E, having been removed by the Secretary of the Treasury from a
place in the customs service after due hearing upon charges, was
later reinstated by the same authority, pursuant to an order of the
President based on further investigation and findings that the
charges were not just.
Held:
(1) That the removal was an act of discretion not subject to
revision by the court. P.
257 U. S.
84.
Page 257 U. S. 83
(2) That the power of appointment and removal in the case was
constitutionally lodged in the Secretary of the Treasury; the
President's order could not and was not intended to operate as a
reinstatement, but merely restored E's eligibility to appointment.
P.
257 U. S.
84.
(3) E had no claim to the salary between the dates of his
removal and his reinstatement by the Secretary.
53 Ct.Clms. 466 affirmed.
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims in an action to
recover salary accruing between the dates of appellant's removal
from an office and his reinstatement.
See also ante,
257 U. S. 71,
257 U. S. 77.
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, the plaintiff, who was a United States storekeeper
in the customs service at the port of New York, brought suit in the
Court of Claims to recover from the United States the sum of
$4,164.44, that being the salary of the office from the date of his
removal therefrom to the date of his reinstatement. The Court of
Claims decided against him. 53 Ct.Clms. 466. On May 9, 1910, he was
suspended without pay pending an investigation of written charges
preferred against him. He had a hearing upon his answer to the
charges, and on May 26, 1910, was removed from office. The charges
involved the acceptance of bribes in the matter of underweighing
cargoes of sugar, and thereby defrauding the government. In May,
1912, the Attorney General reinvestigated claimant's record, and
reported that, in his judgment, the charges were
Page 257 U. S. 84
not sustained, and the surveyor of the port made a similar
report. On December 3, 1912, the President of the United States, by
an executive order of that date, in pursuance of further
investigation, directed the reinstatement of the plaintiff. On
December 6, 1912, he was reinstated.
There can be no question, from the findings in this case, that
the plaintiff had the benefit of a hearing according to the
regulations then in force. The Court of Claims, in its opinion,
stated that the subsequent investigation established his innocence
of the charges made against him. But the things required by law and
regulations were done, and the discretion of the authorized
officers was exercised as required by law. It is settled that, in
such cases, the action of executive officers is not subject to
revision in the courts.
Keim v. United States,
117 U. S.
290.
The order of the President could not have the effect of
reinstating the plaintiff to the office from which he was removed.
The power of appointment and removal was in the Secretary of the
Treasury. It was within the power of Congress to confer this
authority on the Secretary.
Burnap v. United States,
252 U. S. 512.
The President's order, while reciting the wrong which had been
done to the plaintiff, could have no more effect than to reinstate
him to eligibility for reappointment in the government service.
Indeed, such was found to be the import of the order itself, and
fairly so. It provides that Eberlein may be reinstated in any
appropriate classified position in the customs service in New York,
without regard to the length of time he has been separated from the
service. That was the purpose of the order, although it goes on to
say, doubtless in fairness to Eberlein, that he was separated from
the service on May 26, 1910, and charged with having accepted money
from importers for underweighing merchandise, that, upon rehearing
the surveyor of customs of New York was of the opinion that
Page 257 U. S. 85
the charges had not been sustained, and that the Attorney
General recommended that the plaintiff be restored to the office
from which he had been dismissed. It is apparent that the
President's order was intended to have no more effect than to
restore him to eligibility for appointment. Such was the view of
the Court of Claims, and we find no error in its judgment.
Affirmed.