1. Section 33 of the Merchant Marine Act incorporated into the
maritime law in favor of injured "seamen" the applicable provisions
of the Employers' Liability Act and its amendments, and these may
be enforced either in suits in admiralty or actions at law. P.
277 U. S.
228.
2. A stevedore engaged in stowing cargo upon a vessel is a
"seaman" within the meaning of that section, and, under applicable
provisions of the Liability Act, may recover from the stevedoring
company employing him for an injury caused by the negligence of a
fellow servant.
Id.
3. Where the circuit court of appeals erroneously reverses a
judgment upon one question without deciding another upon which its
correctness also depends, the case may be reversed for the error
and remanded to that court for decision of the other question.
Id.
19 F.2d 871 reversed.
Certiorari,
275 U. S. 518, to
a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed a
judgment of the district court on a libel in admiralty for personal
injuries.
Page 277 U. S. 227
MR. JUSTICE SANFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner, Karl Buzynski, brought a libel
in
personam in admiralty in the Federal District Court for
Southern Texas against the Luckenbach Steamship Company, the owner
of the Steamship
Edgar F. Luckenbach, and the Texas
Contracting Company, to recover damages for personal injuries
suffered by him while working as a stevedore for the Contracting
Company, an independent contractor engaged in loading cargo on the
steamship while at dock in the port of Galveston. He was awarded a
judgment against the two companies jointly. 12 F.2d 92. This was
reversed by the circuit court of appeals. 19 F.2d 871.
Shortly after Buzynski had started to work, and while he was
removing a cover from one of the hatches on the ship, he was struck
and severely injured, without fault on his part, by a chain which
fell from the end of the boom of a derrick at this hatch, which was
used in loading the cargo. The accident was caused by the starting
in motion, in a manner not shown by direct evidence, of a winch
belonging to the ship which connected with and controlled the
movement of the boom. The winchman who operated the winch was an
employee of the Contracting Company and a fellow servant of
Buzynski.
The district court was of opinion that the accident resulted
from a defect in the winch for which both companies were
responsible. The circuit court of appeals was of opinion that the
evidence showed no defect in the
Page 277 U. S. 228
winch for which either of the Companies was liable, and that,
although there was evidence from which it might reasonably be
inferred that the accident was caused by negligence of the winchman
or of another stevedore, nevertheless the Contracting Company would
not be liable for the negligence of such fellow servant.
We granted this writ of certiorari on account of this ruling of
the circuit court of appeals as to the negligence of a fellow
servant, and no other question need be considered here.
It is settled by this Court that § 33 of the Merchant
Marine Act, 1920, [
Footnote 1]
incorporated into the maritime law in favor of injured "seamen" the
applicable provisions of the Employers' Liability Act [
Footnote 2] and its amendments, and
that these may be enforced either in suits in admiralty or actions
at law.
Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.
S. 375,
264 U. S. 388;
Engel v. Davenport, 271 U. S. 33,
271 U. S. 35;
Panama R. Co. v. Vasquez, 271 U.
S. 557,
271 U. S. 560;
Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.
S. 316,
274 U. S. 324;
Messel v. Foundation Co., 274 U.
S. 427,
274 U. S. 434. And
in
Internat'l Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U. S.
50,
272 U. S. 52, we
held that the word "seamen," as used in § 33, included a
stevedore engaged in the maritime work of stowing cargo upon a
vessel, and that, under the applicable provisions of the Employers'
Liability Act, he could recover from the stevedoring company for an
injury caused by the negligence of a fellow servant.
The view of the circuit court of appeals that the Contracting
Company would not be liable for the negligence of a fellow servant
was erroneous, and its judgment must be reversed. But since, it did
not determine whether the accident was in fact due to such
negligence, or to some other cause, the case will be remanded to
that court with
Page 277 U. S. 229
instructions to determine this question and take further
proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
See Cole v.
Ralph, 252 U. S. 286,
252 U. S. 290;
Gerdes v. Lustgarten, 266 U. S. 321,
266 U. S.
327.
Reversed and remanded.
[
Footnote 1]
41 Stat. 988, c. 250.
[
Footnote 2]
35 Stat. 65, c. 149.