1. A suit is within the jurisdiction of the district court as a
controversy arising under the laws of the United States, Jud.Code,
§ 24, where the right and title set up by the plaintiff depend
upon the construction of an act of Congress. P.
263 U. S.
363.
2. The Act of Congress of May 23, 1908, directing that 25% of
all money received from each forest reserve shall be paid to the
state in which the reserve is situated,
"to be expended as the state . . . legislature may prescribe for
the benefit of the public schools and public roads of the county or
counties in which the forest reserve is situated,"
does not create a trust, but results in a sacred obligation
imposed on the public faith of the donee state. P.
263 U. S.
364.
3. The act does not prescribe how the moneys shall be divided as
between the two purposes named, but leaves this to the state.
Id.
4. Where a state law authorizes and directs county commissioners
to expend the moneys received by their county under the above act
of Congress for the benefit of the public schools and public roads
thereof, a school district has no standing to call a county to
account when more of the funds are used for the one than for the
other purpose, since equal division between the two is not
contemplated or required by the act, and the rule that a grant to
several, without specification of interests, conveys equal
interests does not apply. P.
263 U. S. 365.
278 F. 46 reversed.
Appeal from a decision of the circuit court of appeals which
affirmed a decree of the district court in favor of
Page 263 U. S. 362
the school district in its suit against the county for an
accounting.
MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Act of Congress of May 23, 1908, c. 192, 35 Stat. 260,
[
Footnote 1] directs that 25
percent of all money received from each forest reserve during any
fiscal year shall be paid at the end thereof by the Secretary of
the Treasury to the state in which the reserve is situated,
"to be expended as the state . . . legislature may prescribe for
the benefit of the public schools and public roads of the county or
counties in which the forest reserve is situated,"
and it is provided that, when any forest reserve is in more than
one state or territory or county, the distributive share to each
from the proceeds of said reserve shall be proportional to its area
therein. A statute of Washington (Laws 1907, c. 185, p. 406)
directs the state treasurer to turn over to the county treasurers
the amounts of such money belonging to the respective counties, and
provides that
"county commissioners of the respective counties to which the
money is distributed are hereby authorized and directed to expend
said money for the benefit of the public schools and public roads
thereof, and not otherwise."
The Secretary of the Treasury paid over to the state the proper
amounts for the years from 1908 to 1918, inclusive. A part of the
Snoqualmie Forest Reserve is in King county, and the proportionate
amounts for these
Page 263 U. S. 363
years, aggregating $20,106.07, were turned over by the state to
the county treasurer. For each of the years 1908, 1916, 1917, and
1918, the county commissioners directed that one-half of the amount
be apportioned to the county school fund and one-half to the road
and bridge fund, and for each of the years from 1909 to 1915,
inclusive, directed that all be assigned to the road and bridge
fund. The county treasurer made the distributions as directed. Out
of the total amount above mentioned there was assigned $18,481.43
to the road and bridge fund and $1,624.64 to the county school
fund. The latter is $8,428.40 less than one-half the total received
by the county. The appellee is one of the school districts of the
county, and claims to be entitled to such proportion of one-half
the amount received in each year by the county as the annual school
attendance in the district bore to the total attendance in all the
districts of the county. The amounts so claimed make a total of
$6,789.22.
This suit was brought by the appellee, Seattle School District
No. 1, to have King County and its treasurer declared to be
trustees, to require them to account, and to recover the sum so
claimed. The complaint set forth the facts substantially as above
stated. The county moved to dismiss on the grounds that the court
was without jurisdiction and that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action. The motion was denied, and, the appellant
declining to plead further, a decree was entered in favor of the
appellee as prayed; this was affirmed by the circuit court of
appeals.
Section 24 of the Judicial Code provides that the district
courts shall have original jurisdiction where the matter in
controversy arises under the laws of the United States. In this
case, the right and title set up by the appellee depends upon the
act of Congress. There is involved the question whether that act
permits the money so received by the county to be expended by the
county
Page 263 U. S. 364
commissioners as directed by state legislation, or requires an
equal distribution annually for the benefit of public schools and
public roads of the county. Appellee contended for the latter
construction, and the courts below sustained its claim. If this is
not a correct construction of the act, appellee has no cause of
action.
See Northern Pacific Railway v. Soderberg,
188 U. S. 526,
188 U. S. 528;
Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U. S. 561,
225 U. S. 569.
The district court had jurisdiction.
When turned over to the state, the money belongs to it
absolutely. There is no limitation upon the power of the
legislature to prescribe how the expenditures shall be made for the
purposes stated, though, by the act of Congress, "there is a sacred
obligation imposed on its public faith."
Cooper v.
Roberts, 18 How. 173,
59 U. S. 182;
Alabama v. Schmidt, 232 U. S. 168,
232 U. S. 173;
Mills County v. Railway Companies, 107 U.
S. 557,
107 U. S. 566;
Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U.
S. 701,
111 U. S. 713.
No trust for the benefit of appellee is created by the grant. But,
assuming the moneys paid over to the state are charged with a trust
that there shall be expended annually one-half for schools and
one-half for roads, the appellee had no right to enforce the trust.
Congress alone can inquire into the manner of its execution by the
state.
United States v. Louisiana, 127 U.
S. 182,
127 U. S.
185-192;
Mills County v. Railway Companies, supra;
Emigrant Co. v. County of Adams, 100 U. S.
61,
100 U. S. 69;
Barrett v. Brooks, 21 Iowa. 144, 148.
See also Stearns
v. Minnesota, 179 U. S. 223,
179 U. S. 231.
The act does not direct any division of the money between schools
and roads. Its language above quoted indicates an intention on the
part of Congress that the state, in its discretion, may prescribe
by legislation how the money is to be expended. No distribution to
the appellee or any other school district is required. The public
schools and public roads are provided and maintained by the state
or its subdivisions, and the moneys granted by
Page 263 U. S. 365
the United States are assets in the hands of the state to be
used for the specified purposes as it deems best.
See State v.
Callvert, 34 Wash. 58, 61.
The rule that, where a grant to two or more persons does not
state the interest of each, their estates are presumed to be equal
[
Footnote 2] does not apply.
Under the act of Congress, it was competent for the legislature of
Washington to authorize county commissioners to expend the money
for public schools and public roads. Equal division annually
between the two purposes is not required or contemplated by the
act. The appellee has no standing to object to the distributions
made by the county commissioners.
The decree appealed from is reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
See Act March 4, 1907, c. 2907, 34 Stat. 1270.
[
Footnote 2]
Loring v. Palmer, 118 U. S. 321,
118 U. S. 341;
Lee v. Wysong, 128 F. 833, 838;
Keuper v. Mette,
239 Ill. 586, 592;
Campau v. Campau, 44 Mich. 31, 34;
Hill v. Reiner, 167 Mich. 400, 402.