Under the provision of the Copyright Act that suits "may be
instituted in the district of which the defendant or his agent is
an inhabitant, or in which he may be found," jurisdiction cannot be
acquired over a corporation in a district where it has no office
and does no business, by serving process on its president while
there temporarily and not on business of the corporation. P.
261 U. S.
177.
Affirmed.
Appeal from an order of the district court quashing service of a
subpoena
ad respondendum.
Page 261 U. S. 176
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The venue of suits for infringement of copyright is not
determined by the general provision governing suits in the federal
district courts. Judicial Code, § 51. The Copyright Act
provides that suits "may be instituted in the district of which the
defendant or his agent is an inhabitant, or in which he may be
found." Act March 4, 1909, c. 320, § 35, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084.
Whether under this section a valid service was made upon defendant
is the only question for decision.
New York is divided into four federal judicial districts.
Judicial Code, § 97. Lumiere, a citizen and resident of New
York City, in the southern district, brought, in the federal court
for that district, this suit to enjoin the infringement of a
copyright by publications in that city. The defendant, Mae Edna
Wilder, Inc., is a New York corporation, with its place of business
in Rochester, in the western district. It was not an inhabitant of
the southern district. It had no place of business there. It had no
agent or employee there authorized to carry on business on its
behalf. It transacted no business there. The only service of
process made was by delivering to Mr. Adkin, who was its president,
a copy of the summons while he was temporarily in New York City. He
was not an inhabitant of the southern district, and it was not
shown that he was there on business of the company. The defendant,
appearing especially for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of he court, moved to quash the service on the ground
that it was not amenable to process. The motion was granted, and
the case is here on appeal
Page 261 U. S. 177
under § 238 of the Judicial Code, the question of
jurisdiction having been duly certified.
That jurisdiction over a corporation cannot be acquired in a
district in which it has no place of business and is not found,
merely by serving process upon an executive officer temporarily
therein, even if he is there on business of the company, has been
settled.
Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin,
243 U. S. 264;
Rosenberg Bros. & Co., Inc. v. Curtis Brown Co.,
260 U. S. 516;
Bank of America v. Whitney Central National Bank, ante,
261 U. S. 171. The
contention here is that jurisdiction was obtained over the
defendant because its president is an agent within the meaning of
the statute, and was personally found in New York City. If such
facts are sufficient to give jurisdiction, a suit upon a copyright
may be brought in any district of the United States in which one
who is an officer or an agent of a defendant is served with
process, although neither plaintiff nor defendant has his residence
or a place of business there, and although the copyright was not
infringed there. It is not to be lightly assumed that Congress
intended such a thing.
Compare In re Keasbey & Mattison
Co., 160 U. S. 221;
Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.,
215 U. S. 501;
Ladew v. Tennessee Copper Co., 218 U.
S. 357.
Ordinarily a civil suit to enforce a personal liability under a
federal statute can be brought only in the district of which the
defendant is an inhabitant. Judicial Code, § 51. In a few
classes of cases, a carefully limited right to sue elsewhere has
been given. In patent cases, it is the district of which the
defendant is an inhabitant or in which acts of infringement have
been committed and the defendant has a regular and established
place of business. Judicial Code, § 48;
W. S. Tyler Co. v.
Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co., 236 U. S. 723. In
cases under the antitrust laws, it is where the defendant "resides
or is found or has an agent" (Act. Oct. 15, 1914, c. 323, § 4,
38 Stat.
Page 261 U. S. 178
730, 731), and, in the case of corporations, the "district
whereof it is an inhabitant" or "any district wherein it may be
found or transacts business." Section 12, p. 736. It is not
reasonable to conclude that Congress intended in copyright cases to
give a right far greater than these. "Agent" is a word used in the
law in many senses. What it means in a statute is to be determined
from the context and the subject matter. The president of a
business corporation is commonly authorized to represent it for
many purposes, and it may often be said properly that he is acting
as its agent. But induction into office does not impress upon a
person the status of agent of the corporation so that he must be
deemed its agent in every jurisdiction which he happens to enter,
although the corporation transacts no business there and he is not
there in any way representing it. The service of process made upon
Mr. Adkin was clearly not service upon an agent of the corporation
within the meaning of the Copyright Act.
As there is in this case only one defendant, the provision
concerning suits in states which contain more than one federal
judicial district can have no application.
See Judicial
Code, § 52;
Comp v. Gress, 250 U.
S. 308,
250 U. S. 314.
Whether, under the Copyright Act, service upon an agent would be
effective as upon one "found," if it appeared that the agent when
served was transacting some business for defendant within the
jurisdiction, but was there only temporarily, and had his residence
and place of business elsewhere is a question which we need not
decide in this case.
Affirmed.