The testatrix directed that the interest of certain funds should
be applied "to the proper education" of certain persons her nephews
"
so that they may be severally fitted and accomplished in some
useful trade," and gave to each of them "who should live to
finish his education or reach the age of twenty-one years of age
one hundred pounds to set him up in his trade." She also gave the
whole of her estates of every description, to be equally divided
among certain persons who should be living when the interest
applicable to the education of her nephews should cease to be
required, they being some of the persons among whom the same was to
be divided, and she directed that so long as any one of the three
nephews who should live had not finished his education or arrived
at the age of twenty-one years, the division of the properly so
devised and given should be deferred, and no longer.
A bill was filed by the appellant, one of the nephews of the
testatrix, charging that the executors had not paid the several
sums of money bequeathed to him and praying that they may be
decreed to pay the same. No other persons were made parties to the
proceeding but the executors, and after a report of the master, the
cause came on to a hearing and the circuit court dismissed the bill
for want of proper parties. The defendants at the argument insisted
that not only the two nephews, whose education was provided for by
the testatrix, should have been made parties, but also all the
residuary legatees.
So far as the bill sought to obtain such a portion of the fund
as was by a fair construction of the will applicable to the
education of the nephews of the testatrix, they alone were required
to be parties, and the court reversed the decree of the circuit
court which dismissed the bill for the purpose of enabling the
complainant to make the other two nephews of the testatrix
parties.
The Court did not consider it necessary to make the residuary
legatees parties in a proceeding the sole object of which was to
ascertain and distribute among the nephews of the testatrix, the
amount to which they were entitled for the expenses of education.
The residuary legatees have undoubtedly an interest in reducing
every demand on the estate. Whatever remains sinks into the
residuum, and that residuum is diminished as well by the claims of
creditors and specific legatees as by this. In all such cases, the
executors represent the residuary legatees and guard their
interests. It is a part of that duty which requires them to protect
the interests of the estate. In such suits, the residuary legatees
are never made parties. To require it would be an intolerable
burden on those who have claims on an estate in the hands of
executors.
The Court does not think that in ascertaining the amount
applicable to the education of the appellant, one of the learned
professions may be taken as the standard with as much propriety as
the trade or art of a mechanic. The distinction between a
profession and a trade is well understood, and they are seldom, if
ever, confounded with each other in ordinary language. If the
testatrix had contemplated what in the common intercourse of
society is denominated a profession, she would scarcely have used a
term which is generally received as denoting a mechanical art.
But the bequest is not confined to the expense of acquiring the
trade, so as to be enabled to exercise it in the common way. The
testatrix intended such an education as would fit her relations to
hold a distinguished place in that line of life in which she
designed them to move. The sum allowed for the object ought to be
liberal, such as would accomplish it, if the fund from which it
was to be drawn would permit it.
In the circuit court, the appellant filed his bill against
George W. Curtis and Thomas Peter as executors of Mrs. Martha
Washington, late of Mount Vernon, claiming the payment of a sum of
money due to him, under the bequests in the will of the testatrix,
for the expenses of his education, and also for a distributive
share of the residuary estate of the deceased, in the hands of the
executors, acting as trustees under the will. The facts of the case
are stated at large in the opinion of the court.
Page 27 U. S. 373
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Page 27 U. S. 374
This suit was brought by the plaintiff against the defendants,
the acting executors of Mrs. Martha Washington, late of Mount
Vernon, to obtain payment of legacies bequeathed to him in her last
will.
The testatrix, after several devises and bequests, devised as
follows:
"Item. It is my will and desire that all the rest and residue of
my estate, of whatever kind and description, not herein
specifically devised or bequeathed shall be sold by the executors
of this my last will for ready money as soon after my decease as
the same can be done, and that the proceeds thereof, together with
all the money in the house and the debts due to me (the debts due
from me and the legacies bequeathed being first satisfied) shall be
invested by my executors in eight percent stock of the funds of the
United States and shall stand on the books in the name of my
executors in their character of executors of my will, and it is my
desire that the interest thereof shall be applied to the proper
education of Bartholomew Henley, and Samuel Henley, the two
youngest sons of my sister Henley, and also to the education of
John Dandridge, son of my deceased nephew John Dandridge, so that
they may be severally fitted and accomplished in some useful trade,
and to each of them who shall have lived to finish his education or
to reach the age of twenty-one years I give and bequeath one
hundred pounds to set him up in his trade."
"Item. My debts and legacies being paid, and the education of
Bartholomew Henley, Samuel Henley, and John Dandridge aforesaid
being completed or they being all dead before the completion
thereof, it is my will and desire that all my estates and
interests, in whatever form existing, whether in money, funded
stock, or any other species of property, shall be equally divided
among all the persons hereinafter mentioned who shall be living at
the time that the interest of the funded stock shall cease to be
applicable in pursuance of my will hereinbefore expressed, to the
education of my nephews, Bartholomew Henley, Samuel Henley, and
John Dandridge, namely among Anna Maria Washington, daughter of my
niece, and John Dandridge, son of my nephew, and all my great
grandchildren living at the time
Page 27 U. S. 375
that the interest of the said funded stock shall cease to be
applicable to the education of the said B. Henley, S. Henley, and
John Dandridge, and the same shall cease to be so applied when all
of them shall die before they arrive to the age of twenty-one
years, or those living shall have finished their education, or
arrived at the age of twenty-one years, and so long as any one of
the three lives who has not finished his education or arrived to
the age of twenty-one years, the division of the said residuum is
to be deferred, and no longer."
The bill charges that the executors have not paid the several
sums of money bequeathed to him by their testatrix, and prays that
they may be decreed to pay the same with interest.
The process was executed on one of the executors only. He failed
to answer, and the bill as to him was taken for confessed, and the
court ordered the master commissioner to ascertain the period when
the complainant attained his age of twenty-one years, and what
would have been a competent sum for his education, according to the
true intent and meaning of the last will of Martha Washington, and
make report to the court. At a subsequent term, the defendants were
ordered to settle their accounts before the commissioner. The
defendant, Thomas Peter, afterwards appeared and filed his answer
in which he admits the last will of Martha Washington deceased, and
that his co-defendant and himself alone have qualified as executors
thereof. He says that they have paid the legacy of one hundred
pounds and advanced a considerable sum of money to the guardian of
B. Henley, S. Henley, and the complainant, to fit them for some
useful trade. He also alleges that the executors have been
prevented from dividing the residuum by the unreasonableness of the
demand made by the complainant.
The master's report shows that the complainant attained his age
of 21 on 21 November, 1817; that the defendants were on that day
indebted to the estate for principal the sum of $7,282.30, and for
interest accruing thereon and remaining in their hands, the sum of
$7,345.11. That they had paid the legacy of 100 pounds, and
Page 27 U. S. 376
had advanced to the guardian of the complainant for his
education the sum of $166.67.
The cause came on to be heard in April, 1827, when the bill was
dismissed for want of proper parties.
At the argument, the counsel for the defendants have insisted
that not only Bartholomew and Samuel Henley but all the residuary
legatees should have been made parties.
This Court is clearly of opinion that the two Henleys who
participated with the complainant in the fund applicable to their
education, ought to have been parties to a suit which asks the
distribution of that fund. This would be admitted if the whole was
distributable among them. But the Court thinks it also proper,
though a different construction should be put on the will. The fund
is not so large that the claims of each, while all were under age,
might be satisfied without taking into view the claims of the other
two. In determining how much ought to have been applied to the
education of the complainant, the court would find it necessary to
take into consideration the amount of the fund and the relative
situation of all the persons entitled to it. They ought to have
been parties to a suit in which their interests were involved.
The question whether the whole interest accruing on the residuum
ought to be divided among the legatees to whose education it was
applicable, or only so much thereof as was necessary for the
purpose for which it was given, has been earnestly discussed at the
bar. In considering this question, as in all others depending on
wills, the intention of the testatrix is to be collected from the
will, and from the circumstances under which it was made. In this
case, the testatrix does not appear to have intended a pecuniary
donation to the parties in the particular bequest under
consideration. Her intention in that respect was effected by the
gifts of 100 pounds to each, to set him up in his trade. This
bequest seems to have been made not with a view of adding to their
private fortunes, but with a view to their education and
preparation for that particular business which they were afterwards
to pursue. They are not, therefore, entitled to the
Page 27 U. S. 377
whole fund, whatever may be its amount, but to so much of it as
is required for the object it is to accomplish.
In ascertaining the amount which is so applicable, the
plaintiffs contend that one of the learned professions may be taken
as the standard, with as much propriety as the trade or art of a
mechanic. The court does not think so. The distinction between a
profession and a trade is well understood, and they are seldom, if
ever, confounded with each other in ordinary language. If the
testatrix had contemplated what in the common intercourse of
society is denominated a profession, she would scarcely have used a
term which is generally received as denoting one of the mechanical
arts.
But we do not think the bequest is confined to the expense of
acquiring the trade, so as to be enabled to exercise it in the
common way. Such does not appear to have been the intent of the
testatrix. Her bounty is extended to the proper education of three
relatives, so that they may be severally fitted and accomplished in
some useful trade. Their education is a primary object, as well as
their acquisition of the trade, and when we consider the situation
and character of the parties and the language of the will, we
cannot doubt that the testatrix intended such an education as would
fit her relatives to hold a distinguished place in that line of
life in which she designed them to move. The sum allowed for the
object ought to be liberal, such as would accomplish it, if the
fund from which it was to be drawn would admit of it.
In a suit for the distribution of this fund, we do not think the
residuary legatees necessary parties. They have undoubtedly an
interest in reducing the sum to be allowed out of it to the
complainant, but they have the same interest in reducing every
demand on the estate. Whatever remains sinks into the residuum, and
that residuum is diminished as well by the claims of creditors and
specific legatees as by this. In all such cases, the executors
represent the residuary legatees and guard their interests. It is a
part of that duty which requires them to protect the interests of
the estate. In
Page 27 U. S. 378
such suits the residuary legatees are never made parties. To
require it would be an intolerable burden on those who have claims
on an estate in the hands of executors.
We do not think that the bill ought to have been dismissed for
want of proper parties unless the complainant refused to make such
as were really necessary, and then it might have been dismissed
without prejudice.
The circuit court can make no decree for the distribution of the
residuum unless all those entitled to distribution are brought
before the court, but it may grant all other relief to which the
complainant may be entitled on making Bartholomew and Samuel Henley
parties.
This Court is of opinion that the decree of the circuit
court dismissing the complainant's bill ought to be reversed and
the cause remanded to the said circuit court with leave to the
plaintiff to make new parties, after which the cause ought to be
referred to the master with instructions to compute the several
sums which ought to be allowed out of the fund applicable to the
education of Bartholomew Henley, Samuel Henley, and John Dandridge,
in conformity with the will of Mrs. Martha Washington deceased, on
which sums interest ought to be allowed, and also to compute the
sum to which the plaintiff may be entitled as one of the residuary
legatees of the said Martha Washington deceased, provided the other
residuary legatees be brought before the court as parties, on
failure to do which the plaintiff's bill is to be dismissed so far
as it claims a part of the residuary estate, without
prejudice.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
Columbia holden in and for the County of Alexandria and was argued
by counsel, on consideration whereof this Court is of opinion that
the circuit court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's bill for want
of proper parties, and that the said decree ought to be reversed.
Whereupon it is ordered and decreed by this Court that the decree
of the
Page 27 U. S. 379
said circuit court in this cause be, and the same is hereby
reversed, and this Court doth further order that the said cause be
and the same is hereby remanded to the said circuit court with
directions to give leave to the plaintiff to make new parties that
the proper accounts may be taken in order to a final decree, in
which decree the plaintiff ought to be allowed interest on the sum
due to him for his education out of the money applicable to that
object.
