2. Under § 10 of the Act of 1899, 26 Stat. 455,
obstructions to the navigable capacity of the waters of the United
States are prohibited if not affirmatively authorized by Congress,
but obstructions of the kinds specified in the second and third
clauses of the section are so authorized when approved by the Chief
of Engineers and the Secretary of War, without further action by
Congress. P.
278 U. S.
411.
3. The authority thus conferred on executive officers is not an
unconstitutional delegation as applied to determining the amount of
water that may be diverted from a lake without impairing
navigability. P.
278 U. S.
414.
Page 278 U. S. 368
4. Authority for diverting water from Lake Michigan through the
Chicago Sanitary Canal is not to be found in such action as
Congress has taken relative to a proposed waterway between that
lake and the State of Illinois and Mississippi Rivers, nor in its
appropriations for widening and deepening the Chicago River. P.
278 U. S.
416.
5. The Sanitary District of Chicago, an agency of the Illinois,
operating a canal partly in the Chicago River and connected with
streams leading to the Mississippi River through which the great
volumes of sewage emanating from Chicago and its environs are
carried to the Mississippi watershed by means of water abstracted
from Lake Michigan, having been enjoined from diverting such water
in excess of the amounts allowed by an existing permit from the
Secretary of War or any that might be issued by him according to
law (
Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U.
S. 405), applied for and received from the Secretary a
new permit, under the Act of March 3, 1899. The new permit was
temporary and revocable and subject to the condition, among others,
that a specified measure of diligence be displayed by the District
in providing other means of sewage disposal which, in course of
time, would obviate excessive drafts on the lake water for that
purpose. In a suit against the Sanitary District and the State of
Illinois by other states bordering on the Great Lakes and
connecting waters, in which it appeared that the continued
diversions at Chicago had lowered the water level to the damage of
the plaintiffs and their citizens,
held:
(1) Under the limited authority conferred upon him by the Act of
March 3, 1899, the Secretary of War could not permit the continued
withdrawal of lake water merely to aid the Sanitary District in
disposing of sewage. P.
278 U. S.
417.
(2) Support for the permit rests upon the need of preserving the
navigability of the Port of Chicago, which would become unusable if
the sewage were to accumulate pending provision of means other than
the waterway for disposing of it, and upon maintaining navigation
in the Chicago River, a part of that Port, for which a
comparatively insignificant water flow may be required. P.
278 U. S.
418.
(3) Save what may be needed for the Chicago River, the
plaintiffs are entitled to have the diversions stopped by
injunction, the decree, however, to be so framed as to accord a
reasonable time within which the Sanitary District may provide
other means of sewage disposal, reducing the diversion as the new
means become operative from time to time, until the sewage shall be
entirely
Page 278 U. S. 369
disposed of thereby, whereupon the injunction shall become final
and complete. Pp.
278 U. S.
418-420.
(4) The cause should be referred to the master to take testimony
on the practical measures needed and the time required for their
completion, and to report his conclusions for the formulation of
such a decree. P.
278 U. S. 421.
(5) states bordering on the Mississippi River and seeking as
interveners to maintain the diversions in question because of their
alleged beneficial effect upon the navigability of that stream
held to have no rightful interests in the matter. P.
278 U. S.
420.
The first of these bills, filed July 14, 1922, by the State of
Wisconsin, was amended October 5, 1925, the States of Minnesota,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania becoming co-plaintiffs. The amended bill
sought an injunction restraining the State of Illinois and the
Sanitary District of Chicago from causing any water to be taken
from Lake Michigan in such manner as permanently to divert the same
from the lake. There was a further prayer that, if the Sanitary and
Ship Canal should be used as a navigable waterway of the United
States and be subject to the same control on the part of the United
States as other navigable waterways, the defendants should be
restrained from permanently diverting any water from Lake Michigan
in excess of the amount which the Court should determine to be
reasonably required for navigation in and through said Canal and
the connecting waters to the Illinois and Mississippi Rivers,
without injury to the navigable capacity of the Great Lakes and
their connecting waters. It was also prayed that the defendants be
restrained from dumping or draining into the canal any sewage or
waste in such quantity and manner as excessively to pollute and
render the canal, the Chicago, Des Plaines, and Illinois Rivers,
unsanitary and injurious to the people of the plaintiff states
navigating said waterways.
To the amended bill, the State of Illinois filed a demurrer and
the Sanitary District filed its answer, which included
Page 278 U. S. 370
a motion to dismiss. The States of Missouri, Kentucky,
Tennessee, and Louisiana, by leave of Court, became intervening
codefendants and moved to dismiss the bill. The demurrer was
overruled and the motions to dismiss were denied without prejudice.
270 U.S. 634. The intervening defendants and the State of Illinois
filed their respective answers. The States of Mississippi and
Arkansas were permitted to intervene as defendants, and adopted the
answers filed by the other interveners.
The State of Michigan, on March 8, 1926, filed its bill in this
Court against the State of Illinois and the Sanitary District for
the same relief, and the defendants filed their answers on June 1,
1926.
On October 18, 1926, the State of New York filed its bill in
this Court against the State of Illinois and the Sanitary District
for the same, and, on April 18, 1927, it was ordered that the
answer filed by the defendants in the Michigan suit should be
accepted and treated as their answer to the bill of New York, other
than the third paragraph. 274 U.S. 712. On May 31, 1927, this
paragraph was stricken out, without prejudice.
274 U.
S. 488.
On June 7, 1926, the first cause was referred to Charles E.
Hughes, Esq., as Special Master, to take the evidence and report
the same to this Court with his findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and recommendations for a decree, the parties in the Michigan
case being granted leave to participate. 172 U.S. 650. Similar
leave was granted on November 23, 1926, to the parties in the New
York case.
273 U. S. 642.
After hearings, the master made his report, in which he
concluded:
(1) That a justiciable controversy was presented; (2) that
Illinois and the Sanitary District had no authority to make or
continue the diversion in question without the consent of the
United States; (3) that Congress had
Page 278 U. S. 371
power to regulate the diversion --
i.e., to determine
whether and to what extent it should be permitted; (4) that
Congress had not directly authorized it; (5) that Congress, by the
Act of March 3, 1899, had conferred authority upon the Secretary of
War to regulate the diversion provided he act not arbitrarily, but
in reasonable relation to the purpose of his delegated authority;
(6) that the permit of March 3, 1925 (described in the opinion of
the Court) was valid and effective according to its terms, the
entire control of the diversion remaining with Congress. He
recommended, therefore, that the bill be dismissed without
prejudice to the rights of the plaintiffs to institute suit to
prevent a diversion of water from Lake Michigan in case such
diversion were made or attempted without authority of law.
The case came before the Court upon exceptions taken by the
plaintiffs to the master's report.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT delivered the opinion of the Court.
These are amended bills by the States of Wisconsin, Minnesota,
Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York, praying for an
injunction against the State of Illinois and the Sanitary District
of Chicago from continuing to withdraw 8,500 cubic feet of water a
second from Lake Michigan at Chicago.
The court referred the cause to Charles Evans Hughes as a
special master, with authority to take the evidence, and to report
the same to the court with his findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and recommendations for a decree, all to be subject to
approval or other disposal by the Court. The master gave full
hearings and filed and submitted his report November 23, 1927, to
which the complainants duly lodged exceptions, which have been
elaborately argued.
When these bills were filed, there was pending in this Court an
appeal by the Sanitary District of Chicago from a decree granted at
the suit of the United States by the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois against a diversion from the
lake in excess of 250,000 cubic feet per minute, or 4,167 cubic
feet per second. This amount had been permitted by the Secretary of
War. In January, 1925, this Court affirmed the
Page 278 U. S. 400
decree, without prejudice to the granting of a further permit by
the Secretary of War according to law.
266 U.
S. 405. On March 3, 1925, the Secretary of War, after
that decree, enlarged the permit for a diversion not to exceed an
annual average of 8,500 cubic feet per second upon certain
conditions hereafter to be noted.
The amended bills herein averred that the Chicago diversion had
lowered the levels of Lakes Michigan, Huron, Erie, and Ontario,
their connecting waterways, and of the St. Lawrence River above
tidewater, not less than six inches, to the serious injury of the
complainant states, their citizens, and property owners; that the
acts of the defendants had never been authorized by Congress, but
were violations of the rights of the complainant states and their
people; that the withdrawals of the water from Lake Michigan were
for the purpose of taking care of the sewage of Chicago, and were
not justified by any control Congress had attempted to exercise or
could exercise in interstate commerce over the waters of Lake
Michigan, and that the withdrawals were in palpable violation of
the Act of Congress of March 3, 1899. The bills prayed that the
defendants be enjoined from permanently diverting water from Lake
Michigan or from dumping or draining sewage into its waterways
which would render them unsanitary or obstruct the people of the
complainant states in navigating them.
The State of Illinois filed a demurrer to the bills and the
Sanitary District of Chicago an answer, which included a motion to
dismiss. The States of Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, and
Louisiana, by leave of Court, became intervening codefendants, on
the same side as Illinois, and moved to dismiss the bills. The
demurrer of Illinois was overruled, and the motions to dismiss were
denied, without prejudice. Thereupon the intervening defendants and
the defendants the Sanitary District and the State of Illinois
filed their respective answers. The States of
Page 278 U. S. 401
Mississippi and Arkansas were also permitted to intervene as
defendants, and adopted the answers of the other interveners. The
answers of the defendants denied the injuries alleged and averred
that authority was given for the diversion under the acts of the
Legislature of Illinois and under acts of Congress and permits of
the Secretary of War authorized by Congress in the regulation of
interstate commerce. All the answers stressed the point that the
diversion of water from Lake Michigan improved the navigation of
the Mississippi River and was an aid to the commerce of the
Mississippi Valley, and sought the preservation of this aid. They
also set up the defense of laches, acquiescence, and estoppel on
the ground that the purposes of the canal and the diversion were
known to the people and the officials of the complainant states,
and that no protest or complaint had been made in their behalf
prior to the filing of the original bills herein.
The master has made a comprehensive review of the evidence
before him in regard to the history of the canal, the extent and
effect of the diversion, the action of the state and federal
governments, the plans for the disposal of the sewage and waste of
Chicago and the other territory within the Sanitary District, as
well as the character and feasibility of works proposed as a means
of compensating for the lowering of lake levels. From this review
we shall take what will assist us in the consideration of the
issues deemed necessary to be considered on the exceptions to the
report.
We shall first consider in brief the parts taken by Congress and
the State of Illinois and their respective agencies in the
construction of the Sanitary District Canal and the creation of the
Lake Michigan diversion.
By the Act of March 30, 1822, c. 14; 3 Stat. 659, Congress
authorized Illinois to survey and mark, through the public lands of
the United States, the route of a canal connecting the Illinois
River with Lake Michigan, and
Page 278 U. S. 402
granted certain lands in aid of the project. A further land
grant was made in 1827. The canal was completed in 1848. The canal
crossed the continental divide between the Chicago and Des Plaines
Rivers, on a summit level 8 feet above the lake, and then
paralleled the Des Plaines River and the Upper Illinois River to La
Salle, Illinois, where it entered the latter stream. The summit of
the canal was supplied with water by pumps located in a plant on
the Chicago River. Originally, only enough water was pumped to
answer the needs of navigation in the canal, but thereafter, in
1861, the legislature provided for improvement in the canal by
excavation and a larger flow of water from Lake Michigan.
Before 1865, the Chicago River, being a sluggish stream in its
lower reaches, had become so offensive, because of receiving the
sewage of the rapidly growing city, that for its immediate relief
the municipal authorities and the canal Commissioners agreed to
pump water from the river in excess of the needs of navigation. By
1872, the summit level of the canal had been lowered, and it was
hoped that this would result in a permanent flow of lake water
through the south branch of the Chicago River sufficient to keep it
in good condition, but the plan failed, and the canal again became
grossly polluted.
In 1881, the Illinois Legislature passed a resolution
authorizing the installation of pumps at the northern terminus of
the canal, with a capacity of not less than 1,000 cubic feet a
second, to draw water from Lake Michigan through the Chicago River
and the canal. Pumps were installed and pumping was begun in 1883.
For a few years, this afforded sufficient dilution in the canal
because of the high stage of Lake Michigan, but, in 1886, the lake
level began to fall, and continued to fall until 1891, when it was
two feet lower than when the pumps were installed. Their capacity
was thus reduced to a little more than 600 cubic feet a second. The
nuisance
Page 278 U. S. 403
along the canal continued to grow. The drainage and water supply
Commission of the state recommended, as the most economical method
for meeting the requirement, a discharge into the Des Plaines River
through a canal across the continental divide, providing a waterway
of such dimensions as would furnish ample dilution. The Commission
pointed out that the proposed canal would, from its necessary
dimensions and its regular discharge, produce a magnificent
waterway between Chicago and the Mississippi River, suitable for
navigation of boats having as much as 2,000 tons burden, and would
give also large water power of great commercial value to the
state.
The Sanitary District was organized under the Illinois Act of
1889. It was completed in 1890. It embraced an area of 185 square
miles. By later acts, it was increased to approximately 438 square
miles, extending from the Illinois state line on the south and east
to the northern boundary of Cook County on the north, with about 34
miles of frontage on Lake Michigan, embracing the metropolitan area
of Chicago, consisting of a total of 54 cities, towns, and
villages.
The main drainage canal was begun in 1892, and was opened in
January, 1900. Since that time, the flow of the Chicago River has
been reversed -- that is, it has been made to flow away from Lake
Michigan toward the Mississippi. As originally constructed, the
canal ended in a nonnavigable tail race. There was no lock at the
southwestern end. But, by the Act of May 14, 1903, the Illinois
Legislature gave the Sanitary District the power to construct dams,
waterwheels, and other works appropriate to render available the
power arising from the water passing through the main channel and
any auxiliary channels thereafter constructed.
In 1908, the Constitution of Illinois was amended to authorize
the legislature to provide for the construction of
Page 278 U. S. 404
a deep waterway or canal from the water power plant of the
Sanitary District of Chicago at or near Lockport to a point on the
Illinois River at or near Utica, and to provide that this power
might be leased for the benefit of the state treasury. Meantime,
all the sewage in the drainage district, including Evanston, was
turned into the main channel, and the water directly abstracted
from Lake Michigan by the Sanitary District was increased from
2,541 cubic feet a second in 1900 to 5,751 in 1909, to 7,228 in
1916 to 6,888 cubic feet a second in 1926, not including
pumpage.
The Sanitary District authorities have expended in the
construction of works for sewage and the deep waterway canal
$109,021,613, including interest on bonds.
In 1888, Congress directed the Secretary of War to make surveys
for a channel improvement in the Illinois and Des Plaines Rivers.
In 1892, Congress appropriated $72,000 to complete the improvement
of the harbor at Chicago, and again $25,000 in 1894. Three
engineers appointed by the Secretary of War reported to him that a
diversion of 10,000 cubic feet a second through the Sanitary and
Ship Canal would lower the levels of the lakes, except Lake
Superior. In 1896, Congress appropriated money for dredging the
Chicago River. The Sanitary District in that year asked for a
permit from the Secretary of War to enlarge the cross-section of
the Chicago River, and announced that the work had progressed so
far that this must be done to make available the artificial channel
under construction from Robey Street, Chicago, to Lockport, 28
miles distant. The Secretary of War granted the permit, but said
that this authority was not to be interpreted as an approval of the
plans of the Sanitary District of Chicago to introduce a current
into the Chicago River; that the United States should not be put to
any expense, and that the authority was to expire by limitation in
2 years. Other permits relating to the same
Page 278 U. S. 405
subject were issued by the same officer in 1897, 1898, and twice
in 1899. The Act of Congress of 1899 amplified the provisions of an
earlier Act of 1890 looking to the regulation, prevention, and
removal by federal authority of obstructions to navigation and
alteration of capacity of the navigable waters of the United States
by enacting §§ 9 and 10 thereof.
Other permits were allowed by the Secretary of War-one on
December 5, 1901, allowing a diversion of 250,000 cubic feet per
minute throughout the full 24 hours of each day. And in another
instance on January 17, 1903, a diversion of 350,000 cubic feet per
minute until March 31, 1903, was permitted, in order to carry off
the accumulations of sewage deposit lining the shores along the
city, with the provision that, after that, the flow should be
reduced to 250,000 cubic feet per minute as required by the permit
of December, 1901. The Board of Engineers in 1905 reported to
Congress that the effect upon the level of Lake Michigan of
withdrawing 10,000 cubic feet per second for an indefinite period
had been the subject of elaborate investigation, and that the
conclusion reached was that the final effect would be to lower the
level of the lake six inches.
An application for the flow of more water through the Calumet
Sag Channel was declined by the Chief of Engineers, and was refused
by the Secretary of War in March, 1907, and as the Sanitary
District apparently intended to proceed with the work for which a
permit had been refused, the United States brought suit in 1908 to
prevent its construction and prevent the increase of the flow.
Another application was refused by the Secretary of War in January,
1913, and there seems to have been another denied later.
A second bill to enjoin the Sanitary District from a diversion
of more than 250,000 cubic feet per minute or its
Page 278 U. S. 406
equivalent 4,167 cubic feet a second of water from Lake Michigan
was filed and was consolidated with the earlier suit, and, after a
long delay of 6 or 7 years, an oral opinion was given by Judge
Landis of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois in favor of the government. A decree not
having been entered before Judge Landis resigned, a decree was
entered by Judge Carpenter in the case, which was affirmed by this
Court in January, 1925.
Sanitary District of Chicago v. United
States, 266 U. S. 405.
This Court's decree provided that the defendant, the Sanitary
District of Chicago, its agents, and all other persons acting or
claiming or assuming to act under its authority, should be enjoined
from diverting or abstracting any waters from Lake Michigan over
and above or in excess of 250,000 cubic feet per minute, to go into
effect in 60 days, without prejudice to any permit that might be
issued by the Secretary of War according to law.
Immediately after this decision, the Sanitary District applied
to the Secretary of War for permission to divert 10,000 cubic feet
a second. The exigency was set out in the petition. The Secretary
of War then issued a permit on March 3, 1925, which recited that
the instrument did not give any property rights either in real
estate or material, or any exclusive privileges, and that it did
not authorize any injury to private property or invasion of private
rights, or any infringement of federal, state, or local laws or
regulations, or obviate the necessity of obtaining the state's
assent to the work authorized. It certified that, upon the
recommendation of the Chief of Engineers, the Secretary of War,
under § 10 of the Act of 1899, authorized the Sanitary
District to divert from Lake Michigan an amount of water not to
exceed an annual average of 8,500 cubic feet per second, the
instantaneous maximum not to exceed 11,000 cubic feet per second,
upon certain conditions.
Page 278 U. S. 407
The conditions of the permit require the City of Chicago to take
immediate steps to carry out sewage treatment by artificial
processes, so that, before the expiration of the permit, they
should provide the equivalent of 100 percent treatment of the
sewage of 1,200,000 people, or one-third of the population of the
city, and that this should be done under supervision of the United
States District Engineer at Chicago, the permit to be revoked if
the conditions were not complied with, and the permit to cease
unless renewed on December 31, 1929. In granting the permit, the
Secretary of War expressed the opinion that steps should be taken
to complete the entire work of providing for disposal of all the
sewage in 10 years. Colonel Schultz, United States District
Engineer at Chicago, reported that the conditions of the March 3,
1925, permit have been complied with, and the master confirms this
in his report.
In providing for the improvement of the channel of the Illinois
River in the Act of January 21, 1927, c. 47; 44 Stat. 1013,
Congress declared that nothing in the Act should be construed as
authority for any diversion from Lake Michigan.
The master's findings on the subject of injury to the
complainants are, in effect, as follows:
The diversion which has taken place through the Chicago Drainage
Canal has been substantially equivalent to a diversion of about
8,500 cubic feet a second for a period of time, sufficient to
cause, and it has caused, the lowering of the mean levels of the
lakes and the connecting waterways, as follows: Lakes Michigan and
Huron approximately 6 inches; Lakes Erie and Ontario approximately
5 inches, and of the connecting rivers, bays, and harbors to the
same extent respectively. A diversion of an additional 1,500 cubic
feet per second, or a total diversion of 10,000 cubic feet a
second, would cause an additional lowering in Lakes Michigan and
Huron of about one inch, and in Lakes Erie and Ontario, a little
less than one inch, with
Page 278 U. S. 408
a corresponding additional lowering in the connecting waterways.
The master also finds that, if the diversion at Chicago were ended,
assuming that other diversions remained the same, the mean levels
of the lakes and rivers affected by the Chicago drainage would be
raised in the course of several years (about 5 years in the case of
Lakes Michigan and Huron, and about 1 year in the case of Lakes
Erie and Ontario) to the same extent as they had been lowered,
respectively, by that diversion.
The master finds that the damage due to the diversion at Chicago
relates to navigation and commercial interests, to structures, to
the convenience of summer resorts, to fishing and hunting grounds,
to public parks and other enterprises, and to riparian property
generally, but does not report that injury to agriculture is
established. He says that the Great Lakes and their connecting
channels form a natural highway for transportation, having a water
surface of over 95,000 square miles, and a shoreline of 8,300
miles, extending from Duluth-Superior, and from Chicago and Gary,
to Montreal at the head of deep-draft ocean navigation on the St.
Lawrence; that there are approximately 400 harbors on the Great
Lakes and connecting channels, of which about 100 have been
improved by the federal government; that the latter improvements
consist in the excavation and maintenance of channels from deep
water in the lakes to the harbor entrances; that inner or local
harbors are located inside of the federal channels, and the depths
in the inner harbors have been obtained and are maintained at local
expense; that inner harbors are necessary to afford practical
navigation; that extensive and expensive loading, unloading, and
other terminal facilities have been constructed in these various
ports within the territory of the complainant states on the Great
Lakes at local expense.
The master's report says that the waterborne traffic on the
Great Lakes for the year 1923 consisted of 81,466,902,000 ton-miles
of water haul, and that consideration of
Page 278 U. S. 409
individual loaded boats and of their respective dimensions shows
that, if water had been available for an additional 6 inches of
draft, the fleet could have handled for the year 3,346,000 tons
more than was actually transported, or to put the matter in another
light, the season's business could have been done with the
elimination from service of about 30 freighters of the
2,000-3,000-ton class, and that the lost tonnage of the total
through business of the Lakes for 1923, incident to a 6-inch
deficiency of draft, exceeded 4,000,000 tons, and that the average
water haul rate for the year was 88 cents per ton.
The great losses to which the complainant states and their
citizens and their property owners have been subjected by the
reductions of levels in the various lakes and rivers, except Lake
Superior, are made apparent by these figures.
The pleadings question the jurisdiction of this Court and the
sufficiency of the facts set forth in the bills to constitute a
cause of action. These issues, although raised, are not pressed by
the defendants, and we concur with the master in his conclusion
that they are met completely by our previous decisions.
Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208;
200 U. S. 200 U.S.
496;
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1;
Sanitary District of Chicago v. United States,
266 U. S. 405;
Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125;
206 U. S. 206 U.S.
46;
New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.
S. 296;
Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.
S. 419;
North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.
S. 365;
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,
262 U. S. 553,
262 U. S. 623;
263 U. S. 263 U.S.
350;
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.
S. 230,
206 U. S.
237.
The controversies have taken a very wide range. The exact issue
is whether the State of Illinois and the Sanitary District of
Chicago, by diverting 8,500 cubic feet from the waters of Lake
Michigan, have so injured the riparian and other rights of the
complainant states bordering the Great Lakes and connecting streams
by lowering their levels as
Page 278 U. S. 410
to justify an injunction to stop this diversion, and thus
restore the normal levels. Defendants assert that such a diversion
is the result of congressional action in the regulation of
interstate commerce; that the injury, if any, resulting is
damnum absque injuria to the complaining states. Those
states reply that the regulation of interstate commerce under the
Constitution does not authorize the transfer by Congress of any of
the navigable capacity of the Great Lakes system of waters to the
Mississippi basin -- that is from one great watershed to another;
second, that the transfer is contrary to the provision of the
Constitution forbidding the preference of the ports of one state
over those of another; and, third, that the injuries to the
complainant states deprive them and their citizens and property
owners of property without due process of law, and of the natural
advantages of their position, contrary to their sovereign rights as
members of the Union. If one of these issues is decided in favor of
the complaining states, it ends the case in their favor, and the
diversion must be enjoined. But, in the view which we take
respecting what actually has been done by Congress, some of these
objections need not be considered or passed upon.
The complainants, even apart from their constitutional
objections, contend that Congress has not, by statute or otherwise,
authorized the Lake Michigan diversion, that it is therefore
illegal, and that injuries by it to the complainant states and
their people should be forbidden by decree of this Court. The
diversion of 8,500 cubic feet a second is now maintained under a
permit of the Secretary of War of March 3, 1925, acting under
§ 10 of the Act of 1899, which it is contended by the
complainants vests no such authority in him. They claim that the
diversion is based on a purpose not to regulate navigation of the
lake, but merely to get rid of the sewage of Chicago; that this is
a state purpose, not a federal function, and should be enjoined to
save the rights of complainants. If the view
Page 278 U. S. 411
urged by the complainants is right, the necessity for the use of
the 8,500 cubic feet a second to save the health of the inhabitants
of the Sanitary District will then present the problem of the power
and discretion of a court of equity to moderate the strict and
immediate rights of the parties complainant to a gradual one which
will effect justice as rapidly as the situation permits. The
framing of the decree will then require the careful consideration
of the Court.
The complainants contend that Congress has given no authority
for the diversion from Lake Michigan, even if it has power so to do
by way of regulating interstate commerce. The defendants rely for
this authority on the permit of the Secretary of War issued by him
March 3, 1925, to the Sanitary District shortly after the decree of
this Court in
Sanitary District v. United States,
266 U. S. 405.
That decree forbade the diversion of the waters from Lake Michigan
in excess of 4,167 cubic feet a second, but was made expressly
without prejudice to any permit issued by the Secretary of War
according to law. The complainants contend that the permit which
allows a diversion of 8,500 cubic feet a second is not in
regulation of interstate commerce, is not according to law, and
should be declared invalid.
The defendants base their claim of congressional authority on
§ 10 of the Act of March 3, 1899, c. 425, 30 Stat. 1151:
"That the creation of an obstruction not affirmatively
authorized by Congress to the navigable capacity, of any of the
waters of the United States is hereby prohibited, and it shall not
be lawful to build or commence the building of any wharf, pier,
dolphin, boom, weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty, or other
structures in any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, navigable
river, or other water of the United States outside established
harbor lines, or where no harbor lines have been established,
except on
Page 278 U. S. 412
plans recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by
the Secretary of War, and it shall not be lawful to excavate or
fill, or in any manner to alter or modify the course, location,
condition, or capacity of, any port, roadstead, haven, harbor,
canal, lake, harbor of refuge, or inclosure within the limits of
any breakwater, or of the channel of any navigable water of the
United States, unless the work has been recommended by the Chief of
Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of War prior to beginning
the same."
The policy carried out in the Act of March 3, 1899, had been
begun in the Act of September 19, 1890, c. 907, 26 Stat. 454, 455.
Sections 9 and 10 were the rearranged result of the provisions of
§§ 7 and 10 of the Act of 1890. A new classification was
made in §§ 9 and 10 of the Act of 1899, and substituted
for § 10 of the Act of 1890. The latter provided that the
creation of any obstruction to navigable capacity was prohibited
unless "affirmatively authorized by law," and this was changed so
as to read "affirmatively authorized by Congress." The change in
the words of the first clause of § 10 was intended to make
mere state authorization inadequate.
Sanitary District v.
United States, 266 U. S. 405,
266 U. S. 429;
United States v. Bellingham Bay Boom Co., 176 U.
S. 211. It was not intended to override the authority of
the state to put its veto upon the placing of obstructing
structures in navigable waters within a state, and both state and
federal approval were made necessary in such case.
Cummings v.
Chicago, 188 U. S. 410. The
words "affirmatively authorized by Congress" should be construed in
the light of the administrative exigencies which prompted the
delegation of authority in the succeeding clauses. Congress, having
stated in § 9 as to what particular structures its specific
consent should be required, intended to leave to the Secretary of
War, acting on the recommendation of the Chief of Engineers,
the
Page 278 U. S. 413
determination of what should be approved and authorized in the
classes of cases described in the second and third clauses of
§ 10. If the section were construed to require a special
authorization by Congress whenever in any aspect it might be
considered that there was an obstruction to navigable capacity,
none of the undertakings specifically provided for in the second
and third clauses of § 10 could safely be undertaken without a
special authorization of Congress. We do not think this was
intended. The Supreme Court of Maine, in
Maine Water Co. v.
Knickerbocker Steam Towage Co., 90 Me. 473, took the same
general view in construction of the same section. It held that the
broad words of the first clause of that section were not intended
to limit the second and third clauses, and that Congress' purpose
was a direct prohibition of what was forbidden by them except when
affirmatively approved by the Chief of Engineers and the Secretary
of War. We concur in this view.
The true intent of the Act of Congress was that unreasonable
obstructions to navigation and navigable capacity were to be
prohibited, and, in the cases described in the second and third
clauses of § 10, the Secretary of War, acting on the
recommendation of the Chief of Engineers, was authorized to
determine what in the particular cases constituted an unreasonable
obstruction.
This construction of § 10 is sustained by the uniform
practice of the War Department for nearly 30 years. Nothing is more
convincing in interpretation of a doubtful or ambiguous statute.
United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.
S. 181,
270 U. S. 205;
Swendig v. Washington Water Power Co., 265 U.
S. 322,
265 U. S. 331;
Kern River Co. v. United States, 257 U.
S. 147,
257 U. S. 154;
United States v. Burlington & Missouri River R. Co.,
98 U. S. 334,
98 U. S. 341;
United States v. Hammers, 221 U.
S. 220,
221 U. S. 228;
Logan v. Davis, 233 U. S. 613,
233 U. S.
627.
The practice is shown by the opinion of the Acting Attorney
General, transmitted to the Secretary of War.
Page 278 U. S. 414
34 Op.Attys.Gen. 410, 416. The Secretary of War acted on this
view on May 8, 1899, about two months after the passage of the Act.
This was followed by the permits subsequently granted down to March
3, 1925. The fact that the Secretary of War acted on this view was
made known to Congress by many reports.
But it is said the construction thus favored would constitute it
a delegation by Congress of legislative power, and invalid. We do
not think so. The determination of the amount that could be safely
taken from the lake is one that is shown by the evidence to be a
peculiarly expert question. It is such a question as this that is
naturally within the executive function that can be deputed by
Congress.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Olympian Dredging Co.,
260 U. S. 205,
260 U. S. 208;
Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U.
S. 405,
266 U. S. 428;
Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649,
143 U. S. 693;
Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470,
192 U. S. 496;
Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.
S. 364,
204 U. S. 386;
Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.
S. 177,
216 U. S. 192;
Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States, 242 U.
S. 409,
242 U. S. 424;
J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,
276 U. S. 394,
276 U. S.
407.
The construction of § 10 of the Act of March 3, 1899, was
settled by this Court in the decision of the first
Chicago
Drainage Canal case in
266 U. S. 405,
266 U. S. 429.
The decision there reached and the decree entered cannot be
sustained except on the theory that the Court decided, first, that
Congress had exercised the power to prevent injury to the
navigability of Lake Michigan and the other lakes and rivers in the
Great Lakes watershed, and, second, that it could properly and
validly confer the administrative function of passing on the issue
of unlawful injury or otherwise on the Secretary of War, and that
it had done so. To give any other interpretation would necessarily
be at variance with our previous decision.
Page 278 U. S. 415
It is further argued by complainants that, while the power of
Congress extends to the protection and improvement of navigation,
it does not extend to its destruction or to the creation of
obstructions to navigable capacity. This Court has said that, while
Congress, in the exercise of its power, may adopt any means having
some positive relation to the control of navigation and not
otherwise inconsistent with the Constitution,
United States v.
Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U. S. 53,
229 U. S. 62, it
may not arbitrarily destroy or impair the rights of riparian owners
by legislation which has no real or substantial relation to the
control of navigation or appropriateness to that end.
United
States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.
S. 411,
269 U. S. 419;
Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Washington R. Co.,
255 U. S. 56,
255 U. S.
63.
So complainants urge that the diversion here is for purposes of
sanitation and development of power only, and therefore that it
lies outside the power confided by Congress to the Secretary of
War. The master says:
"There is no doubt that the diversion is primarily for the
purposes of sanitation. Whatever may be said as to the service of
the diverted water in relation to a waterway to the Mississippi, or
as to the possible benefit of its contribution to the navigation of
that river at low water stages, it remains true that the
disposition of Chicago's sewage has been the dominant factor in the
promotion, maintenance, and development of the enterprise by the
State of Illinois and the Sanitary District. The purpose of
utilizing the flow through the drainage canal to develop power is
also undoubtedly present, although subordinated to the exigency of
sanitation. So far as the diverted water is used for the
development of power, the use is merely incidental. This Court, in
Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U. S.
405,
266 U. S. 424, in describing
the channel, looked upon its interest to the Sanitary District
'primarily as a
Page 278 U. S. 416
means to dispose of the sewage of Chicago,' although it was also
'an object of attention to the United States as opening water
communication between the Great Lakes and the Mississippi and the
Gulf.'"
The master then considered whether there was any express
authorization of the diversion now permitted, except under
§§ 9 and 10 of the Act of March 3, 1899, already referred
to. On this subject he said:
"Consideration by Congress of the advisability of the proposed
waterway from Lake Michigan to the Illinois and Mississippi Rivers,
demands by Congress for surveys, plans and estimates, the
establishment of project depths, and appropriations for specified
purposes did not, in my opinion, constitute direct authority for
the diversion in question, however that diversion, or the diversion
of some quantity of water from Lake Michigan, might fit into an
ultimate plan."
This conclusion of the master is fully supported by reference to
the already cited Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1927,
declaring that nothing therein should authorize any Lake Michigan
diversion.
The master also says that appropriations for widening and
deepening the Chicago River, and the cooperation with the Sanitary
District for several years in that improvement, merely committed
Congress to the work as thus actually prescribed, but did not go
further, whatever the advantages of that work in connection with
the purposes of the Sanitary District's canal.
He then proceeds:
"There is nothing in any of the acts of Congress upon which the
defendants rely specifying any particular quantity of water which
could be diverted, and it could hardly be considered a reasonable
contention that the acts of Congress justified any diversion of
water from Lake Michigan that the State of Illinois and the
Sanitary District might see fit to make. It is manifest that it
was
Page 278 U. S. 417
the view of the War Department that Congress had not acted
directly and whatever the department did was subject to such action
as Congress might take."
He continues:
"This understanding that Congress has not yet acted directly so
as to authorize the diversion in question has continued. It was in
this view that the United States prosecuted its suit to decree in
this Court to enjoin the defendants from taking more water from
Lake Michigan than the Secretary of War had allowed."
In this conclusion, which the Court confirms, we are therefore
remitted solely to the effect and operation of the permit of 1925
as authority for the maintenance of the diversion.
The normal power of the Secretary of War under § 10 of the
Act of March 3, 1899, is to maintain the navigable capacity of Lake
Michigan, and not to restrict it or destroy it by diversions. This
is what the Secretaries of War and the Chiefs of Engineers were
trying to do in the interval between 1896 and 1907 and 1913, when
the applications for 10,000 cubic feet a second were denied by the
successive Secretaries and in 1908 a suit was brought by the United
States to enjoin a flow beyond 4,167 cubic feet a second. Then,
pending the suit, the Sanitary District disobeyed the restriction
of the Secretary of War's permit and increased the diversion to
8,500 cubic feet in order to dispose of the sewage of that
district. Had an injunction then issued and been enforced, the port
of Chicago almost immediately would have become practically
unusable because of the deposit of sewage without a sufficient flow
of water through the canal to dilute the sewage and carry it away.
In the nature of things, it was not practicable to stop the deposit
without substituting some other means of disposal. This situation
gave rise to an exigency which the Secretary, in the interest of
navigation and its protection, met by issuing a temporary
Page 278 U. S. 418
permit intended to sanction for the time being a sufficient
diversion to avoid interference with navigation in the port of
Chicago.
See New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.
S. 296,
256 U. S.
307-308. The elimination and prevention of this
interference was the sole justification for expanding the prior
permit, the limitations of which had been disregarded by the
Sanitary District. Merely to aid the district in disposing of its
sewage was not a justification, considering the limited scope of
the Secretary's authority. He could not make mere local sanitation
a basis for a continuing diversion. Accordingly, he made the permit
of March 3, 1925, both temporary and conditional -- temporary in
that it was limited in duration and revocable at will, and
conditional in that it was made to depend on the adoption and
carrying out by the district of other plans for disposing of the
sewage.
It will be perceived that the interference which was the basis
of the Secretary's permit, and which the latter was intended to
eliminate, resulted directly from the failure of the Sanitary
District to take care of its sewage in some way other than by
promoting or continuing the existing diversion. It may be that some
flow from the lake is necessary to keep up navigation in the
Chicago River, which really is part of the port of Chicago, but
that amount is negligible as compared with 8,500 second feet now
being diverted. Hence, beyond that negligible quantity, the
validity of the Secretary's permit derives its support entirely
from a situation produced by the Sanitary District in violation of
the complainants' rights, and, but for that support, complainants
might properly press for an immediate shutting down by injunction
of the diversion, save any small part needed to maintain navigation
in the river. In these circumstances, we think they are entitled to
a decree which will be effective in bringing that violation and the
unwarranted part of the diversion to an end. But, in keeping with
the principles
Page 278 U. S. 419
on which courts of equity condition their relief, and by way of
avoiding any unnecessary hazard to the health of the people of that
section, our decree should be so framed as to accord to the
Sanitary District a reasonably practicable time within which to
provide some other means of disposing of the sewage, reducing the
diversion as the artificial disposition of the sewage increases
from time to time, until it is entirely disposed of thereby, when
there shall be a final, permanent, operative, and effective
injunction.
It is very apparent from the report of the master and from the
state legislation that the Legislature of Illinois and the Sanitary
District have for a long period been strongly insistent upon such a
use of the waters of Lake Michigan as would dispose of the sewage
of the district and incidentally furnish a navigable water route
from Lake Michigan to the Mississippi basin, and that not until
1903 was the attention of the public, and especially of the
district authorities, drawn to the fact that a diversion like that
now used would lower the lake levels with injurious consequences to
the Great Lakes navigation and to the complainant states. The
Secretary of War and the Chief of Engineers in 1907 refused a
permit by which there would be more than 4,167 feet a second
diverted. Advised that the district authorities proposed to ignore
that limitation, the United States brought suit against the
authorities of the district to enjoin any diversion in excess of
that quantity, as fixed in an earlier permit. Another application
for enlargement was made to Secretary of War Stimson in 1913 and
was rejected. For several years, including the inexcusable delays
made possible by the failure of the federal court in Chicago to
render a decision in the suit brought by the United States, the
district authorities have been maintaining the diversion of 8,500
cubic feet per second or more on the plea of preserving the health
of the district. Putting this plea
Page 278 U. S. 420
forward has tended materially to hamper and obstruct the remedy
to which the complainants are entitled in vindication of their
rights, riparian and other.
The intervening states on the same side with Illinois, in
seeking a recognition of asserted rights in the navigation of the
Mississippi, have answered denying the rights of the complainants
to an injunction. They really seek affirmatively to preserve the
diversion from Lake Michigan in the interest of such navigation and
interstate commerce, though they have made no express prayer
therefor. In our view of the permit of March 3, 1925, and in the
absence of direct authority from Congress for a waterway from Lake
Michigan to the Mississippi, they show no rightful interest in the
maintenance of the diversion. Their motions to dismiss the bills
are overruled, and, so far as their answer may suggest affirmative
relief, it is denied.
In increasing the diversion from 4,167 cubic feet a second to
8,500, the Sanitary District defied the authority of the national
government resting in the Secretary of War. And insofar as the
prior diversion was not for the purposes of maintaining navigation
in the Chicago River, it was without any legal basis, because made
for an inadmissible purpose. It therefore is the duty of this Court
by an appropriate decree to compel the reduction of the diversion
to a point where it rests on a legal basis, and thus to restore the
navigable capacity of Lake Michigan to its proper level. The
Sanitary District authorities, relying on the argument with
reference to the health of its people, have much too long delayed
the needed substitution of suitable sewage plants as a means of
avoiding the diversion in the future. Therefore they cannot now
complain if an immediately heavy burden is placed upon the district
because of their attitude and course. The situation requires the
district to devise proper methods for providing sufficient money
and to construct and put in operation with all reasonable
expedition adequate plants for the disposition
Page 278 U. S. 421
of the sewage through other means than the lake diversion.
Though the restoration of just rights to the complainants will
be gradual, instead of immediate, it must be continuous and as
speedy as practicable, and must include everything that is
essential to an effective project.
The court expresses its obligation to the master for his useful,
fair, and comprehensive report.
To determine the practical measures needed to effect the object
just stated and the period required for their completion, there
will be need for the examination of experts, and the appropriate
provisions of the necessary decree will require careful
consideration. For this reason, the case will be again referred to
the master for a further examination into the questions indicated.
He will be authorized and directed to hear witnesses presented by
each of the parties, and to call witnesses of his own selection,
should he deem it necessary to do so, and then with all convenient
speed to make report of his conclusions and of a form of
decree.
It is so ordered.