1. An action against a railroad for the value of switching
service performed by a shipper who did so at the railroad's request
during a railroad strike and also paid the railroad tariff charges
covering the same service is within the jurisdiction of the
district court
Page 274 U. S. 182
where diversity of citizenship and jurisdictional amount are
present, and the question whether an administrative decision by the
Interstate Commerce Commission is prerequisite to the plaintiff's
cause of action, is a question of the merits. P
274 U. S.
185.
2. Under Jud.Code § 238, a judgment of the district court
dismissing a case within its power to decide, upon a decision of
the merits, was not reviewable directly by this Court though
erroneously styled a dismissal "for want of jurisdiction." P.
274 U. S.
185.
3. By the Act of September 14, 1922 (repealed by Act of February
13, 1925) a writ of error from this Court to the district court was
transferrable to the circuit court of appeals when erroneously
allowed under Jud.Code § 238 to a judgment of dismissal on the
merits properly reviewable in the latter court. P.
274 U.S. 186.
4. The provision of the Act of February 13, 1925, § 14,
that it shall not affect cases "pending in the Supreme Court" on
its effective date (three months from its approval) applies to a
case erroneously lodged in this Court under Jud.Code § 238,
which should have gone to the circuit court of appeals, and imposes
the duty of transferring it to that court under the Act of
September 14, 192. P.
274 U. S.
187.
5. A writ of error from this Court, issued in due form by a
judge having authority to issue such writs, followed by due
execution of the writ and lodgment of the record here, is to be
regarded as a case "pending" in this Court from the allowance and
issuance of the writ, even though the writ was allowed and issued
erroneously. P.
274 U. S. 188.
Actions to recover the value of switching service, brought in an
Ohio state court and removed, on the ground of diversity of
citizenship, to the district court, where they were dismissed for
supposed want of jurisdiction. Orders made at this term dismissing
the writs of error are now set aside, and the causes are
transferred to the circuit court of appeals.
Page 274 U. S. 183
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT delivered the opinion of the Court.
These two cases are exactly alike, and the same disposition will
be made of them. They were dismissed at this term for lack of
jurisdiction, as follows:
"Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in this Court on the
authority of
Transportes Maritimos Do Estado v. Almeida,
265 U. S.
104,
265 U. S. 105, and
Oliver American Trading Co. v. Government of the United States
of Mexico, 264 U. S. 440,
264 U. S.
442."
This is a motion to set aside the dismissals and to substitute
therefor orders transferring them to the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit.
The Timken Roller Bearing Company is a corporation of Ohio,
engaged in the business of making roller bearings and other steel
products, with its principal place of business in Canton, Stark
County, Ohio. The Pennsylvania Railroad is a corporation of
Pennsylvania, and a common carrier engaged in Ohio, and carried
freight for the Timken Company. The Timken Company sued the
Pennsylvania Company, averring the following facts:
On April 10, 1920, the yard employees of the Pennsylvania
Company struck. That company notified the Timken Company that it
would be unable to switch freight cars for it from the
Pennsylvania's interchange tracks to the customary delivery of the
Timken plant at Canton, Ohio. The Pennsylvania Company then
provided the Timken Company with a yard locomotive, and from April
13, 1920, to about September 30, 1920, the Timken Company, with the
knowledge and consent, and at the request, of the Pennsylvania
Company, did the switching service itself. The Pennsylvania Company
made to the Timken Company its customary charges for such switching
service at its regular freight rates, which the Timken Company
paid. During that period, the Timken Company switched 1,640 freight
cars for the Pennsylvania Company, the
Page 274 U. S. 184
reasonable value of which service was $6,534.61. This amount was
included in the line haul freight charges paid by the Timken
Company to the Pennsylvania Company. The Pennsylvania Company was
thus unjustly enriched in the amount above stated, and the
Pennsylvania Company owed to the Timken Company the reasonable
value of the service as stated.
The suit of the Timken Company was brought in the Common Pleas
Court of Cuyahoga county, Ohio, and removed by the Pennsylvania
Company on the ground of diverse citizenship to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. In that court,
the Pennsylvania Company filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction, on the grounds:
(a) That the matters complained of in the plaintiff's petition
essentially involved the making of a rate, as to which the district
court had no power.
(b) The subject affected the reasonableness of rates and the
reasonableness of a practice in interstate commerce, which were
administrative questions, confided primarily to the Interstate
Commerce Commission, and there was no allegation in the plaintiff's
petition that the Interstate Commerce Commission had prescribed any
rule, rate, or practice which would regulate, control, or govern
the rights or obligations of the plaintiff and defendant in the
matter complained of.
(c) That to compensate the plaintiff for the expense of the
switching service set forth in plaintiff's petition would be
tantamount to giving him a rebate, contrary to law.
The motion to dismiss was sustained by the district court on the
ground that the question presented by the plaintiff's petition was
an administrative, and not a judicial, question, and that exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and determine the matters complained of was
vested in the Interstate Commerce Commission. The district
court
Page 274 U. S. 185
therefore dismissed the petition solely for want of
jurisdiction, and, under the provisions of § 238 of the
Judicial Code of the United States as it stood at the time, January
30, 1925:
"Appeals and writs of error may be taken from the district
courts, including the United States District Court for Hawaii, . .
. direct to the Supreme Court in the following cases: in any case
in which the jurisdiction of the court is in issue, in which case
the question of jurisdiction alone shall be certified to the
Supreme Court from the court below for decision, . . ."
it made the following certificate:
"This court, by its final order, dismissed the suit solely for
want of jurisdiction."
"This certificate is made conformably to Judicial Code, §
238, and the opinion filed herein is made a part of the record and
will be certified and sent up as a part of the proceedings,
together with his certificate."
Thereupon a writ of error from this Court to the district court
was allowed by the district judge.
When the case was argued here in open court, this Court ordered
the dismissal of the writ of error as above, for the reason that
the question of jurisdiction passed on by the district court in
this case was not such a question as was covered by § 238. As
interpreted by repeated decisions of the Court, such a question is
in issue only when the district court's power to hear and determine
the cause as defined and limited by the Constitution or statutes of
the United States is in controversy, and where a district court is
vested with jurisdiction of a cause, as where diversity of
citizenship exists, and the matter in controversy is of the
requisite value, the question whether it has the power to afford
the plaintiff a particular remedy does not present a jurisdictional
issue.
Smith v. Apple, 264 U. S. 274,
264 U. S. 278;
Oliver Trading Co. v. Mexico, 264 U.
S. 440,
264 U. S. 442;
Transportes Maritimos Do
Estado
Page 274 U. S. 186
v. Almeida, 265 U. S. 104,
265 U. S.
105.
In this case, there was no question about the jurisdiction of
the court, for there was diverse citizenship and the value of the
matter in controversy was of requisite amount. The real question
was whether, in the absence of an administrative decision by the
Interstate Commerce Commission, the plaintiff had a cause of
action.
See Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants' Elevator
Co., 259 U. S. 285. It
went to the merits, and not to the jurisdiction, and therefore this
Court had no jurisdiction by writ of error under § 238 to
consider the case.
The issue now made is whether this Court made the proper
disposition of the cause by dismissing it, in view of the amendment
by Act of Congress of September 14, 1922, to § 238 of the
Judicial Code, called § 238a, c. 305, as follows:
"If an appeal or writ of error has been or shall be taken to, or
issued out of, any circuit court of appeals in a case wherein such
appeal or writ of error should have been taken to or issued out of
the Supreme Court; or if an appeal or writ of error has been or
shall be taken to, or issued out of, the Supreme Court in a case
wherein such appeal or writ of error should have been taken to, or
issued out of, a circuit court of appeals, such appeal or writ of
error shall not for such reason be dismissed, but shall be
transferred to the proper court, which shall thereupon be possessed
of the same and shall proceed to the determination thereof, with
the same force and effect as if such appeal or writ of error had
been duly taken to, or issued out of, the court to which it is so
transferred."
There is no doubt that, under this section, if it applies to the
present case, the motion to dismiss should not have been granted as
it was, but the case should have been transferred to the circuit
court of appeals for a review of the issue on the merits as to the
cause of action set up by the Timken Company in its petition.
Page 274 U. S. 187
The motion now made to set aside the dismissal and enter an
order of transfer is resisted by the attorneys for the Pennsylvania
Company on the ground that § 238a does not now apply to the
present case. This suit was filed in the Common Pleas Court of
Cuyahoga County on May 31, 1924, and was removed to the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio June 30,
1924, and upon the defendant's motion was dismissed by the district
court for lack of jurisdiction, the judge's certificate to that
effect being filed January 30, 1925. The writ of error was allowed
by the district court on April 6, 1925, was issued on that date,
and served upon the defendant in error April 18, 1925 -- all before
the taking effect of the Act of February, 1925, on May 13, 1925.
The return on the writ of error was transmitted by the clerk of the
district court on July 3, 1925; the transcript of record being
filed on July 13, 1925.
The Act of September 14, 1922, § 238a, was expressly
repealed by the Act of February 13, 1925, § 13, 43 Stat. 942.
Section 14 provides that the Act
"shall take effect after three months after its approval, but it
shall not affect cases then pending in the Supreme Court, nor shall
it affect the right to a review, or the mode or time for exercising
the same, as respects any judgment or decree entered prior to the
date when it takes effect."
The defendant contends that § 14 cannot be construed to
continue the effect of § 238a of the Act of September 22,
1922, because § 14 only saves cases then pending in the
Supreme Court; that, as this Court has now found it had no
jurisdiction of the writ of error issued by this Court to the
district court, it cannot be said that it was a case pending in
this Court, and therefore did not come within the saving clause,
and that the order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction
must stand. We think that this is much too narrow a construction of
the saving provision of § 14. A writ of error duly issued by a
judge having authority to issue writs of error from this Court to
the district
Page 274 U. S. 188
court of the United States in a case there pending, even though
the writ of error is erroneously issued, is, when the writ is
executed and the record brought here, to be regarded as having been
a case pending in this Court from the allowance and issuing of the
writ of error and as then removed from the control and jurisdiction
of the district court -- and to continue as such for the purposes
of § 14 until the writ of error is dismissed. The effect of
§ 14, therefore, is to impose on this Court the duty of
granting the transfer to the circuit court of appeals if that is
the court, as it is, to which this case should have been taken on
error. The previous dismissal of the case is set aside and the
transfer of the case to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit is ordered.
A similar order will be made in the case of
Goodbody v.
Pennsylvania Company, (No. 178).