to be worthless and charged
off within the taxable year."
The points of difference between the allowances under §
206(b), upon the one hand, and those under § 234, upon the
other are important and obvious. The deductions allowable under
§ 234 represent expenses paid or accrued or losses suffered
during the same taxable year covered by the return. They are thus
included in the net income according to the fundamental concept of
such income reflected in the statute, instead of falling within an
exception which, irrespective of its precise extension, is a
departure from the general scheme. Even more decisive is the
consideration that there is nothing in § 234 prohibiting the
allowance by one unit of its current losses and expenses as a
deduction for the benefit of the affiliated group, nor any
statement that the use to be made of them shall follow other lines.
On the other hand, § 206(b) provides, as we have seen, that
the excess of loss remaining over the current net income of the
taxpayer who has suffered it shall be carried over into the next
year, and, if need be, into a third, and thereafter disregarded.
Subtle arguments have been addressed to us in support of the
contention that the loss of one affiliated company suffered in
earlier years may be allocated to the other without infraction of
the rule that the loss shall be carried forward. They are not
lacking in plausibility, but we cannot hold that they comport with
the directions of the statute "if we take words in their plain
popular meaning, as they should be taken here."
United States
v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U. S. 1,
284 U. S. 3.
Doubt, if there can be any, is not likely to survive a
consideration of the mischiefs certain to be engendered by any
other ruling. A different ruling would mean that a prosperous
corporation could buy the shares of one that
Page 286 U. S. 330
had suffered heavy losses and wipe out thereby its own liability
for taxes. The mind rebels against the notion that Congress, in
permitting a consolidated return, was willing to foster an
opportunity for juggling so facile and so obvious. Submission to
such mischiefs would be necessary if the statute were so plain in
permitting the deduction as to leave no room for choice between
that construction and another. Expediency may tip the scales when
arguments are nicely balanced. True, of course, it is that, in a
system of taxation so intricate and vast as ours, there are many
other loopholes unsuspected by the framers of the statute, many
other devices whereby burdens can be lowered. This is no reason,
however, for augmenting them needlessly by the addition of another.
The petitioner was prosperous in 1927, and, so far as the record
shows, for many years before. Piedmont was unfortunate in 1927, and
unfortunate in the years preceding. The petitioner, affiliating in
1927, has been allowed the loss suffered by Piedmont though the
business of that year as a permissible deduction from the
consolidated balance. What it claims is a right to deduct the
losses that were suffered in earlier years when the companies were
separate. To such an attempt, the reaction of an impartial mind is
little short of instinctive that the deduction is unreasonable, and
cannot have been intended by the framers of the statute. Analysis
of the sections shows that there is no gap between what they wrote
and what, in reason, they must have meant.
The petitioner refers us to the Revenue Act of 1928 (45 Stat.
791, 835) and to Treasury Regulations adopted thereunder as
supporting its position. These provisions were adopted after the
liability for the tax of 1927 had accrued, and they can have little
bearing upon the meaning to be given to statutes then in force. The
Revenue Act of 1928, § 141(b), protects against unfair
evasions in
Page 286 U. S. 331
the making of consolidated returns by increasing the
discretionary power of the Commissioner in prescribing
regulations.
"The Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary, shall
prescribe such regulations as he may deem necessary in order that
the tax liability of an affiliated group of corporations making a
consolidated return and of each corporation in the group, both
during and after the period of affiliation, may be determined,
computed, assessed, collected, and adjusted in such manner as
clearly to reflect the income and to prevent avoidance of tax
liability."
Under the authority so conferred, the Commissioner has adopted
the following regulation (Treasury Regulations 75, art. 41),
applicable only to the taxable year 1929, and to taxable years
thereafter:
"A net loss sustained by a corporation prior to the date upon
which its income is included in the consolidated return of an
affiliated group (including any net loss sustained prior to the
taxable year 1929) shall be allowed as a deduction in computing the
consolidated net income of such group in the same manner, to the
same extent, and upon the same conditions as if the consolidated
income were the income of such corporation, but in no case in which
the affiliated status is created after January 1, 1929, will any
such net loss be allowed as a deduction in excess of the cost or
the aggregate basis of the stock of such corporation owned by the
members of the group."
The provision in this regulation limiting the deductions to the
cost or value of the stock will make it profitless hereafter to
purchase stock for the purpose of gaining the benefit of deductions
in excess of what is paid.
In holding that the Piedmont losses of 1925 and 1926 were
properly excluded from the consolidated return, we are in accord
with the preponderance of authority in the other federal courts.
Swift & Co. v. United States, 38 F.2d 365;
Sweets
Co. v. Commissioner, 40 F.2d 436;
Page 286 U. S. 332
Commissioner v. Ginsburg, 54 F.2d 238. Only one
decision has been cited to us as favoring a different view.
National Slag Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 846.
The judgment is
Affirmed.