1. In determining whether the privileges and immunities clause
of the Constitution, or an Act of Congress, is contravened by a
state statute, the purport established for the state statute by the
highest court of the state is accepted here. P.
279 U. S.
385.
2. Where a state law is susceptible of two constructions, one of
which might put it in conflict with the Federal Constitution, it is
to be presumed that the other construction, rendering it valid,
would be adopted by the state courts. P.
279 U. S.
386.
3. In § 1780 of the New York Code of Civil Procedure, under
which, as locally construed, actions by nonresidents against
foreign corporations doing business in the state are subject to
dismissal at the discretion of the court, the term "nonresident"
should be interpreted as embracing citizens of the state who do not
actually live in the state at the time of bringing such actions. P.
279 U. S.
386.
4. A state law under which citizens of the state who actually
reside there have the right to maintain actions in the state courts
against foreign corporations doing business there on causes of
action arising from foreign torts, but under which such actions,
when brought by nonresidents, whether citizens of that state or of
other states, are subject to dismissal at the discretion of the
court, makes a distinction based on rational considerations, and
does not violate the privileges and immunities clause, Art. IV,
§ 2, of the Constitution. P.
279 U. S.
387.
5. The Federal Employers' Liability Act does not purport to
require state courts to entertain actions under it as against an
otherwise valid excuse under the state law. P.
279 U. S.
387.
248 N.Y. 580 affirmed.
Certiorari, 278 U.S. 590, to review a judgment of the Supreme
Court of New York, entered on a rescript from the Court of Appeals
affirming the dismissal of an action
Page 279 U. S. 378
brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
See
also 223 App.Div. (N.Y.) 782. The Attorney General of New York
was given leave to file a brief and take part in the reargument
because of the importance of the case.
Page 279 U. S. 385
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit under the Employers' Liability Act for personal
injuries. The injuries were inflicted in Connecticut, the
plaintiff, the petitioner, is a citizen and resident of
Connecticut, and the defendant, the respondent, is a Connecticut
corporation, although doing business in New York, where the suit
was brought. Upon motion, the trial court dismissed the action,
assuming that the statutes of the state gave it a discretion in the
matter, and its action was affirmed by the Appellate Division, 223
App.Div. 782, and by the Court of Appeals, 248 N.Y. 580. Thus, it
is established that the statute purports to give to the Court the
power that it exercised. But the plaintiff says that the Act as
construed is void under Article IV, § 2, of the Constitution
of the United States: "The Citizens of each state shall be entitled
to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
states." A subordinate argument is added that the jurisdiction is
imposed by the Employers' Liability Act when, as here, the Court
has authority to entertain the suit. C., Title 45, § 56; Acts
of April 22, 1908, c. 149, § 6, 35 Stat. 66, April 5, 1910, c.
143, § 1, 36 Stat. 291. That section gives concurrent
jurisdiction to the Courts of the United States and the states and
forbids removal if the suit is brought in a state court.
Page 279 U. S. 386
The language of the New York statute, Laws of 1913, c. 60,
amending § 1780 or the Code of Civil Procedure is:
"An action against a foreign corporation may be maintained by
another foreign corporation, or by a nonresident, in one of the
following cases only; . . . 4. Where a foreign corporation is doing
business within this state."
Laws of 1920, c. 916, § 47. The argument for the petitioner
is that, construed as it is, it makes a discrimination between
citizens of New York and citizens of other states because it
authorizes the court, in its discretion, to dismiss an action by a
citizen of another state, but not an action brought by a citizen of
New York, which last it cannot do.
Gregonis v. Philadelphia
& Reading Coal & Iron Co., 235 N.Y. 152. It is said
that a citizen of New York is a resident of New York wherever he
may be living in fact, and thus that all citizens of New York can
bring these actions, whereas citizens of other states cannot unless
they are actually living in the state. But, however often the word
resident may have been used as equivalent to citizen, and for
whatever purposes residence may have been assumed to follow
citizenship, there is nothing to prohibit the legislature from
using "resident" in the strict primary sense of one actually living
in the place for the time, irrespective even of domicile. If that
word in this statute must be so construed in order to uphold the
act or even to avoid serious doubts of its constitutionality, we
presume that the courts of New York would construe it in that way,
as indeed the supreme court has done already in so many words.
Adams v. Penn Bank of Pittsburgh, 35 Hun (N.Y.) 393;
Duquesne Club v. Penn Bank of Pittsburgh, 35 Hun (N.Y.)
390;
Robinson v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., 112 N.Y.
315, 324;
Klotz v. Angle, 220 N.Y. 347.
See Canadian
Northern Ry. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U. S. 553,
252 U. S.
562-563. The same meaning seems to be assumed in
Gregonis
Page 279 U. S. 387
v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 235
N.Y. 152. We cannot presume, against this evidence and in order to
overthrow a statute, that the courts of New York would adopt a
different rule from that which is well settled here.
Panama R.
Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375,
264 U. S.
390.
Construed as it has been and we believe will be construed, the
statute applies to citizens of New York as well as to others, and
puts them on the same footing. There is no discrimination between
citizens as such, and none between nonresidents with regard to
these foreign causes of action. A distinction of privileges
according to residence may be based upon rational considerations,
and has been upheld by this Court, emphasizing the difference
between citizenship and residence, in
La Tourette v.
McMaster, 248 U. S. 465.
Followed in
Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.
S. 525,
250 U. S. 539.
It is true that, in
Blake v. McClung, 172 U.
S. 239,
172 U. S. 247,
"residents" was taken to mean citizens in a Tennessee statute of a
wholly different scope, but, whatever else may be said of the
argument in that opinion (
compare p.
172 U. S. 262,
ibid.), it cannot prevail over the later decision in
La Tourette v. McMaster and the plain intimations of the
New York cases to which we have referred. There are manifest
reasons for preferring residents in access to often overcrowded
courts both in convenience and in the fact that, broadly speaking,
it is they who pay for maintaining the courts concerned.
As to the grant of jurisdiction in the Employers' Liability Act,
that statute does not purport to require state courts to entertain
suits arising under it, but only to empower them to do so, so far
as the authority of the United States is concerned. It may very
well be that, if the Supreme Court of New York were given no
discretion, being otherwise competent, it would be subject to a
Page 279 U. S. 388
duty. But there is nothing in the Act of Congress that purports
to force a duty upon such Courts as against an otherwise valid
excuse.
Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S.
1,
223 U. S.
56-57.
Judgment affirmed.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER, and MR. JUSTICE
BUTLER dissent.
