Section 3 of the California Alien Land Law, permitting aliens
ineligible to citizenship to
"acquire shares of stock in any . . . corporation that is or may
be authorized to acquire, possess, enjoy or convey agricultural
land, in the manner and to the extent and for the purposes
prescribed by any treaty . . . and not otherwise,"
renders illegal a contract between a citizen of the state and a
Japanese alien for sale by the one to the other of shares in such a
corporation, and is consistent with the treaty between the United
States and Japan and the due process and equal protection clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment . P.
263 U. S. 333.
See Porterfield v. Webb and
Webb v. O'Brien,
ante, pp.
263 U. S. 225,
263 U. S. 313.
281 F. 407 affirmed.
Appeal from an order of the district court refusing an
interlocutory injunction in a suit to restrain officials of the
State of California from enforcing the California Alien Land
Law.
Page 263 U. S. 331
MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit brought by the appellants to enjoin the
above-named Attorney General and district attorney
Page 263 U. S. 332
from enforcing the California Alien Land Law,
* submitted by the
initiative and approved by the electors, November 2, 1920, on the
grounds that it is in conflict with the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and with the treaty
between the United States and Japan.
Appellants are residents of California. Frick is a citizen of
the United States and of California. Satow was born in Japan, of
Japanese parents, and is a subject of the Emperor of Japan. Frick
is the owner of 28 shares of the capital stock of the Merced Farm
Company, a corporation organized under the laws of California, that
owns 2,200 acres of farm land in that state. Frick desires to sell
the shares to Satow, and Satow desires to buy them. By the
complaint it is alleged in substance that the appellees have
threatened to and will enforce the act against appellants if Frick
sells such stock to Satow, and will institute proceedings to
escheat such shares to the state as provided in the act; that, but
for the provisions of the act and such threats, Frick would sell
and Satow would buy the stock. And it is averred that the act is so
drastic and the penalties attached to its violation are so great
that appellees are deterred from carrying out the sale, and that,
unless the court shall determine its validity in this suit,
appellants will be compelled to submit to it whether valid or
invalid.
Appellants applied for an interlocutory injunction to restrain
appellees during the pendency of the suit from instituting any
proceeding to enforce the act against appellants. The application
was heard by three judges, as provided in § 266 of the
Judicial Code. The motion was denied, and the case is here on
appeal from that order.
Page 263 U. S. 333
In
Porterfield v. Webb, ante, 263 U. S. 225, and
Webb v. O'Brien, decided this day,
ante,
263 U. S. 313, we
held that the act does not conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment
or with the treaty between the United States and Japan. In the case
first mentioned, we held that the act prohibits the leasing of
agricultural land by citizens of the United States to a Japanese
alien, and in the latter that it prohibits the making of a cropping
contract between a citizen and a Japanese alien.
The treaty does not grant permission to the citizens of subjects
of either of the parties in the territories of the other to own,
lease, use, or have the benefit of lands for agricultural purposes,
and, when read in the light of the circumstances and negotiations
leading up to its consummation, the language shows that the parties
respectively intended to withhold a treaty grant of that privilege.
Terrace v. Thompson, ante, 263 U. S. 197;
Same v. Same, 274 F. 841, 844, 845. The applicable
provision of § 3 of the act is: hereafter, all ineligible
aliens
"may . . . acquire shares of stock in any . . . corporation that
is or may be authorized to acquire, possess, enjoy or convey
agricultural land, in the manner and to the extent and for the
purposes prescribed by any treaty . . . , and not otherwise."
The provisions of the act were framed and intended for general
application and to limit the privileges of all ineligible aliens in
respect of agricultural lands to those prescribed by treaty between
the United States and the nation or country of which such alien is
a citizen or subject. The state has power, and the act evidences
its purpose, to deny to ineligible aliens permission to own, lease,
use, or have the benefit of lands within its boarders for
agricultural purposes.
Webb v. O'Brien, supra.
"As the state has the power . . . to prohibit, it may adopt such
measures as are reasonably appropriate or needful to render
exercise of that power effective."
Crane v. Campbell, 245 U. S. 304,
245 U. S. 307,
and
Page 263 U. S. 334
cases cited;
Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.
S. 297,
248 U. S. 303.
It may forbid indirect as well as direct ownership and control of
agricultural land by ineligible aliens. The right "to carry on
trade" given by the treaty does not give the privilege to acquire
the stock above described. To read the treaty to permit ineligible
aliens to acquire such stock would be inconsistent with the
intention and purpose of the parties. We hold that the provision of
§ 3 above referred to does not conflict with the Fourteenth
Amendment or with the treaty.
The order appealed from is affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS and MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS think there is
no justiciable question involved, and that the case should have
been dismissed on that ground.
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
* The substance of the portions of the act which are material in
this case is printed in the margin of
Webb v. O'Brien,
decided this day
ante, 263 U. S.
319.