1. A court of a state where a foreign railroad corporation is
authorized to do business, owns and operates part of its lines,
maintains an office, and has agents for the transaction of its
general business has jurisdiction of a suit against the company in
damages for personal injuries under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, brought by a resident upon a cause of action which
arose in another state when he was residing there. P.
284 U. S.
287.
2. Jurisdiction in such case is not defeated by the fact that a
second railroad company, over which the court is without
jurisdiction, is named codefendant.
Id.
3. A foreign railroad corporation which is not authorized to do
business within the state, and does not own or operate any of its
lines within the state, although it owns some property there and
employs agents who solicit traffic,
held not subject to
the jurisdiction of a court of that state in a suit in damages for
personal injuries under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
brought by a resident upon a cause of action which arose in another
state when he was residing there, as otherwise an undue burden upon
interstate commerce would result.
Id.
4. The prohibition against burdening interstate commerce cannot
be evaded merely by attaching the property of the foreign railroad
corporation within the state, nor may it be avoided by joining as
codefendant in the suit a second railroad company over which the
court has jurisdiction. The burden and expense which the carrier
must incur in order to make defense in a state where the accident
did not occur has no relation to the nature of the process used to
bring it before the court.
Id.
5. The fact that witnesses for the plaintiff reside within the
state, thus enabling him to try his cause there with less
inconvenience
Page 284 U. S. 285
than elsewhere, is not sufficient to justify the state court in
retaining jurisdiction of the suit. P.
284 U. S.
287.
Reversed.
Certiorari,
post, p. 601, to review a judgment of the
Supreme Court of Missouri denying a petition for a writ of
prohibition to restrain a county circuit court from entertaining
further jurisdiction of a suit in damages for personal injuries,
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, against two foreign
railroad corporations.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Missouri brings
up for review a judgment which denied a petition for prohibition
without an accompanying opinion.
Following the local practice, the Denver & Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company (Rio Grande) and the Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Railway Company (Santa Fe) presented their petition
directly to the Supreme Court. After setting out the proceedings in
an action against them pending in the Jackson County Circuit Court,
it alleged that, if the cause proceeded to trial, an undue burden
on interstate commerce would result; also, the commerce clause of
the Federal Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment would be
violated. It asked that the presiding judge be restrained from
entertaining further jurisdiction.
On August 26, 1930, Curtis, then residing in Missouri, brought
the above-mentioned action against both the Santa Fe and the Rio
Grande under the Federal Employers'
Page 284 U. S. 286
Liability Act. He sought damages for personal injuries said to
have resulted from their joint negligence on December 26, 1929,
while he was employed by them at an interlocking track and signal
plant near Pueblo, Colorado.
A writ of attachment against the Rio Grande was served by
garnishee process upon several railroad companies said to be
indebted to it. Summonses for both defendants were served upon
their agents.
Defendants, appearing specially, moved to quash the attachment
and summonses and presented affidavits to support their motions.
The plaintiff filed counteraffidavits. It appeared that properly to
defend the cause would require attendance of witnesses from
Colorado at large expense; also the attendance of some witnesses
for the plaintiff who resided in Missouri. The trial court
overruled the motions. Thereupon, the defendants petitioned the
supreme court as above stated.
The Rio Grande, a Delaware corporation, operates lines which lie
wholly within Colorado, Utah, and New Mexico. It neither owns nor
operates any line in Missouri, but it does own and use some
property located there. It maintains one or more offices in the
state, and employs agents who solicit traffic. These agents engage
in transactions incident to the procurement, delivery, and record
of such traffic. It is not licensed to do business in Missouri.
The Santa Fe a Kansas corporation, owns and operates railroad
lines in Missouri, Kansas, Colorado, and other states. It is
licensed to do business in Missouri, and has an office and agents
in Jackson county. These agents transact the business ordinarily
connected with the operation of a carrier by railroad.
After being injured at Pueblo, and before instituting his action
against the railroad companies, Curtis removed to and became a
bona fide resident and citizen of Missouri.
Page 284 U. S. 287
According to the doctrine approved in
Hoffman v.
Foraker, 274 U. S. 21, we
think the Santa Fe was properly sued in Jackson county. The Supreme
Court committed no error of which we can take notice by refusing to
prohibit further prosecution of the action against that company.
The mere fact that the Santa Fe was named a codefendant with the
Rio Grande was not enough to defeat jurisdiction of the court over
the former.
Under the rule approved in
Michigan Central R. Co. v.
Mix, 278 U. S. 492, the
Rio Grande properly claimed exemption from suit in Jackson county.
It was not necessary to join the two railroad companies in one
action. Whatever liability exists is several. The prohibition
against burdening interstate commerce cannot be avoided by the
simple device of a joint action. Nor can this be evaded merely by
attaching the property of the nonresident railroad corporation.
Obviously, the burden and expense which the carrier must incur in
order to make defense in a state where the accident did not occur
has no relation to the nature of the process used to bring it
before the court.
The alleged residence in Missouri of persons whose testimony
plaintiff supposed would be necessary to prove his claim was not
enough to justify retention of jurisdiction by the circuit court.
While this circumstance might enable plaintiff to try his cause
there with less inconvenience than elsewhere, it would not prevent
imposition of a serious burden upon interstate commerce. And, we
have held, it is the infliction of this burden that deprives the
courts of jurisdiction over cases like this.
Davis v. Farmers'
Cooperative Equity Co., 262 U. S. 312.
Further, as a practical matter, courts could not undertake to
ascertain in advance of trial the number and importance of probable
witnesses within and without the state and retain
Page 284 U. S. 288
or refuse jurisdiction according to the relative inconvenience
of the parties.
The judgment of the supreme court must be reversed. The cause
will be remanded there for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE STONE took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.
