1. A person who has been removed from a place in the classified
civil service, by the proper authority but without charges or
opportunity to answer, in violation of § 6 of the Act of
August 24, 1912, c. 389, 37 Stat. 555, cannot recover subsequent
salary attached to the position if he has not been diligent in
asserting his rights. P.
257 U. S. 75.
United States v. Wickersham, 201 U.
S. 390, distinguished.
2. After summary removal, without charges, from the office of
Inspector of Customs, claimant did nothing for his vindication for
three years, when he sued for the salary since accrued.
Held that he had abandoned his title, and could not
recover. P.
257 U. S.
76.
53 Ct. Clms. 463; 55
id. 188, affirmed.
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims in a suit to
recover the emoluments of an office accruing after appellant's
unlawful removal from it.
See also post, 257 U. S. 77,
257 U. S. 82.
Page 257 U. S. 72
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
Claimant brought suit in the Court of Claims to recover
compensation as inspector of customs at the port of Baltimore from
February 20, 1913, to May 20, 1916, in the sum of $4,740, being at
the rate of $4 per day for the period covered. He alleged that he
was summarily removed from the service of the United States without
charges of any kind being preferred against him, and without an
opportunity to be heard, in violation of § 6 of an Act of
Congress approved August 24, 1912, 37 Stats. 555. He afterwards
amended his petition so as to claim $4 per day to the day of
rendering judgment, September 30, 1917, being the sum of $6,732.
The Court of Claims rendered judgment for the United States. 53
Ct.Clms. 463.
The Court of Claims made a finding of fact from which it appears
that Nicholas was appointed an inspector of customs at the port of
Baltimore on January 28, 1902, at a compensation of $4 per day;
that he continued to discharge the duties of such inspectorship
until February 20, 1913, when he was summarily discharged by the
collector of customs at the port of Baltimore pursuant to
instructions issued by the Secretary of the Treasury; that he was
in the classified civil service of the United States; that charges
had been preferred against him by a committee appointed by the
Secretary of the Treasury to examine into and report the conduct of
the customs business at Baltimore; that Nicholas had no notice of
the charges, was not furnished with a copy thereof, nor was he
allowed
Page 257 U. S. 73
a reasonable time to personally answer the same in writing. The
court further found that there was no evidence of the willingness
and ability of the claimant to perform the duties of the office of
inspector of customs from the date of his removal on February 20,
1913; that it did not appear that he made any report in person, or
writing, to the office of the collector at Baltimore. As a
conclusion of law, the court found the claimant not entitled to
recover.
An appeal was taken to this Court from the judgment of the Court
of Claims. Upon motion, the Court of Claims was directed to set
aside its judgment, reopen the case, and make additional findings
of fact. In obedience to a mandate of this Court, the Court of
Claims set aside its judgment, took additional proof, made new
findings, and again concluded that the claimant was not entitled to
a recovery. 55 Ct.Clms. 188. That judgment is here for review.
From the amended findings of fact, it appears that Nicholas
entered the customs service in 1899 as an inspector; that the
committee, appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury to examine
into and report the conduct of the customs service at Baltimore,
made a report from which they concluded that, owing to the conduct
of Nicholas, and from personal observation, they were of the
opinion that the service would be benefited by his removal
therefrom. On February 5, 1913, the Secretary of the Treasury
approved this recommendation, and instructed the Collector of
Customs at Baltimore to remove the claimant on account of his use
of intoxicating liquors, and the unsatisfactory and perfunctory
manner in which he performed his work. On February 20, 1913, he was
removed from the service. At the time of his dismissal, he was in
the classified civil service, and had no notice of any charges
against him. On August 24, 1912, Congress passed and act
authorizing the President to reorganize the
Page 257 U. S. 74
customs service. 37 Stat. c. 355, p. 434. This reorganization
was reported to Congress March 3, 1913. Thirty-three inspectors of
customs were provided for the district of Maryland, including the
State of Maryland, the District of Columbia, and the City of
Alexandria, Virginia, which offices were filled since March 13,
1913, by persons appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury;
claimant made no appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury at the
time of his removal from office; he was willing and physically able
to resume the duties of the office, and capable of discharging the
same, but did not apply for reinstatement at any time, nor notify
the Secretary of the Treasury of his desire therefor, or for a
revocation of the order for his dismissal.
It appears that the petition was filed in the Court of Claims
more than three years after the claimant had been removed from
office. It alleged that, being able and willing to discharge the
duties of the office, plaintiff was entitled to compensation
because of his illegal removal by failure to comply with the
provisions of the Act of August 24, 1912, 37 Stat. 555:
"Sec. 6. That no person in the classified civil service of the
United States shall be removed therefrom except for such cause as
will promote the efficiency of said service and for reasons given
in writing, and the person whose removal is sought shall have
notice of the same and of any charges preferred against him, and be
furnished with a copy thereof, and also be allowed a reasonable
time for personally answering the same in writing, and affidavits
in support thereof; but no examination of witnesses nor any trial
or hearing shall be required except in the discretion of the
officer making the removal, and copies of charges, notice of
hearing, answers, reasons for removal, and of the order of removal
shall be made a part of the records of the proper department or
office, as shall also the reasons for reduction in rank or
compensation; and
Page 257 U. S. 75
copies of the same shall be furnished to the person affected
upon request, and the Civil Service Commission also shall, upon
request, be furnished copies of the same."
The purpose of this statute, as its terms plainly show, is to
require that one in the classified civil service of the United
States have an opportunity to know of the charges against him
before removal, with an opportunity to answer them, and, if awarded
a trial, to have one before the officer empowered to act in the
matter. The question presented is whether the plaintiff may recover
his salary when removed without compliance with the statute where
he delays taking any steps to test the legality of his removal, or
asking for an opportunity to be heard, for the length of time
herein shown.
We agree with the Court of Claims that a person illegally
dismissed from office is not thereby exonerated from obligation to
take steps for his own protection, and may not for an unreasonable
length of time acquiesce in the order of removal, which it was
within the power of the Secretary to make, and then recover for the
salary attached to the position. In cases of unreasonable delay, he
may be held to have abandoned title to the office and any right to
recover its emoluments. The claimant relies upon the
Wickersham case,
201 U. S. 390. In
that case, this Court held that one entitled to the protection of a
rule or statute requiring notice to be given him could not legally
be separated from the service by suspension without compliance with
the rule or statute, and was entitled to compensation during the
period of his wrongful suspension. In that case, the record
disclosed that Wickersham was suspended on November 1, 1897, and
that, on November 5, 1897, he protested against his suspension, and
on December 28, 1897, demanded his salary. The case did not
present, and there was no occasion to decide, the question of the
effect of delay and acquiescence upon the right to recover
compensation. It appeared that Wickersham
Page 257 U. S. 76
was diligent in asserting his rights, as well as ready and
willing to discharge the duties of the government employment in
which he was engaged.
It must be remembered that we are dealing with the discharge of
public duties which it is important shall be carried on regardless
of the personnel of those who discharge them. While one inducted
into office or public employment is entitled to the privileges or
emoluments thereof until legally separated therefrom, he is not
absolved from the duty of diligence upon his part in the assertion
of his right to the office, or to the compensation attached
thereto. Public policy requires that the government shall be
seasonably advised of the attitude of its officers and employees
attempted to be displaced when they assert illegal removal or
suspension as a basis for the recovery of the office or its
emoluments. This is necessary in order that proper action may be
taken in the public interest, as well as that which is required to
vindicate the rights of one wrongfully removed from the public
service. This principle was recognized in
United States ex rel.
Arant v. Lane, 249 U. S. 367.
That case was one in mandamus to compel the restoration of an
officer who alleged that he was wrongfully removed without notice
or an opportunity to be heard, and it was held that a delay of 20
months barred by laches his right to the writ. The reasoning of the
opinion, and the comments as to the character of public employment
and the conduct required of one who would assert his rights when
wrongfully deprived of them, are apposite here. The findings in
this case disclose that plaintiff took no steps to question the
order dismissing him from the service, nor to ask for a copy of the
charges upon which he was removed. He did nothing for his
vindication until he brought this suit three years after his
removal from the office, to recover compensation. We hold,
therefore, as did the Court of Claims, that such a lack of
diligence evidenced an
Page 257 U. S. 77
abandonment of his title to the office, and of his right to
recover the emoluments thereof.
Affirmed.