A state law which, in the taxation of carriers of freight by
motor vehicle using the public highways distinguishes between those
common carriers who operate over regular routes between fixed
termini and other carriers, common and private, does not
deprive
Page 280 U. S. 81
the first mentioned class of equal protection in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, even if the tax upon it be more
burdensome than that upon the others, since it cannot be aid that
the classification lacks any reasonable basis. So
held in
view (1) of the differences between common and private carriers,
and (2) of the probability that common carrier operating regularly
between fixed termini cause greater wear to the public highways and
greater danger to the public thereon. P.
280 U. S.
82.
Affirmed.
Appeal from a decree of the district court (three judges)
dismissing a bill to enjoin the state Controller from enforcing a
tax on the appellants' gross receipts from transportation of
freight on public highways in motor vehicles.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellants, as common carriers, are engaged in transporting
freight by motor vehicles for hire along public highways between
fixed termini and over regular routes within California. The 1926
amendment to the Constitution and the statutes of that state lay
upon such carriers a tax of 5% of their gross receipts in lieu of
all other taxes, while other freight carriers, common and private,
by motor vehicles, are subjected to different and, it is alleged,
less burdensome taxation.Const. Cal. Art. 13, § 15; Act March
5, 1927, Chap. 19, 1927 Cal.Stats.
By this proceeding, instituted July 21, 1928, appellants ask
that the constitutional amendment and that statute
Page 280 U. S. 82
which undertake to lay such tax upon them be declared
discriminatory and in conflict with § 1, of the Fourteenth
Amendment; also that an injunction issue against the State
Controller forbidding him from attempting to enforce payment.
Upon motion, without written opinion, the district court --
three judges sitting -- dismissed the bill. The cause is here by
direct appeal, and the only matter for our determination is the
validity of the challenged classification.
The power of a state in respect of classification has often been
declared by opinions here. We are unable to say that there was no
reasonable basis for the one under consideration; the court below
reached the proper result, and its decree must be affirmed.
Appellants voluntarily assumed the position of common carriers
operating between fixed termini, and enjoy all consequent benefits.
That a marked distinction exists between common and private
carriers by auto vehicles appears from
Frost v. Railroad
Commission, 271 U. S. 583, and
Michigan Public Utilities Commission v. Duke, 266 U.
S. 570. Sufficient reasons for placing common carriers,
operating as appellants do, in a special class are pointed out by
Raymond v. Holm, 165 Minn. 215;
State v. Le
Febvre, 174 Minn. 248;
Iowa Motor Vehicle Assn. v. Board
of Railroad Commissioners, 207 Iowa 461;
Liberty Highway
Co. v. Michigan Public Utilities Commission, 294 F. 703. Their
use of the highways probably will be regular and frequent, and
therefore unusually destructive thereto; also, it will expose the
public to dangers exceeding those consequent upon the occasional
movements of other carriers.
Although relied upon by counsel and said to be almost identical
with the case at bar,
Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania,
277 U. S. 389,
gives no support to claim of
Page 280 U. S. 83
undue discrimination. regard the controversy as not open to
serious doubt, and further discussion of it seems unnecessary.
