1. The right of one who was a master in the federal court to
retain money paid him by a party in excess of the compensation
found permissible by this Court cannot be determined by a state
court in a suit between the master and such party. P.
276 U. S. 9.
2. A master cannot rightfully accept or retain anything as
compensation unless sanctioned by proper order of court. P.
276 U. S. 9.
3. Respondent, as master in equity suits, was allowed fees
which, by direction of the district court, were paid by the
successful plaintiffs before the time for appeal expired and were
taxed against their opponents. On appeals by the latter, this Court
decided that the fees were excessive and were awarded by the
district court in abuse of its judicial discretion. Upon return of
the cases, the fees were retaxed against the defendants in the
maximum amounts permitted by this Court's decision, but the
respondent did not repay the excess to the successful plaintiffs,
nor seek any further direction from either court respecting it.
Held, that it was respondent's imperative duty to return
the excess to the parties who paid it, whether they required it or
not, together with six percent interest thereon from the date when
the decision of this Court fixing the amounts allowable was
announced, and that his conduct in retaining the excess was not
"upright and according to law " -- the words of the oath taken at
his admission to practice before this Court. P.
276 U. S. 9.
Rule,
275 U. S. 499,
upon the respondent to make report of the fees and allowances paid
him as master in several cases in the district court, and the
amounts, if any, repaid by him, and, if he received compensation in
excess of the amounts heretofore limited by this Court, to show
cause why he should not be disbarred and punished for contempt.
Page 276 U. S. 7
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT announced the opinion of the Court.
Under our order of November 21, 1927, the clerk issued a rule to
the respondent, Abraham S. Gilbert, of New York City, a member of
this bar, which directed --
That he make written report to this Court, showing what fees or
allowances have been paid to him (also when and by whom paid) for
services as master in the several causes reviewed here during the
October term, 1921, and reported in
259 U. S. 259 U.S.
101, under the following titles:
Newton, as Attorney General of
the New York, et al. v. Consolidated Gas Company of New York; Same
v. New York & Queens Gas Company; Same v. Central Union Gas
Company; Same v. Northern Union Gas Company; Same v. New York
Mutual Gaslight Company; Same v. Standard Gaslight Company of the
City of New York; Same v. New Amsterdam Gas Company; Same v. East
River Gas Company of Long Island City.
That he likewise report whether he has returned or repaid any
portion of the fees or allowances received by him as such master,
with dates and names of the parties.
That, if he has received fees or allowances as master in any of
the specified causes exceeding the maximum amount held by us to be
permissible, and has not returned or repaid the excess, then he
shall show cause why his name ought not to be stricken from the
roll of attorneys permitted to practice here, and he be punished
for contempt or otherwise dealt with as the circumstances may
require.
On the return day, January 16, 1928, Gilbert presented himself,
filed a written report, and was heard through counsel.
Page 276 U. S. 8
He asserts that he received as fees for services as master in
the eight above-mentioned causes a total of $118,000; he sets out
their several amounts and shows by whom and when they were paid. He
avers that no one of the gas companies which paid these fees has
ever questioned the amount or asked return of any portion, and says
that he believes it was proper for him to retain them,
notwithstanding they greatly exceeded what we declared permissible.
But he further says that, if this Court, after viewing his
response, should conclude that he is under legal or moral
obligation to return any part of them, he is willing so to do.
In December, 1921, the District Court for the Southern District
of New York made allowances to respondent for services as master in
each of the above-mentioned causes and directed that they be paid
by the complaining corporations respectively and thereafter taxed
as costs against the defendants, the Attorney General of New York
and others. In obedience to such orders and before the time for
appeal expired, these were paid, as follows: by Consolidated Gas
Company, December 13, 1921, $57,500.00; by New York & Queens
Gas Company, December 16, 1921, $12,500.00; by Central Union Gas
Company, December 16, 1921, $12,500.00; by Northern Union Gas
Company, December 13, 1921, $7,500.00; by New York Mutual Gaslight
Company, December 16, 1921, $11,500.00; by Standard Gaslight
Company, January 13, 1922, $7,500.00; by New Amsterdam Gas Company,
January 13, 1922, $4,500.00; by East River Gas Company, January 13,
1922, $4,500.00.
The Attorney General and other defendants insisted that the
allowances were excessive. The district court overruled their
objections; the matter came here and was decided May 15, 1922.
259 U. S. 259 U.S.
101. We held that in the
Consolidated Gas Company's case
twice too much had been allowed, and in the other causes, three
times too much; that the total compensation should not exceed
$49,250, and further, that in making these awards, the district
court abused its judicial discretion. Accordingly,
Page 276 U. S. 9
we reversed the challenged decrees and remanded the causes, with
instructions to fix respondent's compensation within the following
limitations:
"In the cause wherein the Consolidated Gas Company is appellee
here (No. 750) not exceeding $28,750, one-half of the amount
heretofore allowed; in each of the other seven causes, Nos. 751,
752, 753, 832, 833, 844, and 845, not exceeding one-third of the
amount heretofore allowed therein; and in the eight cases
allowances totaling not more than $49,250."
We also directed "such further action in conformity with this
opinion as may be necessary."
Upon receipt of the mandates, issued here June 19, 1922, the
district court ordered that the master's fees, to the extent of the
maximum permitted by us, should be taxed against the several
defendants as costs. Respondent made no effort to secure any
further orders or direction by the district court or this
Court.
More than a year thereafter -- December, 1923 -- apparently
moved by published criticisms, respondent instituted a proceeding
against the Consolidated Gas Company in the Supreme Court of New
York under § 473, New York Civil Practice Act, wherein he
sought and obtained a declaratory judgment reciting that that
company had no valid claim against him for return of any part of
the $57,500 which it had paid. This proceeding was ill advised, or
worse, and the pronouncement therein cannot aid him here. The state
court had no power to determine the matter now before us.
Upon announcement of our opinion, May 15, 1922, it became the
imperative duty of respondent immediately to return the fees
received by him so far as they exceeded what we declared
permissible. It is now his duty, without further delay, to return
this excess, with interest thereon at 6 percentum from May 15,
1922.
When respondent accepted appointment as master, he assumed the
duties and obligations of a judicial officer. He could not
rightfully accept or retain anything as compensation
Page 276 U. S. 10
unless sanctioned by proper order of court. Reception then or
now of a gratuity from any party would be indefensible, and whether
or no the corporations which paid him by direction of the court are
satisfied with the result is not unimportant. He has long been an
attorney and counselor authorized to practice at this bar under the
sanction of an oath to demean himself "uprightly, and according to
law." Notwithstanding the adjudication here that excessive fees had
been allowed by orders granted in abuse of judicial discretion, he
has retained them for more than five years. He knew that he had got
unearned money by improper orders of court, but he decided to keep
it. Such conduct is far from "upright and according to law" within
the fair intendment of those terms.
Further action will be postponed until Monday, February 20,
1928. The respondent will present himself at that time and report
in writing concerning efforts made to comply with his
obligations.