1. When the plain words of a statute leave no room for
construction, the courts must follow it, however harsh the
consequences. P.
265 U. S.
313.
2. Section 3 of the Immigration Act of 1917 and § 2(d) of
the Quota Law of 1921, as amended May 11, 1922, are both operative,
and should be construed as acts
in pari materia. P.
265 U. S.
312.
3. Section 3 of the Immigration Act of 1917, after an
enumeration of excluded classes ending with the natives of a
designated part of Asia and those of certain islands adjacent to
that continent, declares that "the provision next foregoing" shall
not apply to persons of various named occupations, including
ministers of religion, or their legal wives or their children under
18 years, etc.,
held, that the exception applies only to
aliens coming from the regions referred to. P.
265 U. S.
313.
4. Section 2(d) of the Quota Act provides that, when the maximum
number of aliens of any nationality shall have been admitted,
Page 265 U. S. 311
all others of such nationality applying during the same year
shall be excluded, except (
inter alios) ministers of
religion, and gives preference, so far as possible, in the
enforcement of the act to the wives, children, etc., of citizens of
the United States, of aliens here who have applied for citizenship,
or of persons eligible to citizenship who have served in our
military or naval forces.
Held, that the wife and child of
a minister have no right to admission when the quota allowed their
nationality is exhausted. P.
265 U. S.
313.
285 F. 295 reversed.
Certiorari to a judgment of the circuit court of appeals
affirming a judgment of the district court discharging two aliens
by habeas corpus.
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondents are the wife and infant son of Solomon Gottlieb,
a rabbi of a synagogue in New York City. They are natives of
Palestine who sought admission to this country in December,
1921.
After a hearing before the board of special inquiry at Ellis
Island, they were ordered deported, on the ground that the quota of
immigrants entitled to be admitted had already been filled. Upon
habeas corpus proceedings in the federal court for the Southern
District of New York, it was held they were entitled to admission,
irrespective of quota limitations, as the wife and child of a
minister who was already here, under § 2(d) of the Act of May
19, 1921, c. 8, 42 Stat. 5, as amended by Act May 11, 1922, c. 187,
42
Page 265 U. S. 312
Stat. 540. Thereupon they were ordered discharged. This judgment
was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. 285 F. 295.
That court reached its conclusion by considering § 3 of the
Act of 1917, c. 29, 39 Stat. 874, 875,
in pari materia
with § 2(d) of the Act of 1921. Section 3 of the earlier act
enumerates various classes of aliens who are excluded from
admission into the United States, among them all persons from
certain Asiatic territory, with specified exceptions. The Act of
1921, as amended, is an act to limit the number of aliens who may
be admitted under the immigration laws to the United States, and is
declared to be "in addition to, and not in substitution for, the
provisions of the immigration laws." Section 4. Section 2(d), among
other things, provides that, when the maximum number of aliens of
any nationality shall have been admitted, all others of such
nationality applying during the same year shall be excluded, except
as otherwise provided in the act. Following this, one of the
provisos enumerates the aliens who are thus excepted, among them,
ministers of any religious denomination. Another proviso is:
"That, in the enforcement of this act, preference shall be
given, so far as possible, to the wives, parents, brothers,
sisters, children under 18 years of age, and of fiancées (1) of
citizens of the United States; (2) of aliens now in the United
States who have applied for citizenship in the manner provided by
law, and (3) persons eligible to United States citizenship who have
served in the military or naval forces of the United States,"
etc.
The court below, taking these various provisions together, held
that, under § 3 of the Act of 1917, these respondents were
entitled to admission.
The lower court was right in holding that the acts are
in
pari materia, and that § 3 of the earlier act is still
fully operative, and may be considered as though it formed a part
of the later act. The question then is
Page 265 U. S. 313
whether it includes aliens occupying the status of these
respondents. The case, as the evidence shows, is one of peculiar
and distressing hardship, and it is not unnatural that any
appropriate canon of construction should be laid hold of to justify
a conclusion favorable to the respondents. But if the plain words
of the statute are against such a conclusion, leaving no room for
construction, the courts have no choice but to follow it, without
regard to the consequences.
Fook v. White, 264 U.
S. 443;
Zartarian v. Billings. 204 U.
S. 170;
Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.
S. 460,
225 U. S. 476.
Section 3 of the Act of 1917 defines and enumerates the classes of
aliens who are to be excluded -- idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded
persons, paupers, professional beggars, diseased persons,
criminals, polygamists, anarchists, prostitutes, and numerous
others, the last in the enumeration being natives of islands not
possessed by the United States adjacent to the continent of Asia
and of the continent within certain described limits of latitude
and longitude. The clause relied upon immediately follows:
"The provision next foregoing, however, shall not apply to
persons of the following status or occupations: government
officers, ministers or religious teachers, missionaries, lawyers,
physicians, chemists, civil engineers, teachers, students, authors,
artists, merchants, and travelers for curiosity or pleasure,
nor to their legal wives or their children under sixteen
years of age who shall accompany them or who subsequently may apply
for admission to the United States. . . ."
The limited scope of this exception is apparent, and no amount
of discussion could make it plainer. It applies to "the provision
next foregoing," namely, to that dealing with aliens coming from
the barred Asiatic zone, and to that only.
Section 2(d) of the Quota Law of 1921, as amended, in terms
permits the admission of
"aliens returning from a
Page 265 U. S. 314
temporary visit abroad, aliens who are professional actors,
artists, lecturers, singers, nurses,
ministers of any religious
denomination, professors for colleges or seminaries, aliens
belonging to any recognized learned profession, or aliens employed
as domestic servants,"
notwithstanding the quota of the same nationality has been
filled. Then follows the further proviso already quoted -- that, in
the enforcement of the act, "preference shall be given, as far as
possible, to the wives . . . children," etc., of certain enumerated
classes.
The respondents are not natives of the barred Asiatic zone, and
therefore are not entitled to admission under the exception in the
Act of 1917. There is nothing in the later Act of 1921, as amended,
which gives the wife or children of a minister any right of entry
beyond that enjoyed by aliens generally, unless he falls within one
of the classes specified in the proviso to § 2(d), in which
event they are to be given preference over other aliens within the
limits of the quota. The quota having been exhausted, no case was
presented calling for the application of the proviso, even if the
respondents could otherwise have been brought within its terms. The
contention that it is absurd and unreasonable to say that the wives
and children of ministers from the barred Asiatic zone are to be
admitted, and those outside of it denied admission, does not
require consideration, since the result we have stated necessarily
follows from the plain words of the law, for which we are not at
liberty to substitute a rule based upon other notions of policy or
justice. That aliens from one part of the world shall be admitted
according to their status, and those from another part according to
fixed numerical proportions, is a matter wholly within the
discretion of the lawmaking body, with which the courts have no
authority to interfere.
Reversed.