1. Action by a subcontractor in the Court of Claims
held not maintainable under the Dent Act, §§ 1
and 4, the petition not showing an agreement with the plaintiff
entered into by or under authority of the Secretary of War, or
performed, etc., prior to November 12, 1918, or a claim presented
before June 30, 1919, or that, before a payment was made by the
government to the prime contractor, the plaintiff had made
expenditures, etc., "with the knowledge or approval of any agent of
the Secretary of War duly authorized thereunto." P.
267 U. S.
340.
2. Where a contractor, upon settling with the government under
the Dent Act, induced the claimant to release his subcontract for
less than was due him by fraudulently misrepresenting to him the
basis upon which the settlement was made, and the government,
learning this, exacted a repayment to itself from the contractor of
of an amount equal to that of which the claimant had thus been
defrauded, but it did not appear that the exaction was for the
claimant's benefit,
held that the claimant had no cause of
action to recover this amount from the United States under the
Tucker Act, since the United States was under no express contract
to pay the claimant, and none was to be implied in fact. P.
267 U. S.
340.
3. The Tucker Act does not give a right of action against the
United States in those cases where, if the transaction were between
private parties, recovery could be had upon a contract implied in
law.
Id.
4. The practice of the Court of Claims does not allow a general
. statement of claim in analogy to the common counts, but
requires
Page 267 U. S. 339
a plain, concise statement of the facts relied on, not leaving
the defendant in doubt as to what must be met. P.
267 U. S. 341.
58 Ct.Clms. 371 affirmed.
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims dismissing the
petition on demurrer.
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In July, 1918, or earlier, the United States contracted with the
Panama Knitting Mills for a quantity of khaki at $3.20 a yard. In
June, 1919, this contract was cancelled by a new agreement between
the government and the mills, made pursuant to the Dent Act, March
2, 1919, c. 94, 40 Stat. 1272. Under the cancellation agreement,
the government adjusted its liability by accepting delivery of half
of the khaki originally contracted for, paying the contract rate
together with the carrying charges. The mills had a subcontract
with the plaintiff for the supply of the khaki. By falsely
representing that the government compelled settlement on the basis
of $2.50 a yard plus the carrying charges, the mills induced the
plaintiff to release it, on that basis, from the subcontract. When
the government learned of the fraud thus perpetrated, it exacted
from the mills a repayment of $5,210.02 -- the difference between
the amount actually paid by the government and what would have been
paid if settlement had been made on the basis of $2.50 a yard.
Page 267 U. S. 340
This suit was brought in March, 1923, to recover from the United
States the sum so repaid. The Court of Claims dismissed the
petition on demurrer for failure to state a cause of action. The
case is here on appeal under § 242 of the Judicial Code.
Plaintiff cannot recover under the Dent Act. There are three
obstacles. It does not appear, as required by § 1, that, prior
to November 12, 1918, an agreement with the plaintiff, express or
implied, was entered into by the Secretary of War, or "by any
officer or agent acting under his authority, direction, or
instruction, or that of the President."
Baltimore & Ohio R.
Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 385;
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.
S. 592. It does not appear, as required by § 1,
that any such agreement had been "performed, . . . or expenditures
. . . made or obligations incurred upon the faith of the same . . .
prior to" November 12, 1918.
Price Fire & Water Proofing
Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 179,
261 U. S. 183.
It does not appear, as required by § 1, that the claim sued on
was presented before June 30, 1919. The Dent Act affords relief,
although there is no agreement "executed in the manner prescribed
by law," but only under the conditions stated. The plaintiff is not
helped by § 4, which deals with subcontracts, among other
reasons, because it does not appear, as therein prescribed, that,
before the payment made by the government to the prime contractor,
the plaintiff had
"made expenditures, incurred obligations, rendered service, or
furnished material, equipment, or supplies to such prime
contractor, with the knowledge and approval of any agent of the
Secretary of War duly authorized thereunto."
Plaintiff cannot recover under the Tucker Act (Judicial Code,
§ 145, 24 Stat. 505). The petition does not allege any
contract, express or implied in fact by the government with the
plaintiff to pay the latter for the khaki on
Page 267 U. S. 341
any basis. Nor does it set forth facts from which such a
contract will be implied. The pleader may have intended to sue for
money had and received. But no facts are alleged which afford any
basis for a claim that the repayment made by the mills was exacted
by the government for the benefit of the plaintiff. The Tucker Act
does not give a right of action against the United States in those
cases where, if the transaction were between private parties,
recovery could be had upon a contract implied in law.
Tempel v.
United States, 248 U. S. 121;
Sutton v. United States, 256 U. S. 575,
256 U. S. 581.
For aught that appears, repayment was compelled solely for the
benefit of the government, under the proviso in § 1 of the
Dent Act, which authorizes recovery of money paid under a
settlement if it has been defrauded.
The practice of the Court of Claims, while liberal, does not
allow a general statement of claim in analogy to the common counts.
It requires a plain, concise statement of the facts relied upon.
See rule 15, Court of Claims. The petition may not be so
general as to leave the defendant in doubt as to what must be met.
Schierling v. United States, 23 Ct.Cls. 361;
The
Atlantic Works v. United States, 46 Ct.Cls. 57, 61;
New
Jersey Foundry & Machine Co. v. United States, 49 Ct.Cls.
235;
United States v. Stratton, 88 F. 54, 59.
Affirmed.
