1. Section 206(a) of the Transportation Act, providing that
actions against the agent designated by the President shall be
brought not later than two years from the passage of the act, did
not set aside a shorter limitation provided in existing bills of
lading. P.
260 U. S.
688.
2. A stipulation in a bill of lading that actions for loss,
damage or delay shall be instituted only within two years and one
day after delivery of the goods, or in case of failure to make
delivery, then within two years and one day after a reasonable time
for delivery has elapsed, is reasonable and valid. P.
260 U. S. 689.
3. A decision of the Interstate Commerce Commission that such a
stipulation was unreasonable,
held not binding in this
case. P.
260 U. S. 689.
4. The reasonableness of such a limitation is a matter of law.
P.
260 U. S. 689.
5. When not affected by statute, a limitation prescribed by
contract like the above applies to the action which is prosecuted
to judgment, and is not extended by the bringing of a previous
action. P.
260 U. S. 689.
6. An agreement limiting the time for bringing actions against
the carrier "for loss, damage or delay" of goods shipped applies to
claims that the goods delivered were short of the weight specified
in the bills of lading. P.
260
U. S. 689.
276 F. 400 affirmed.
Error to a judgment affirming a judgment of the district court
dismissing the petition in an action by the
Page 260 U. S. 683
transferee of bills of lading for failure to deliver the full
weight of cotton covered by them.
Page 260 U. S. 687
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit upon two bills of lading for failure to deliver
the full amount of cotton covered by them. The plaintiffs allege
that they purchased the bills at a rate determined by the number of
pounds specified in the bills, but that, on delivery, it turned out
that the weight of 100 bales covered by one of the bills was
15,312
Page 260 U. S. 688
pounds short, and that of 200 bales covered by the other was
11,527 pounds short. The 200 bales were delivered to the carrier on
March 25, 1918, and the 100 on March 26, 1918, when the railroads
were under federal control. A claim for this loss was made to the
Atlanta, Birmingham & Atlantic Railroad, the road over which
the cotton was sent, on April 25, 1918, and denied by the road on
July 28, 1918. This suit was begun on January 29, 1921, more than
two years and a day after the short delivery. The bills of lading,
which were in the same general form, provided that:
"suits for loss, damage or delay shall be instituted only within
two years and one day after delivery of the property, or, in case
of failure to make delivery, then within two years and one day
after a reasonable time for delivery has elapsed."
They also stated the weight "subject to correction." The
district court, after careful consideration, dismissed the petition
upon demurrer on the ground that the suit was too late under the
quoted words of the contract, and also on the merits. 274 F. 443.
The circuit court of appeals affirmed the judgment, adopting the
opinion below as to the time within which the suit must be brought.
276 F. 400.
We find it unnecessary to consider other defenses besides the
contract limitation, as we agree with the courts below that that
disposes of the case. The main objection urged is that the contract
is overridden by § 206(a) of the Transportation Act Feb. 28,
1920, c. 91, 41 Stat. 456, 461, giving actions in cases like this
against an agent designated by the President, and providing that
they may be brought within the periods of limitation now prescribed
by state or federal statutes, but not later than two years from the
date of the passage of the Act. The contention is supported with
some ingenuity, but we think it enough to observe that the general
purpose was to limit not to extend rights of action, and that
we
Page 260 U. S. 689
cannot suppose that it was intended to invalidate existing
contracts good when made.
New York Central R. Co. v.
Lazarus, 278 F. 900;
William F. Mosser Co. v. Payne,
Director General, (W.Va.) 114 S.E. 365;
Northern Milling
Co. v. Davis, (Wis.) 190 N.W. 351. In our opinion, this
contract was good when made. The time allowed was reasonable.
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Harriman,
227 U. S. 657,
227 U. S. 672;
Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Leatherwood, 250 U.
S. 478,
250 U. S. 481.
We agree with the district court that Decker & Sons v. Director
General, 55 I.C.C. 453, should not be understood or allowed to
contravene our conclusion, upon the facts here. The statutes of the
states where the goods were shipped and the suit was brought do not
affect the contract, and the reasonableness of the limitation is a
matter of law;
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v.
Harriman, 227 U. S. 657,
227 U. S. 672,
so that the bringing of a previous suit, alleged in the
declaration, does not save the case.
Riddlesbarger v. Hartford
Insurance Co., 7 Wall. 386.
The only other argument that seems to us to need notice is that
the claim is not within the words of the limitation. But it is of
the kind that the clause "suits for loss, damage or delay"
manifestly intended to limit, and we see no reason why it should
not be included under the head of loss.
Judgment affirmed.
