An action under the Federal Employers Liability Act for death by
negligence may be maintained against a railroad in the state of its
incorporation where it owns part of its line, operated in
intrastate as well as interstate commerce, in a county where it has
an agent and a usual place of business, though this be not the
state where the cause of action arose. P.
274 U. S.
22.
309 Mo. 625 affirmed.
Error to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri, in
mandamus, which directed the judge of an inferior court to set
aside a judgment dismissing an action for damages, and to entertain
jurisdiction over it.
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Missouri, which
had granted, in an original proceeding, a peremptory writ of
mandamus. 309 Mo. 625. Its judgment directed the judge of an
inferior court to set aside a judgment dismissing an action, and
ordered him to entertain
Page 274 U. S. 22
jurisdiction. That action had been brought under the federal
Employers' Liability Act by a citizen and resident of Kansas for
the death of an employee of the Missouri Pacific Railroad. The
accident occurred on its line in Kansas, and the deceased was a
citizen of Kansas at the time of his death. The railroad is a
Missouri corporation. The action was brought in a county traversed
by the railroad in which it had an office and an agent for the
transaction of business. Under a statute of the state, it was
liable to suit there. R.S. Mo.1919, § 1180.
The railroad contends that, as it could have been sued in
Kansas, where the accident occurred and the plaintiff resided, the
statute, as applied, was void under the doctrine of
Davis v.
Farmers' Cooperative Equity Co., 262 U.
S. 312, and
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.
v. Wells, 265 U. S. 101,
because a suit in Missouri would burden interstate commerce. In
support of its contention, it was urged that the claims against the
carrier for personal injuries are numerous; that the amounts
demanded are large; that in many cases the carrier deems it
advisable to leave the determination of liability to the courts;
that in the action in question there were at least 11 employees
working for it in Kansas who were material witnesses without whose
attendance it could not safely proceed to trial; that to procure
their attendance at the trial in Missouri would cause absence from
their work in interstate commerce, and that this would subject the
carrier to expense.
These allegations remind of
Davis v. Farmers' Cooperative
Equity Co. But other facts on which the decision of that case
was rested are absent in the case at bar. Here, the railroad is not
a foreign corporation; it is sued in the state of its
incorporation. It is sued in a state in which it owns and operates
a railroad. It is sued in a county in which it has an agent and a
usual place of business. It is sued in a state in which it carries
on doubtless intrastate
Page 274 U. S. 23
as well as interstate business. Even a foreign corporation is
not immune from the ordinary processes of the courts of a state
where its business is entirely interstate in character.
International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.
S. 579. It must submit, if there is jurisdiction, to the
requirements of orderly, effective administration of justice,
although thereby interstate commerce is incidentally burdened.
Compare Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.
S. 160,
242 U. S. 167;
St. Louis, Brownsville & Mexico Ry. v. Taylor,
266 U. S. 200.
Affirmed.