1. Evidence in an action by an administratrix under the
Employers' Liability Act
held sufficient to go to the jury
on the question of negligence and for computing damages on the
basis of the present value of anticipated benefits. P.
278 U. S.
498.
2. When a charge to the jury correctly states the applicable
rule, a party desiring more detailed instruction should request it.
P.
278 U. S. 499.
37 Ga.App. 771 affirmed.
Certiorari, 278 U.S. 588, to a judgment of the Court of Appeals
of Georgia sustaining a recovery under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act. The Supreme Court of Georgia refused a
certiorari.
Page 278 U. S. 497
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Ira L. Hughes, a traveling fireman, was killed on the Western
& Atlantic Railroad while engaged in the performance of his
duties. His widow, as administratrix, brought this action under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act in a state court of Georgia. She
recovered a verdict of $17,500, which was set aside as excessive by
the presiding judge. At the second trial before another judge and
jury, a verdict was rendered for $10,000. A motion for a new trial
was overruled. Judgment was entered on this verdict, and it was
affirmed by the intermediate appellate court. The supreme court of
the state refused a certiorari. This Court granted the writ. 278
U.S. 588.
Hughes was killed while riding on a locomotive moving in
interstate commerce. The plaintiff claimed that he was knocked from
the running board and thrown against an upright on a bridge as the
train entered it; that the accident resulted from an unusual
rocking of the engine from side to side due to the defective
condition of the track leading to the bridge; that the railroad had
been negligent in permitting the track to remain in bad condition,
and that this negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. The
railroad claimed that the alleged cause of the accident was mere
speculation. It denied that the track was in bad condition, denied
that its condition had produced the alleged swaying of the
locomotive, denied that it had been guilty of any negligence,
insisted that the accident was the result of Hughes' gross
negligence and his disobedience of the company's rules, claimed
that he had assumed the risk, and requested a directed verdict. The
request was denied.
The railroad asserts that the scintilla of evidence rule
prevails in Georgia, and argues that the lower courts erred by
applying the local rule in this case. It is true
Page 278 U. S. 498
that submission to the jury of contested issues of fact is not
required in the federal courts if there is only a scintilla of
evidence,
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Groeger,
266 U. S. 521,
266 U. S. 524;
that it is the duty of the judge to direct the verdict, when the
testimony and all inference which the jury could justifiably draw
therefrom would be insufficient to support a verdict for the other
party,
Elliott v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry.
Co., 150 U. S. 245;
Small Co. v. Lamborn & Co., 267 U.
S. 248,
267 U. S. 254,
and that this federal rule must be applied by state courts in cases
arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Coogan, 271 U.
S. 472,
271 U. S. 474;
Gulf, Mobile & Northern R. Co. v. Wells, 275 U.
S. 455,
275 U. S. 457;
Toledo, St. Louis & Western R. Co. v. Allen,
276 U. S. 165,
276 U. S. 168.
We need not consider whether the rule prevailing in Georgia differs
substantially from the federal rule.
* For, even under
the federal rule, it was proper to submit the case to the jury. The
evidence introduced by the plaintiff was substantial, and was
sufficient, if believed, to sustain a verdict in her favor. There
was much conflict in the evidence. The first trial occupied five
days. At the second trial, 33 witnesses testified. Some of the
testimony given by witnesses for the railroad would, if believed,
have entitled it to the verdict as a matter of law. Some of the
testimony given by witnesses called by the plaintiff does not seem
to us persuasive. But the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight of the evidence were obviously matters for the jury. The
defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict.
Page 278 U. S. 499
The railroad contends also that there was error in assessing the
damages. It argues that nominal damages only were recoverable,
since the plaintiff failed to introduce evidence either as to the
proper method of computing the present value of the anticipated
benefits or as to the rate of interest which should be applied in
doing so. The evidence was ample. Among other things, there were
mortality tables introduced by the plaintiff and annuity tables
offered by the railroad -- tables in which values were computed at
both the 6 percent and the 7 percent rate. The railroad argues also
that the charge failed to make it clear to the jury that, in
computing the damages recoverable for the operation of future
benefits, adequate allowance must be made, according to
circumstances, for the earning power of money, that the verdict
should be for the present value of the anticipated benefits, and
that the legal rate of interest is not necessarily the rate to be
applied in making the computation.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.
Co. v. Kelly, 241 U. S. 485,
241 U. S. 491;
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Mosler,
275 U. S. 133.
There is no room for a contention that the charge failed to state
correctly the applicable rule. If more detailed instruction was
desired, it was incumbent upon the Railroad to make a request
therefor.
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Holloway,
246 U. S. 525. It
did not do so.
Affirmed.
*
Compare Georgia Code, §§ 5926, 6082, 6087,
6088;
Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Harden, 113 Ga. 453,
461;
Southern Ry. Co. v. Myers, 108 Ga. 165;
Skinner
v. Braswell, 126 Ga. 761;
Burroughs v. Reed, 150 Ga.
724, 726;
Georgia Ry. & Electric Co. v. Harris, 1
Ga.App. 714, 716, 717;
Carter v. Central of Georgia Ry.
Co., 3 Ga.App. 222;
Smith v. Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co., 5 Ga.App. 219, 222;
Neill v. Hill, 32 Ga.App.
381.