1. In an action on contract in the district court, valid service
on the defendant cannot be made in another district and state. P.
261 U. S.
277.
2. Motion by a defendant in the district court that the cause be
"erased from the docket" for want of proper service
held
in effect a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. P.
261 U. S.
277.
3. The methods of raising questions of jurisdiction in the
federal courts are not controlled by state procedure and the
Conformity Act (Rev.Stats. § 914), but are determined by this
Court. P.
261 U. S.
278.
4. A defendant who seasonably objects to a void service of
process does not submit to the jurisdiction by failing to conform
to an erroneous view of the district court on the manner of raising
the objection, or by subsequent inactivity concurred in by the
opposite party. P.
261 U. S.
278.
Reversed.
Error to a judgment of the district court, entered on default in
an action for goods sold and delivered and for breach of
contract.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
Action in the District Court for the District of Connecticut by
the Weil Corset Company, a corporation of Connecticut, against
Charles Munter, a citizen and resident of New York, for breach of
contract, damages being laid at $7,273.26, with interest from
November 13, 1914. Service upon Munter was made in New York
City.
The case is between citizens of different states, and involves
more than $3,000, exclusive of
Page 261 U. S. 277
interest and costs. It therefore is within the general
jurisdiction of the district courts. § 24 of the Judicial
Code. The plaintiff being a resident of the district in which the
suit was brought, the defendant could not object to the venue or
place of suit. § 51, Judicial Code.
Camp v. Gress,
250 U. S. 308;
Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 260 U.
S. 653.
But service of process was made upon Munter in New York, and he
availed himself of the fact by filing on August 30, 1918, before
the return day, by his attorney, the following motion:
"The defendant moves that the above-entitled case be erased from
the docket because it appears from the writ and complaint therein
that the defendant was, at the time of the commencement of said
action, a resident of the State of New York, and it appears from
the return thereon that service of said writ and complaint was not
otherwise made upon him than by leaving a copy of said writ and
complaint with him in the Borough of Manhattan, City, County, and
State of New York."
The court denied the motion on the ground that it "contained no
prayer for judgment," a prayer for judgment, it was held, being
necessary under the statutes of Connecticut in pleas "to the
jurisdiction, or in attachment, or both," and that the condition
was made applicable to the district court by the Conformity Act
(Section 914, Revised Statutes of United States). That act provides
that
"The practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding in .
. . other than equity and admiralty causes in the Circuit and
District Courts [of the United States] shall conform as near as may
be to the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding
existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the
state within which such circuit or district courts are held, any
rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding."
It may well be contended that the objection to the motion was
more verbal than real. There was substantially
Page 261 U. S. 278
a prayer for judgment, the only judgment that could be granted
-- that is, that the "case be erased from the docket," which
necessarily meant dismissed for want of jurisdiction in the court
over the defendant, because the
"service of said writ and complaint was not otherwise made upon
him than by leaving a copy of said writ and complaint with him in
the Borough of Manhattan, City, County, and State of New York."
We have decided, in cases which concern the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, that, notwithstanding the Conformity Act, neither
the statutes of the states nor the decisions of its courts are
conclusive upon the federal court, the determination of such
questions being "in this Court alone."
Mechanical Appliance Co.
v. Castleman, 215 U. S. 437,
215 U. S. 443.
The motion of Munter therefore should have been granted, and the
action dismissed.
It is, however, contended that he, by his subsequent conduct,
submitted to the ruling and waived his right of objection. The
motion was made August 30, 1918. The case was assigned for trial
for November 28, 1921. After some correspondence with counsel for
plaintiff and some conversation with the court, Munter, through
other counsel, moved the court
"for an order vacating and setting aside the decision of June
12, 1919, and directing that the above-entitled action be erased
from the docket of the court."
The court denied the motion. The court took pains to review the
prior proceedings, and distinguished between the objections to the
jurisdiction that cannot be waived and those that can be waived,
assigning the objection of Munter to the latter, and, when they are
waived, "the jurisdiction of the court is complete."
The court deduced a waiver from the conduct of counsel,
notwithstanding the court conceded that counsel had strenuously
insisted upon the objection. The conclusion was reached because, in
view of the court, the defective
Page 261 U. S. 279
service had not been properly taken advantage of, and that, "by
failing to follow up the ruling made on June 12, 1919," the
defendant was "guilty of gross laches, and, by his laches," had
"waived his right," and this was "equivalent to an actual waiver
under the statute accorded him to object to the jurisdiction."
We are unable to concur. The service on Munter was void. The
district court of Connecticut had no power to send its process to
New York, for service.
Toland v.
Sprague, 12 Pet. 300,
37 U. S. 330;
Herndon v.
Ridgway, 17 How. 424;
New York Life Insurance
Co. v. Bangs, 103 U. S. 435.
That Munter might have waived his right to object to the service is
established by the cases cited by the court. They are all to the
effect that pleading to the merits or a general appearance without
objecting to the service is a waiver. There is no such pleading or
appearance in the present case, and no action or conduct tantamount
to either. There was delay, it is true, but it was as much the
delay of the Corset Company as of Munter, and to this situation the
company brought its action. It subjected its action to the
indulgence of Munter, and he, in the exercise of his right,
immediately declared his opposition to the invalid service made in
another district and state. He did all that was incumbent upon him
to avail of his right. The court erred by denying it, and erred
again in refusing to set aside the order denying it.
Reversed and remanded, with directions to dismiss the
action.