By Revenue Act of 1921, Title II, § 213(b)(4), in computing
gross income, interest on obligations of a state or any political
subdivision thereof is excluded, and by § 214(a)(2), all
interest paid
Page 282 U. S. 515
or accrued on indebtedness owed by the taxpayer is deductible
from gross income, except interest on indebtedness incurred or
continued to purchase or carry obligations (other than certain
specified obligations of the United States) the interest upon which
is wholly exempt from taxation under the Title.
Held that
the purpose of the exception was to prevent the escape from
taxation of income properly subject thereto by the purchase of
exempt securities with borrowed money, and that it is not
unconstitutional either (a) as discriminating against owners of
nontaxable securities and nullifying their immunity from taxation,
or (b) a discriminating against dealers in municipal bonds who, in
the course of their business, pay interest on money borrowed to buy
or carry such securities, but cannot deduct it in their tax
returns, although those engaged in other kinds of business are
allowed to deduct interest as an operating expense, or (c) as
arbitrarily discriminating in favor of those who are able to
purchase and carry securities without borrowing.
National Life
Ins. Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 508,
distinguished. P.
282 U. S.
519.
36 F.2d 145 reversed.
Certiorari, 281 U.S. 712, to review a judgment which affirmed a
recovery from the Collector in a suit in the district court for
money collected as an additional income tax.
Page 282 U. S. 517
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
During the year 1922, while respondent, Slayton, engaged in the
business of buying, carrying, and selling tax exempt municipal
bonds, he collected $65,720.06, as interest on securities of that
character which he owned. He paid out $78,153.84 for interest on
money borrowed by himself in due course for the purpose of
purchasing and carrying exempt securities. In his return showing
income received during that year, he excluded the interest so
collected, and he claimed deduction for the interest paid out on
the borrowed money. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction, and
made a corresponding additional
Page 282 U. S. 518
assessment. Respondent paid the sum demanded thereunder, and,
after proper preliminary action, sued to recover it.
Determination of the question involved must turn upon the
validity, construction, and effect of §§ 213 and 214,
Revenue Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 227, 237, 238, 239. Their pertinent
provisions follow.
"Sec. 213. That, for the purposes of this title . . . , the term
'gross income' --"
"
* * * *"
"(b) Does not include the following items, which shall be exempt
from taxation under this title:"
"
* * * *"
"(4) Interest upon (a) the obligations of a state, Territory, or
any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia. . .
."
"Sec. 214 (a) That, in computing net income there shall be
allowed as deductions:"
"
* * * *"
"(2) All interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on
indebtedness, except on indebtedness incurred or continued to
purchase or carry obligations or securities (other than obligations
of the United States issued after September 24, 1917, and
originally subscribed for by the taxpayer) the interest upon which
is wholly exempt from taxation under this title. . . ."
By original petition in the District Court, Northern District of
Ohio, Slayton asserted that the exception found in paragraph (2),
§ 214(a), conflicts with the federal Constitution in that, by
necessary operation, it causes discrimination against the owners of
nontaxable securities and nullifies their immunity from taxation.
Also, that the act is discriminatory and unconstitutional in that
necessary expenses incident to all other kinds of business,
including interest paid for purchasing and carrying merchandise and
inventories, are allowed as part of the operating cost, whereas
deduction of interest paid by plaintiff upon funds borrowed to
carry nontaxable securities (an ordinary operating expense) is
prohibited. Also
Page 282 U. S. 519
that the act is arbitrary and unconstitutional because it
discriminates against plaintiff, whose resources do not permit him
to purchase tax-free securities for cash, and in favor of those
whose resources permit them to purchase and carry such securities
without borrowing.
The collector unsuccessfully demurred to the petition upon the
ground that it states no cause of action. Judgment went for the
plaintiff, and was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. Both
courts were of opinion that, under the doctrine announced in
National Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 277 U.
S. 508, enforcement of paragraph (2), § 214(a),
would deprive respondent of rights guaranteed by the federal
Constitution.
The challenged judgment must be reversed. The case will be
remanded to the district court with instructions to enter judgment
for the collector.
The circumstances disclosed in
National Life Ins. Co. v.
United States were radically different from those now
presented, and the doctrine upon which that cause turned does not
control the present one. The respondent here was not in effect
required to pay more upon his taxable receipts than was demanded of
others who enjoyed like incomes solely because he was the recipient
of interest from tax free securities -- a result which we found
would have followed enforcement of the literal provisions of §
245(a), Revenue Act 1921, 42 Stat. 227, 261. While guaranteed
exemptions must be strictly observed, this obligation is not
inconsistent with reasonable classification designed to subject all
to the payment of their just share of a burden fairly imposed.
The manifest purpose of the exception in paragraph 2, §
214(a), was to prevent the escape from taxation of income properly
subject thereto by the purchase of exempt securities with borrowed
money.
Under the theory of the respondent, A, with an income of $10,000
arising from nonexempt securities by
Page 282 U. S. 520
the simple expedient of purchasing exempt ones with borrowed
funds and paying $10,000 interest thereon, would escape all
taxation upon receipts from both sources. It was proper to make
provision to prevent such a possibility. The classification
complained of is not arbitrary, makes no improper discrimination,
does not result in defeating any guaranteed exemption, and was
within the power of Congress. The fact that respondent engaged in
the business of buying and selling is not important.
See
Willcuts v. Bunn, ante, p.
282 U. S. 216.
Reversed.