1. Under the Act of March 4, 1913, c. 143, 37 Stat. 797,
authorizing the Postmaster General to pay additional compensation,
not exceeding five percent, for transportation of mail on railroads
on and after July 1, 1913, for the remainder of the contract
terms,
Page 262 U. S. 71
on account of increased weight of mails resulting from the
parcel post law, the decision of the Postmaster General upon the
mount of compensation to be allowed within the limit fixed was
conclusive, and a railroad company, which accepted payment, under
protest, of amounts so fixed cannot claim more from the government
upon the ground that they were inadequate. P.
262 U. S.
73.
2. Transportation of additional mail matter, resulting from the
parcel post, even if not requirable under contracts existing when
the parcel post system was adopted, did not give the transporting
company a right to additional compensation when it was done
voluntarily during a period (January 1, 1913, to June 30, 1913) for
which Congress has failed to allow such compensation. Act of March
4, 1913,
supra. P.
262 U. S.
73.
56 Ct.Clms. 64 affirmed.
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims dismissing the
petition upon demurrer.
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Prior to July 1, 1910, claimant entered into a contract with the
Post Office Department to carry the mails over a part of its line
for the period of four years from that date. Prior to July 1, 1911,
it entered into a like contract to carry the mails over another
part of its lines. These contracts were in form and substance
similar to that involved in
New York, New Haven & Hartford
R. Co. v. United States, 258 U. S. 32, and
other recent cases. [
Footnote
1] By them, the amount of compensation was fixed by a weighing
prior to the date of the contract. While the mails
Page 262 U. S. 72
were being carried by claimant under these contracts, the parcel
post system was established pursuant of Act Aug. 24, 1912, c. 389,
§ 8, 37 Stat. 539, 557-559. From the inauguration of the
service, on January 1, 1913, to the end of the contract periods,
claimant carried the parcel post together with the other mail. For
rendering this service, during the first six months, no additional
compensation has been paid claimant. For rendering it during the
remainder of the contract periods, claimant received, under later
legislation, sums in addition to the compensation provided by the
contracts. These sums it deems inadequate. On February 1, 1919,
this suit was brought to recover, as reasonable compensation for
the service rendered, the several amounts which it insists should
have been paid. The government demurred to the petition. The Court
of Claims dismissed it on the ground that there was neither a
contract express or implied in fact nor a law of Congress to
support the claims for additional compensation. The case is here on
appeal.
The Act of August 24, 1912, provided that the establishment of
parcel post zones and postage rates should go into effect January
1, 1913. It increased the weight of fourth class mail matter from
four to eleven pounds and the size to seventy-two inches in length
and girth. It also authorized further increases of the weight
limit, by order of the Postmaster General with the consent of the
Interstate Commerce Commission. But that act, while it authorized
the Postmaster General to
"readjust the compensation of star route and screen wagon
contractors if it should appear that as a result of the parcel post
system the weight of the mails handled by them has been materially
increased,"
made no provision whatsoever for increasing the pay of railroads
because of carrying parcel post matter. Act March 4, 1913, c. 143,
37 Stat. 791, 797, authorized the Postmaster General
"to add to the compensation paid for transportation on railroad
routes
Page 262 U. S. 73
on and after July first, one thousand nine hundred and thirteen,
for the remainder of the contract terms"
not exceeding five percent thereof per annum "on account of the
increased weight of mails resulting from the enactment of" the
parcel post provision of the preceding year. The Postmaster General
allowed claimant, under this act on some routes the full five
percent, on some, less, on some, nothing additional. But the latter
act also contained no provision authorizing additional pay to the
railroads for carrying parcel post matter from January 1, 1913, to
June 30, 1913.
First. That no recovery can be had for the period after
June 30, 1913, is clear. Before that date, Congress had made
express provision for the additional compensation, and in so doing
had limited the amount payable. The power to grant or to withhold
was, within the limit set, vested in the Postmaster General, and
his decision as to additional compensation was conclusive except
upon Congress. [
Footnote 2] The
protest alleged to have been made in August, 1913, against the
amounts proposed to be paid for this period cannot avail claimant.
New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co. v. United
States, 251 U. S. 123.
Second. The first six months' period presents a
different situation, but the legal result is the same. There is no
claim of an express contract to pay additional compensation, nor is
there any basis for a claim on a contract implied in fact. The
petition alleges that the parcel post matter was radically
different in character
Page 262 U. S. 74
from the ordinary mails as constituted before January 1, 1913.
It may be that claimant might legally have refused, for this
reason, to carry the parcel post mail under then existing contracts
even if additional compensation had been offered.
Compare
United States v. Utah, Nevada & California Stage Co.,
199 U. S. 414;
Hunt v. United States, 257 U. S. 125. But
the petition contains no allegation that it refused to perform this
extra service unless the government would agree to pay additional
compensation. The petition contains allegations apparently designed
to show that objection to carrying the parcel post matter would
have been largely futile; [
Footnote
3] but the allegations fall far short of showing a demand that
the parcel post matter be eliminated, or a protest against carrying
it under the conditions then existing. If the parcel post act, or
other legislation, gives a right to compensation, the refusal or
failure of the Postmaster General to allow the claim could not, of
course, defeat recovery.
Compare Campbell v. United
States, 107 U. S. 407,
107 U. S.
411;
Page 262 U. S. 75
United States v. Knox, 128 U.
S. 230. But unless there is such legislation, claimant
cannot recover without showing a contract, express or implied, in
fact to pay the extra compensation.
Compare United States v.
North American Transportation & Trading Co., 253 U.
S. 330,
253 U. S. 335;
Sutton v. United States, 256 U. S. 575,
256 U. S. 581.
No basis for such a contract is afforded by the further allegation
that, when the Act of 1912 was passed, and when the parcel post
system was established, railroads, high officials of the Post
Office Department, and members of both houses of Congress in charge
of postal legislation understood that Congress would provide
additional compensation to the railroads.
The legislation makes no provision for additional compensation
to the railroads for the period prior to July 1, 1913, and its
history makes clear that Congress concluded not to allow any. For
some time prior to the passage of the Act of August 24, 1912, there
had been much discussion in Congress concerning the pay of
railroads for carrying the mail. The carriers urged generally that
the pay was inadequate, and there were proposals for increase of
compensation. On the part of the public, there was a widespread
belief that the railroads were overpaid, and there were proposals
to reduce the compensation. When Congress passed the 1912 Act, it
was not prepared to decide this controverted question. It therefore
appointed a special committee to inquire into the subject and also
others, relating to parcel post, and directed the committee to
report at the earliest date possible. Meanwhile, the discussion
continued in Congress. That the parcel post would result in largely
increased weight of mail was repeatedly asserted, but it was
insisted that the pay under existing contracts would give the
railroads even more compensation than they deserved. The fact was
recognized that the appropriation bill enacted March 4, 1913,
provided increased pay only for parcel post service rendered
Page 262 U. S. 76
after June 30, 1913, [
Footnote
4] the failure of Congress to make any provision for the
preceding six months was not inadvertent. It was the deliberate
purpose of Congress not to give the railroads additional pay for
carrying the parcel post mail during that period. [
Footnote 5]
The case at bar is wholly unlike
Freund v. United
States, 260 U. S. 60;
United States v. Utah, Nevada & California Stage Co.,
199 U. S. 414, and
Hunt v. United States, 257 U. S. 125, on
which claimant relies. In each of those cases, there was ample
power in the Postmaster General to pay the additional compensation
claimed. In each, the main question presented was whether, under
the proper construction of the contract, claimant was entitled to
additional pay. Moreover, in each, the contractor had by proper
protest preserved his rights, and there was perhaps an element of
duress. Here, as in
Sutton v. United States, 256 U.
S. 575, the Department had been denied power to pay an
additional sum; there
Page 262 U. S. 77
was no protest by the contractor against assuming the additional
service, and there was no duress. The service was undertaken
voluntarily, no doubt, in the expectation that Congress would
provide additional compensation. It made some provision, but
concluded not to make any for the first six months. We may not
inquire into the reasons for this refusal, or undertake to revise
its judgment. The obstacle to recovery is not strictly lack of
jurisdiction in the Court of Claims. There was an express contract
between the parties; there was also legislation, and on these the
claim is founded. The obstacle to recovery is lack of legal merits.
The government did not in fact promise to pay for the extra
service, nor did the legislation give to claimant a right to
compensation. In other words, the petition fails to set out a cause
of action.
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
United States v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.
Co., 249 U. S. 451;
New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co. v. United
States, 251 U. S. 123;
The Mail Divisor Cases, 251 U. S. 326.
[
Footnote 2]
Some further compensation was in fact made after the expiration
of the contracts, under later legislation. By Act of July 28, 1916,
c. 261, 39 Stat. 412, 425 (passed after both contracts with
claimant had expired), the Postmaster General was authorized to
make an additional payment not exceeding one-half of one percentum
per annum on account of the increased weight of mails resulting
from his order effective August 15, 1913, raising the weight limit
to twenty pounds and additional payment not exceeding one percent
on account of the increased weight resulting from his order
effective January 1, 1914, raising the weight limit to fifty
pounds.
[
Footnote 3]
The petition alleges:
"Much the larger part of the mails on petitioner's routes and on
the routes of the other important railroad companies were carried
in post office cars, for which cars arrangements were made between
the Post Office Department and the railroad companies independent
of the contracts for mail transportation, and, under such
arrangements, such cars were in operation on petitioner's said
routes at the time when the parcel post was established and at the
times when the increases in weight of the parcel post matter became
effective. The greater part of the mails carried in such cars were
loaded into and out of the same by contractors or other persons
employed by the Post Office Department, over whom petitioner and
the other railroad companies had no control, and the Postal Laws
and Regulations (sec. 1583) forbade that railroad employees should
enter the post office cars when in motion for any other purpose
than the operation of the trains. Moreover, the parcel post matter
was so confused with the other mails that the employees of
petitioner and the other railroad companies could not possibly have
distinguished them and removed them from the post office cars, if
otherwise they had had opportunity."
[
Footnote 4]
See Vol. 49, Cong.Rec. part 5, 62d Cong.3d Sess. pp.
4459, 4461, 4684, 4686-4689, 4690, 4692, 4767, 4769, and
particularly p. 4768:
"Mr. Moon, of Tennessee (manager on part of the House,
submitting Conference Report): No; we do not add anything until
after July, 1913."
"Mr. Murdock: That is my question -- do we add five percent
after July, 1913?"
"Mr. Moon: Yes; weighed before January 1."
[
Footnote 5]
See Senate Report Committee on Post Offices and Post
Roads, July 23, 1912, No. 955, p. 25, 62d Cong.2d Session;
Conference Report, August 23, 1912, H.R. No. 1242, 62d Cong.2d
Sess.; Message of President, December 19, 1912, Sen.Doc. 989, p. 6,
62d Cong.3d Session; Senate Report February 11(17), 1913, No. 1212,
pp. 2, 4, 62d Cong.3d Sess.; also Vol. 49, Cong.Rec. part 2, 62d
Cong.3d Sess. pp. 1409, 1411, 1412, 1466, 1476, 1506, 1509, 1511;
Vol. 49, Cong.Rec. part 4, 62d Cong.3d Sess. pp. 4012, 4013, 4014;
Vol. 48, Cong.Rec. 62d Cong.2d Sess. part 5, pp. 4675, 4989, 5068,
5075, 5227; Vol. 48, Cong.Rec. 62d Cong.2d Sess. part 6, pp. 5439,
5473, 5504, 5649.