1. Of two writs of error to a state court, the one sued out
pending motion for rehearing and the other after rehearing denied,
the second may be relied on and the other dismissed. P.
274 U. S. 12.
2. An ordinance of an Ohio village, in 1892, authorizing persons
named to use the streets, etc., for the purpose of erecting,
maintaining, and operating electric light wire mains and apparatus
complete for the distribution of electricity for light, heat, and
power granted an assignable franchise for an unlimited time and not
subject to termination at the mere will of the grantor. P.
274 U. S.
13.
3. Subsequent legislation of the state destroying the
assignability of the franchise would be invalid under the Contract
Clause of the federal Constitution. P.
274 U. S.
14.
113 Oh.St. 325 reversed.
Error to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio which affirmed
a judgment in
quo warranto ousting the public service
company from use of the streets in the Village of Orrville under a
franchise to transmit and distribute electricity.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
These two writs of error were sued out at different stages of
the same cause, the first while a timely application for rehearing
was pending, the second after this
Page 274 U. S. 13
had been denied. Under the circumstances, plaintiff in error may
rely upon the latter writ, and No. 210 will be dismissed.
By an action in
quo warranto, the State of Ohio, upon
relation of the prosecuting attorney for Wayne County, seeks to
oust plaintiff in error, a corporation under her laws, from use of
the streets in the Village of Orrville. The corporation has general
power to transmit and distribute electric energy and current, and
claims the privilege to operate there as assignee of rights granted
to Gans & Wilson and their successors, by an ordinance of the
village council passed February 1, 1892.
The supreme court treated the judgment of the court of appeals
as establishing that the Orrville Light, Heat & Power Company,
immediate successor to Gans & Wilson, acquired in 1893 the
right to occupy the streets which the ordinance of 1892 gave them.
But it held the franchise so acquired was revocable ten years after
the original grant, and had been terminated by appropriate village
action; also, that, under the act of the legislature passed April
21, 1896, 92 Ohio Laws, 204, this franchise could not lawfully be
assigned to plaintiff in error's predecessor during 1907 without
the consent of the village, which was not given. It accordingly
affirmed the judgment of ouster pronounced by the court of appeals.
113 Ohio St. 325.
The Ordinance of February 1, 1892, ordained:
"Sec. 1. That Aurel P. Gans and Mellville D. Wilson of Canal
Dover, Ohio, their associates, successors, and assigns are hereby
authorized and empowered to use the streets, lanes, alleys, and
avenues of the Village of Orrville for the purpose of erecting,
maintaining, and operating electric light wire mains and apparatus
complete for the distribution of electricity for light, heat, and
power."
Subsequent sections inhibited unnecessary obstruction of the
streets, directed how the wires should be strung,
Page 274 U. S. 14
etc.; also that the grantee should furnish, and the village
should use and pay for, a designated number of lights during a
period of ten years at a specified rate, etc.
The Ohio statute of 1896 applies to electric light and power
companies, and provides, that:
"in order to subject the same to municipal control alone, no
person or company shall place, string, construct, or maintain any
line, wire fixture, or appliance of any kind for conducting
electricity for lighting, heating, or power purposes through any
street, alley, lane, square, place, or land of any city, village or
town without the consent of such municipality. . . ."
We think it quite clear that the conclusions of the court below
conflict with rulings heretofore announced by this Court.
In
Northern Ohio Traction Co. v. Ohio, 245 U.
S. 574, we pointed out the state of the law in Ohio
during 1892. It is plain enough from what was there said that, in
our view, the franchise originally granted by the Village of
Orrville was for an unlimited time, and not subject to termination
at the mere will of the grantor.
Louisville v. Cumberland Telephone Co., 224 U.
S. 649,
224 U. S. 661,
and
Owensboro v. Cumberland Telephone Co., 230 U. S.
58,
230 U. S. 75,
are enough to show that the rights acquired under the ordinance of
1892 were assignable without further consent by the village. If to
enforce the Ohio Statute of 1896 would destroy this right, it
conflicts with the provision of the federal Constitution -- "No
state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of
contracts."
The judgment of the court below must be reversed, and the cause
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES and MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS dissent.