1. Upon the facts recited in the opinion,
held,
(a) That certain legacy taxes, assessed under § 29 of the
Spanish War Revenue Act, were "imposed" prior to July 1, 1902,
within the saving clause of the repealing Act, c. 500, § 7, 32
Stat. 96, although the formal assessment by the Treasury Department
was not made before that date.
Cochran v. United States,
254 U. S. 387. P.
269 U. S.
109.
(b) That interests of residuary legatees in a portion of the
estate not distributed prior to July 1, 1902, were not contingent
beneficial interests not absolutely vested in possession or
enjoyment prior to July 1, 1902, within the meaning of § 3 of
the Act of June 27, 1902, c. 1160, 32 Stat. 406.
Kahn v. United
States, 257 U. S. 244;
Simpson v. United States, 252 U.
S. 547. P.
269 U. S.
109.
2. Where the Court of Claims overruled, without prejudice, a
demurrer to the petition and ordered the testimony limited to
certain features of the case, objection to the making of the order,
or to the findings of fact covering the entire case, should have
been made in that court, as a basis for objection in this Court on
appeal. P.
269 U. S.
109,
58 Ct.Cls. 410 affirmed.
Page 269 U. S. 103
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims dismissing the
petition in a suit to recover money voluntarily paid as legacy
taxes.
Page 269 U. S. 107
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
On January 26, 1916, the executors of Oswald Ottendorfer of New
York City brought this suit in the Court of Claims to recover the
sum of $543,708.44, voluntarily paid by them on December 10, 1902,
for legacy taxes assessed under the Spanish War Revenue Act June
13, 1898, c. 448, § 29, 30 Stat. 448, 464, as amended by Act
March 2, 1901, § 10. Section 29 had been repealed by Act of
April 12, 1902, c. 500, § 7, 32 Stat. 96, 98, 99, the repeal
to take effect July 1, 1902; but, by a proviso, all taxes
theretofore imposed were continued in force. The time for
presenting claims for the refunding of any tax under § 29
alleged to have been illegally assessed or to have been excessive
or in any manner wrongfully collected was extended by Act of July
27, 1912, c. 256, 37 Stat. 240. The executors sought recovery of
the whole amount paid, on the ground that the tax had not been
imposed prior to July 1, 1902. Recovery of part of the amount was
sought also on the ground that it was assessed upon legacies which
had not vested in possession or enjoyment prior to that date. There
is no claim here that the assessment was excessive. The lower court
dismissed the petition. 58 Ct.Cls. 410. The case is here on appeal
allowed June 25, 1923, under § 242 of the Judicial Code.
The testator died on December 14, 1900. His will was duly
probated, and the executors qualified on March 28,
Page 269 U. S. 108
1901. There were some specific legacies, a residuary bequest
which gave the bulk of the estate to three stepdaughters free from
any trust, and a provision that all legacy or inheritance taxes
should be paid out of the residue. The assets consisted largely of
listed securities. On March 7, 1902, schedules were filed in the
Surrogate's Court containing a description, and the estimated value
of all of the property known by the executors to have been owned by
the testator at his death, together with statements of decedent's
debt, of the payments for administration expenses, of estimated
commissions of the executors, and of further administration
expenses. On June 5, 1902, the appraiser appointed by the
Surrogate's Court filed his report appraising the property of
decedent, but it was not until July 16, 1902, that the surrogate's
order assessing thereon the New York inheritance tax was entered.
The value of the personal property which passed to the executors
was returned by them as $4,371,947.90. The debts and expenses to be
set off against that sum were reported as $298,646.12. The
assessment of the tax here in question was made by the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue on December 10, 1902, in accordance with the
executors' return, which had been filed with him on November 7,
1902.
Under the laws of New York, the time for the presentation of
claims against the estate had expired before July 1, 1902, and
before that date the legatees were entitled to the full payment of
their legacies. Under the laws of the United States, Act of March
2, 1901, c. 806, § 11, 31 Stat. 938, 948, the time within
which payment of the tax was required to be made had also expired
before July 1, 1902. Before that date, all the testators' debts and
all the specific legacies had been paid, and each of the residuary
legatees had received, on account of the residuary bequest,
$910,000, partly in cash and partly "in securities at New York
Stock Exchange values" assented to by the legatees. Between
Page 269 U. S. 109
that date and the end of the year 1908, each received in cash
further sums aggregating $210,953.66. Some of the assets were still
undistributed when the evidence was taken in this suit. The reason
why no further or complete distribution of the residuary estate was
made by the executors prior to July 1, 1902, was that they
anticipated that the estate would be liable for payment of a New
York estate transfer tax and the federal inheritance tax, for
attorneys' fees, and other expenses of administration, and that the
exact amount of the residuary estate left for distribution could
therefore not be definitely determined prior to July 1, 1902.
The contention that the taxes had not been imposed prior to July
1, 1902, because no formal assessment had in fact been made by the
Treasury Department before that date, is disposed of by
Cochran
v. United States, 254 U. S. 387. The
contention that the interests of the residuary legatees in that
portion of the estate not distributed prior to July 1, 1902, were
contingent beneficial interests, not absolutely vested in
possession or enjoyment, is disposed of by
Kahn v. United
States, 257 U. S. 244,
Simpson v. United States, 252 U.
S. 547, and earlier cases. An objection is made to the
procedure pursued in the Court of Claims. The government originally
demurred to the petition. The demurrer was overruled without
prejudice, and it was ordered that the testimony be limited to "the
question of the amount of the residuary legacies not distributed
until after July 1, 1902." Thereafter evidence was taken, and the
court made its findings. It is urged that the court erred in making
findings of fact upon the entire case, that there are some findings
inconsistent with allegations of the petition relating to matters
other than those named in the order, and that, as to such other
matters, the allegations of the petition must be taken as true. We
have not discovered any inconsistency as to any material fact.
Moreover, it does not appear that the executors objected
Page 269 U. S. 110
below either to the order restricting the scope of the evidence,
or to findings of fact made.
Affirmed.