1. Upon review of a decision of a state supreme court sustaining
a service by publication on a nonresident landowner in a
condemnation case as conformable to a state statute, and rejecting
the landowner's contention that the period of time between service
and the return day was too brief to satisfy the demands of due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment, this Court accepts as
binding upon it the state court's construction of the statute with
respect to the time as of which service is complete and as to the
manner of fixing the return day. P.
280 U. S.
110.
2. Eighteen days between service by publication and the return
day
held sufficient time under the due process clause, as
applied to a nonresident defendant in a suit to condemn land.
Id.
3. Description of property in petition in condemnation
proceedings
held adequate under the due process clause. P.
280 U. S. 111.
4. Where the validity of a state statute is challenged on the
ground of its being repugnant to the due process clause of the
Fourteenth
Page 280 U. S. 109
Amendment, but the contention of appellant are unsubstantial,
this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the
state court. P.
280 U. S. 111.
Appeal from 145 Wash. 129, 148 Wash. 479, dismissed.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington
upholding the constitutionality of a statute providing for service
by publication upon nonresident owners of land in condemnation
proceedings.
MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellee, a public utility corporation organized under the laws
of Washington, was empowered to acquire by eminent domain the right
to use the water of Lake Chelan for the generation of electricity
for public use, and to that end was authorized to impound and raise
the water to 1100 feet above mean sea level. Appellant, a resident
and citizen of Pennsylvania, owns shore land a part of which is
overflowed by the water so raised. Appellee instituted condemnation
proceedings in the Superior Court of Chelan County. The petition
showed that the purpose was to acquire the right so to raise the
water and inundate appellant's land. Notice was published as
required. And later appellee filed a bill of particulars describing
by metes and bounds the land to be condemned. The court found the
taking to be in the public interest, fixed compensation for
appellant, and, by its decree, appropriated to the use of appellee
the right in perpetuity to overflow such land. The judgment was
affirmed in the highest court of the
Page 280 U. S. 110
state. 145 Wash. 129. 148 Wash. 479. Appellant seeks review
under § 237 of the Judicial 'Code. U.S.C., Tit. 28, §
344(a).
Under the laws of Washington (Remington's Compiled Statutes,m
1922, § 921
et seq.) condemnation proceedings are
instituted by the presentation of a petition to the superior court
of the county in which is located the property proposed to be
taken. Notice is required to be given to those interested as owners
or otherwise. § 922. The substance of the provision here
attacked. follows.
"In all cases where the owner . . . is a nonresident of this
state . . . , service [of the notice] may be made by publication
thereof in any newspaper published in the county where such lands
are situated, once a week for two successive weeks. . . . And such
publication shall be deemed service upon each such nonresident. . .
."
September 22, 1926, appellee filed a notice that its petition
for condemnation would be presented to the court October 11. A
notice to that effect was published in a newspaper of the county on
September 23, September 30, and October 7. Appellant appeared
specially, objected to the jurisdiction of the court, moved to
quash the service, and challenged the validity of the statute on
the ground of its being repugnant to the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
She says that the service was not complete until two weeks after
the first publication, and, relying on
Roller v. Holly,
176 U. S. 398,
insists that the time allowed is not sufficient. But the supreme
court distinguished the Texas statute considered in that case from
that of Washington now before us, construed the latter not to
require publication for successive weeks and not to prescribe the
period of time required to elapse between the giving of the notice
and the return day, held that the first publication constituted
service and that the intervening eighteen days was sufficient. That
court's construction of the state
Page 280 U. S. 111
statute is authoritative. No discussion is required to show that
the time so allowed is reasonable. There is no ground on which it
may be contended that the statute as construed is repugnant to the
due process clause.
Huling v. Kaw Valley R. & I. Co.,
130 U. S. 559,
130 U. S. 563.
Bellingham Bay & B.C. R. Co. v. New Whatcom,
172 U. S. 314,
280 U. S. 319.
Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U. S. 71,
dismissing an appeal from the Circuit Court of Appeals (145 F. 844)
for lack of jurisdiction.
And appellant asserts that, as construed in this case, the
provision of § 922 requiring that the petition shall contain a
description of the property proposed to be taken is also repugnant
to the due process clause. But mere inspection of the petition
shows that the point is utterly devoid of merit.
No attempt was made below to draw in question the validity of
any other provision of the state statutes. And, as appellant's
contentions above referred to are unsubstantial, this Court is
without jurisdiction.
Goodrich v. Ferris, supra,
214 U. S. 79.
Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182,
262 U. S. 192.
Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 192,
262 U. S. 196.
Campbell v. Olney, 262 U. S. 352,
262 U. S.
354.
Appeal dismissed.
