A state tax of six cents per gallon on sales of gasoline was
added by the seller to gasoline bought by an air-transport company
for use in its planes, which traversed the state in interstate
commerce and stopped at several places there, but transported no
passengers or freight between those places.
Held:
Whether viewed as a tax on property or as an excise, the tax is
not a direct burden on interstate commerce, and is within the power
of the state. P.
285 U. S.
152.
52 F.2d 456 affirmed.
Page 285 U. S. 148
Appeal from a decree of the District Court of three judges
denying an interlocutory injunction in a suit to restrain
collection of a state tax.
Page 285 U. S. 150
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit was brought to restrain the collection of a tax,
imposed by the State of South Carolina, of 6 cents a gallon with
respect to gasoline purchased by complainant in that state and used
by complainant in interstate commerce. The complainant charged that
the state Act
Page 285 U. S. 151
placed a direct burden upon interstate commerce, and hence was
repugnant to the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. Art.,
§ 8. The District Court, composed of three judges as required
by statute, denied an interlocutory injunction, 52 F.2d 456, and
the complainant appeals to this Court. Judicial Code, § 266,
U.S.C. Tit. 28, § 380.
From the findings of the District Court, it appears that the
complainant is a Delaware corporation operating, in interstate
commerce, air transport lines across the state of South Carolina;
that its planes make regular stops at various points in the state,
but do not carry freight or passengers between such points, and
practically its entire business is interstate in character; that it
purchases gasoline in South Carolina for the use of its planes, and
that the seller adds to the price the amount of the state gasoline
tax which the seller is required to pay under the Act in question,
and thus complainant has to pay 6 cents a gallon more than it
otherwise would, the excess amounting to about $5,000 a year.
The tax is described in the statute [
Footnote 1] as a license tax which, as applied in the
instant case against the dealer,
Page 285 U. S. 152
is for the privilege of carrying on the business of selling
gasoline within the state. The tax is thus imposed upon the seller,
and the sales in question are intrastate sales. The appellant
emphasizes the fact that the tax has been construed by the supreme
court of the state to be an excise tax, and not a property tax.
Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 164 S.E. 588. So far as the
present question is concerned, the distinction is not important. If
such a license tax for the privilege of making sales within the
state were regarded as in effect a tax upon the goods sold,
[
Footnote 2] its validity could
not be questioned in the circumstances here disclosed, as, in that
aspect, the tax would be upon a part of the general mass of
property within the state, and hence subject to the state's
authority to tax, although the property might actually be used in
interstate commerce. [
Footnote
3] "It is elementary," said the Court in
New Jersey
Telephone Co. v. Tax Board, 280 U. S. 338,
280 U. S. 346,
"that a state may tax property used to carry on interstate
commerce." Treating the tax as an excise tax upon the sales
[
Footnote 4] does not change
the result in the instant case, as the sales are still purely
intrastate transactions.
Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi,
280 U. S. 390,
280 U. S. 395.
Undoubtedly, purchases of goods within a state may form part of
transactions
Page 285 U. S. 153
in interstate commerce, and hence be entitled to enjoy a
corresponding immunity. [
Footnote
5] But the mere purchase of supplies or equipment for use in
conducting a business which constitutes interstate commerce is not
so identified with that commerce as to make the sale immune from a
nondiscriminatory tax imposed by the state upon intrastate dealers.
There is no substantial distinction between the sale of gasoline
that is used in an airplane in interstate transportation and the
sale of coal for the locomotives of an interstate carrier, or of
the locomotives and cars themselves bought as equipment for
interstate transportation. A nondiscriminatory tax upon local sales
in such cases has never been regarded as imposing a direct burden
upon interstate commerce, and has no greater or different effect
upon that commerce than a general property tax to which all those
enjoying the protection of the state may be subjected.
In
Helson Kentucky, 279 U. S. 245,
upon which the appellant relies, the tax was laid by Kentucky with
respect to gasoline purchased by the plaintiffs in error in
Illinois and used within Kentucky in the operation of a ferry boat
on the Ohio river between the two states. The Court found that the
tax was laid directly upon the use of the gasoline in interstate
transportation. The Court said that "The tax is exacted as the
price of the privilege of using an instrumentality of interstate
commerce."
Id., p.
279 U. S. 252.
Such a tax is manifestly different from a general property tax or a
tax upon purely local sales.
Decree affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Act of February 23, 1922, as amended (South Carolina Acts, 1922,
pp. 835-838; 1929, pp. 107-112). Section 1 provides:
"That every oil company, person, firm or corporation doing
domestic or intrastate business within this state, and engaging in
the business of selling, consigning, using, shipping, or
distributing for the purpose of sale within this state, any
gasoline or any substitute therefor, or combination thereof, for
the privilege of carrying on such business shall be subject to the
payment of a license tax, which tax shall be measured by and
graduated in accordance with the volume of sales of such oil
company within the state. Every such oil company shall pay to the
state an amount of money equal to six (6) cents per gallon on all
gasoline, combinations thereof, or substitutes therefor, for, sold
or consigned, used, shipped or distributed for the purpose of sale
within the state. . . ."
[
Footnote 2]
Brown v.
Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419,
25 U. S. 444;
Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275,
91 U. S. 278;
Kehrer v. Stewart, 197 U. S. 60,
197 U. S.
65.
[
Footnote 3]
Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517,
116 U. S. 525;
Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U.
S. 194,
165 U. S. 220;
166 U. S. 166 U.S.
185,
166 U. S. 218;
Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio R. Co. v. Texas,
210 U. S. 217,
210 U. S. 227;
Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Nevada, 248 U.
S. 165,
248 U. S. 167;
Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.
S. 245,
260 U. S. 259;
Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.
S. 506,
262 U. S. 509,
262 U. S. 515;
New Jersey Telephone Co. v. Tax Board, 280 U.
S. 338,
280 U. S. 346;
Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U.
S. 390,
280 U. S.
395.
[
Footnote 4]
Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U.
S. 218,
277 U. S. 222;
Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.
S. 570,
283 U. S. 574,
575.
[
Footnote 5]
Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.
S. 282,
257 U. S.
290-291;
Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co.,
258 U. S. 50;
Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495,
258 U. S. 516;
Shafer v. Farmers' Grain Co., 268 U.
S. 189,
268 U. S.
198.