1. Section 19 of the Naturalization Act, which makes liable to
arrest and deportation "any alien who is hereafter sentenced to
imprisonment for a term of one year or more because of conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, committed within five years
after
Page 279 U. S. 399
entry of the alien to the United States," extends to an alien
who has declared his intention to become a citizen. § 1. P.
279 U. S.
400.
2. An alien who, after coming to this country, went to a foreign
port and back as a seaman on an American vessel shipped for the
round voyage, made an entry into the United States, within the
meaning of § 19, when he returned here. P.
279 U. S. 401.
3. An American vessel on the high seas or in foreign waters is
not a place included within the United States as defined by the
Naturalization Act.
Id.
4. In order that there may be an entry within the meaning of the
Act, there must be an arrival from some foreign port or place.
Id.
16 F.2d 15 affirmed.
Certiorari, 278 U.S. 592, to review a judgment of the circuit
court of appeals affirming an order of the district court
dismissing a writ of habeas corpus. The merits of the case were
first passed on by the courts below in an earlier proceeding
against the predecessor in office of the present respondent, which
abated in this Court for want of a timely substitution.
See 16 F.2d 15; 273 U.S. 688; 276 U.S. 590.
MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner is an alien held upon a warrant issued by the
Assistant Secretary of Labor for deportation under § 19 of the
Immigration Act of 1917, U.S.C. Tit. 8. On his petition, the
District Court for the Southern District of New York issued a writ
of habeas corpus. Respondent made return, and, after a hearing, the
writ was dismissed. The circuit court of appeals affirmed.
Section 19 contains the following:
"At any time within five years after entry, . . . any alien who
is hereafter sentenced
Page 279 U. S. 400
to imprisonment for a term of one year or more because of
conviction in this country of crime involving moral turpitude,
committed within five years after the entry of the alien to the
United States, . . . shall, upon warrant of the Secretary of Labor,
be taken into custody and deported."
The facts are not in controversy. Petitioner is a native and
subject of Denmark. He came to this country as a member of the crew
of a British ship and landed at Norfolk January 22, 1912. He
shipped the next day on an American schooner and subsequently
served as a seaman on other American ships. October 19, 1917, he
shipped from New York on the
Elisha Atkins for a voyage to
South America and return by way of Cuba; he landed at Boston, March
26, 1918. That was his last voyage from foreign ports to the United
States. He was subsequently employed in American coastwise trade
and resided for a time on land as representative of a seamen's
labor union. In June, 1919, he petitioned for naturalization and
declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States.
June 17, 1921, in the Cumberland County Court in the State of
Maine, he pleaded guilty to a charge of manslaughter, the killing
of James Walker at Portland on May 21, 1921, and was sentenced to
imprisonment for more than one year. Subsequently a warrant of the
Department of Labor was served upon him, and, after a hearing, he
was ordered to be deported to Denmark upon the termination of his
imprisonment.
The question for decision is whether petitioner was sentenced
within five years after his entry into the United States.
The provision extends to all aliens -- that that is, every
person not a native -- born or naturalized citizen. Section 1;
U.S.C. Tit. 8, § 173. It is immaterial whether he was entitled
to admission or whether he lawfully entered. The cause for which
his deportation was ordered arose after entry.
Page 279 U. S. 401
Lapina v. Williams, 232 U. S. 78,
232 U. S. 91;
Lewis v. Frick, 233 U. S. 291. His
declared purpose to naturalize does not serve him here as he had
not become a citizen. If his landing at Boston in 1918 was an
entry, he is rightly held.
Section 1 provides that "United States," as used in the Act,
shall be construed to mean the United States and any waters,
territory, or other place subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
except the Isthmian Canal Zone. An entry into the United States is
not effected by embarking on an American vessel in a foreign port.
Such a vessel outside the United States, whether on the high seas
or in foreign waters, is not a place included within the United
States as defined by the Act.
See Cunard S.S. Co. v.
Mellon, 262 U. S. 100,
262 U. S. 122;
Scharrenberg v. Dollar S.S. Co., 245 U.
S. 122,
245 U. S. 127.
The word "entry," by its own force, implies a coming from outside.
The context shows that, in order that there be an entry within the
meaning of the Act there must be an arrival from some foreign port
or place. There is no such entry where one goes to sea on board an
American vessel from a port of the United States and returns to the
same or another port of this country without having been in any
foreign port or place.
See §§ 19, 32, 33,
35.
And it is clear that petitioner departed from the United States
on the
Elisha Atkins, and that, when he landed at Boston
on his return from South American and Cuban ports, he made an entry
into the United States within the meaning of the Act.
Judgment affirmed.
