An ordinance requiring a railway company on every street crossed
by its tracks to keep a flagman on duty to give warning of
approaching trains by waving a flag in daytime and a red lighted
lamp at night cannot be held to have become an unreasonable burden
on interstate commerce as applied to interstate trains, or so
arbitrary as to amount to a denial of due process of law, because
automatic devices of an approved modern type that are a better and
cheaper means of protection have been installed by the railway, if
there be reasonable ground for believing that compliance with the
ordinance at the crossing in question would diminish the danger of
accidents. P.
278 U. S.
459.
Affirmed.
Error to and appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of
Tennessee, affirming, with some modification, four judgments in as
many personal injury cases. The writ of error was dismissed.
Page 278 U. S. 458
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
These are actions brought against the plaintiff in error and
appellant for causing the death of W. B. White and personal
injuries to the other plaintiffs by running down an automobile at a
grade crossing in the City of Memphis. The plaintiffs obtained
judgments that were affirmed by the Supreme Court of Tennessee. W.
B. White, who was killed, was driving the car, and his son, R. D.
White, one of the plaintiffs, was sitting by his side. The Court
states that both knew the Railway not to maintain a flagman and
that they were grossly negligent in going upon the track.
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U. S.
66. The Court held, however, that the proximate cause of
the injuries was the railway's failure to comply with an ordinance
of Memphis requiring all railroads on every street crossed by their
trains to keep a flagman constantly on duty, to give warning of
approaching trains by waving a flag in daytime and a red lighted
lamp by night until the engine had crossed the street. The validity
of this ordinance is the only question open before us here.
The railway had substituted for the flagman an electric signal
on the side of the street and about fifteen feet above it that gave
warning by flashing a light and ringing a bell and was set in
operation mechanically by the train when it came within 2,500 feet
of the crossing. The contrivance
Page 278 U. S. 459
was testified to be in general use, and was said to be cheaper
and, in some ways, at least, better than the old precautions. The
railway contended that the ordinance enacted at the beginning of
1880 was valid no longer in view of the modern improvement, and
that to enforce it now would be to enforce an unnecessary burden on
interstate commerce and would be so arbitrary as to amount to a
denial of due process of law.
Galveston Electric Co. v.
Galveston, 258 U. S. 388,
258 U. S. 400.
(It may be mentioned that the train concerned was engaged in
interstate commerce.) But the crossing in question was said by the
Court to be a dangerous one where there was pretty constant travel
by night and day, and it was held that, as applied to such a
crossing, it could not be said that the ordinance was so
indisputably unnecessary and unreasonable that the legislative
judgment could be overruled.
We are compelled to take the same view. The legislative
arguments in favor of the railway are manifest, and we may
conjecture that it is only a matter of time before the old methods
of guarding grade crossings will have disappeared unless the grade
crossings precede them. But if the ordinance were passed today and
came up for a decision upon its validity, it could not be denied
that a man in the middle of the street or near to it and intent on
stopping traffic might stop some travelers who might not notice
electric signs. There is a marginal chance that occasionally a life
may be saved. In this very case, it is at least possible that a man
on the ground would have stopped the plaintiffs, they not being
intent on suicide. No doubt legislatures do neglect such marginal
chances. Many modern improvements must be expected to take their
toll of life. When a railroad is built, experience teaches that it
is pretty certain to kill some people before it has lasted long.
But a Court cannot condemn a legislature that refuses to allow the
toll to be taken even if it
Page 278 U. S. 460
thinks that the gain by the change would compensate for any such
loss. It follows that we must affirm the judgments below.
See
Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.
S. 325,
274 U. S. 328.
There were some exceptions to the exclusion of evidence. But, if
they could be considered, in any case, they went only to proof that
the new device is better than the old. We assume it to be so, but
regard that assumption as not controlling the point considered
here.
As appeal was the proper mode of bringing the cases to this
Court, the writs of error may be dismissed.
Judgment affirmed.