1. The jurisdiction of this Court to review judgments of the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia "in cases in which the
jurisdiction of the trial court is in issue" (Jud.Code § 250,
cl. 1) attaches to a case originating in the Supreme Court of the
District in which the issue concerned the territorial limits of
that court's jurisdiction. P.
257 U. S.
62.
2. The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia being a court
of general jurisdiction, there is no occasion to limit the natural
scope of Jud.Code, § 250, cl. 1, after the manner in which the
similarly worded § 238, applicable to the district courts of
the United States, has been confined to cases in which their
jurisdiction as federal courts is involved. P.
257 U. S.
62.
3. A certificate of the question of jurisdiction is not
necessary, under Jud.Code § 250,
supra, where the
issue was clearly made by plea, and a certificate could add nothing
to the record. P.
257 U. S.
62.
4.
Quaere whether the rule construing the sixth clause
of Jud.Code § 250, as conferring jurisdiction only when the
law drawn in question, is of general application throughout the
United States, as distinguished from one local to the District,
would apply in a case involving a statute fixing the boundary of
the District. P.
257 U. S. 62.
Cf. American Security & Trust Co. v. District of
Columbia, 224 U. S. 491.
5. The original title of Maryland, to which the United States
succeeded in the District of Columbia, extended at least to the low
water mark or the Virginia side of the Potomac River. P.
257 U. S.
63.
Page 257 U. S. 48
See Maryland v. West Virginia, 217 U. S.
1,
217 U. S. 45-46;
id., 217 U. S. 577-578,
and
Morrii v. United States, 174 U.
S. 196.
6. The Maryland title was not affected by later charters granted
by James I to Virginia. P.
257 U. S. 63.
7. A grant made by the Governor of Virginia to one Howsing in
1669, with a boundary "extending down Potomack River by various
courses 3152 po. making a S. Wtly line to a pokecory," etc., and
"including several small creeks or inlets,"
held
consistent with as well as subordinate to the Maryland grant,
merely following the line of the stream, and not intended to
include an indentation or cove. P.
257 U. S.
63.
8. The grant made by Virginia to the United States of territory
formerly included in the District of Columbia and its regrant by
the United States did not enlarge Virginia's rights as they were
originally. P.
257 U. S.
63.
9. The compact entered into between Virginia and Maryland in
1785 to regulate commerce, which provided,
inter alia,
that the Potomac should be a common highway for purposes of
navigation and commerce to the citizens of both states, and gave
the citizens of each full property in the shores of the river
adjoining their lands, with wharfing and fishing rights, did not
settle the question of boundary between the states. P.
257 U. S.
63.
10. The arbitration of boundary between Virginia and Maryland,
the award in which was accepted by those states in 1878 and
assented to by the United States (Act of March 3, 1879, c.196, 20
Stat. 481) fixing the line at low water mark on the Virginia side
of the Potomac drawn from headland to headland, did not involve or
affect the boundary as between Virginia and the District of
Columbia. P.
257 U. S.
64.
11. The filling in and adverse occupation of land originally
below low water mark on the Virginia side of the Potomac under an
erroneous claim that the Virginia line included a cove in which the
land was situated by extending from headland to headland gave no
prescriptive right, as against Maryland or the United States, to
land lying in the cove and below low water next to the areas so
filled, even though the claim was supported by Virginia statutes.
P.
257 U. S.
65.
12. The description of the District of Columbia in the Revised
Statutes relating thereto, June 22, 1874, § 1, as "including
the River Potomac in its course through the District," imports an
assertion by Congress that the title of the United States embraces
the whole river, and the jurisdiction of the District over the
river seems to have been exercised without dispute. P.
257 U. S.
65.
Page 257 U. S. 49
13. The United States is entitled to the possession of land in
the District which it has reclaimed by filling below low water line
on the Virginia side, though access to the water from private lands
adjacent be thereby interrupted. P
49 App.DC. 285, 265 F. 437 affirmed.
Error to review a judgment of the Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia which affirmed a judgment of the Supreme Court
of the District in favor of the United States in a suit brought by
the United States to recover a strip of made land on the Potomac
River.
Page 257 U. S. 61
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit brought by the United States in the Supreme Court
of the District of Columbia to recover possession of a strip of
land on the Potomac riverfront of the City of Alexandria. Except an
insignificant portion as to which no special defense was made and
which it is agreed may be disregarded, this strip lay below low
water mark until it was filled in by the United States in 1910-1912
by dredging from the bottom of the river and depositing the
material on the other side of a riprap wall built on the riverbed.
Act of June 25, 1910, c. 382, 36 Stat. 630, 639; Act of February
27, 1911, c. 166, 36 Stat. 933, 937. The United States enclosed the
made land by a fence at high water mark, but the defendant, the
plaintiff in error, claiming title to the adjoining land inshore,
destroyed the fence and took possession, whereupon this
Page 257 U. S. 62
action was brought. The defendant pleaded to the jurisdiction of
the court, alleging that the land was not in the District but was
part of Virginia. On this issue, the court found or ruled in favor
of the plaintiff and afterwards did the same upon the general
issue, a jury having been waived. Judgment for the plaintiff was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and the defendant took a writ of
error to bring the case to this Court.
A question is raised by the defendant in error as to the
jurisdiction of this Court. The language of the Judicial Code (Act
of March 3, 1911, c. 231) § 250, 36 Stat. 1087, 1159, is that
any final judgment of the Court of Appeals may be reexamined
"First. In cases in which the jurisdiction of the trial court is in
issue." The words taken literally cover this case, but it is argued
that they should be construed as similar words in § 238
concerning the district courts are construed. In the latter
instance, as is well known, they are confined to the jurisdiction
of the district courts as courts of the United States. But the
jurisdiction of the district courts is a limited jurisdiction based
upon statutory grounds, and therefore the words of § 238
naturally enough were confined to what always is the first question
in a case before them. The Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia, on the other hand, is a court of general jurisdiction,
and whether or not the clause of § 250 was suggested by the
earlier one, we see no sufficient justification for denying to it
the scope that it must have if it is given its natural sense. The
plea to the jurisdiction raises the question clearly, and a
certificate would add nothing to what the record shows.
We are not prepared to say that the judgment before us was not
"otherwise reviewable" on the question of the boundary between the
United States and Virginia, so far as the defendant drew in
question the construction of the Revised Statutes relating to the
District of Columbia, § 1, Act June 22, 1874, hereafter
discussed. We should hesitate
Page 257 U. S. 63
to apply the decision in
American Security & Trust Co.
v. District of Columbia, 224 U. S. 491, to
such a case.
The question of the jurisdiction of the trial court and that of
the merits very nearly coalesce, as the original title at least, of
Maryland and its jurisdiction were founded upon the same facts, and
as the United States succeeded to the rights of Maryland by the
grant of the District completed in 1791. That the original title of
Maryland extended at least to low water mark on the Virginia side
it now is too late to deny, in view of the decisions in
Maryland v. West Virginia, 217 U. S.
1,
217 U. S. 45-46,
217 U. S. 217
U.S. 557,
217 U. S. 578,
and
Morris v. United States, 174 U.
S. 196. An attempt to throw doubt upon these authorities
and upon the effect of the charter of Charles I, June 30, 1632,
granting Maryland to Lord Baltimore (
ad ulteriorem dicti
Fluminis Ripam et eam sequendo, etc., 217 U.S.
217 U. S. 25),
"to the farther bank of the said [Potomac] River and following it,"
by the charters of James I to Virginia and especially by the terms
of a grant from the Governor of Virginia to Howsing in 1669 must
fail. The latter grant is subordinate to the former, and is not
inconsistent with it as the language is "extending down Potomac
River by various courses 3152 po. making a S. Wtly line to a
pokecory," etc. The implication of the words "by various courses"
that the grant follows the line of the stream is not changed by the
words "including several small creeks or inlets." The land in
question is situated upon an indentation, called Battery Cove, but
the place is not a creek or inlet. The former decisions of the
court must be followed so far as they go.
The original state of things was not changed by the grant of
Virginia and the regrant by the United States of the part of the
District on the Virginia side. They at least did not enlarge the
rights of that state. The compact between Virginia and Maryland in
1785 also seems to us to have no bearing upon the case. It says
nothing
Page 257 U. S. 64
about the boundary in terms. Without going into the history of
the compact or reciting it, we only need to remark that it was a
regulation of commerce, and while, with a view to opening up a
route to the West, it provided in Article 6 that the Potomac should
be considered as a common highway for the purposes of navigation
and commerce to the citizens of Virginia and Maryland, and in
Article 7 gave the citizens of each state full property in the
shores of the river adjoining their lands and the privilege of
carrying out wharves, etc., with a common right of fishing, it left
the question of boundary open to long continued disputes. It may be
laid on one side even if it ever was in force in the District of
Columbia, which has been denied on the ground that the compact was
abrogated so far as it affected this land by the grant of Virginia,
and was not revived by the grant to the United States.
Evans v.
United States, 31 App.D.C. 544, 550.
See Georgetown
v. Alexandria Canal Co., 12 Pet. 91.
The question of boundary remaining open was submitted to
arbitration which ended in an award accepted by the parties in
1878. But that was an arbitration between the two states, and did
not purport to affect the boundary of the District. The assent of
the United States did not enlarge its scope. Act of March 3, 1879,
c.196, 20 Stat. 481. It is said that, as the submission was to an
ascertainment of the true boundary line, the award must be taken to
have determined it, but the question was confined to the boundary
between the states as they then were, and whatever may be the force
of the argument that the same principle ought to govern here, it
was not and could not be adjudicated. Further discussion on this
point is not needed. The award fixed low water mark on the Virginia
side as the boundary, and is only material if at all as suggesting
a claim that the low water line should be drawn from headland to
headland, and, in that
Page 257 U. S. 65
way, include the indentation or cove where the United States has
filled. But we know of no reason for construing the charter to Lord
Baltimore as so limited, or that to Howsing as importing such a
rule.
The only important aspect of the last mentioned suggestion is in
connection with a claim of prescriptive right. The land behind the
filling of the United States is made land, and the fillings on the
Alexandria side go below the original low water mark. In this case,
however, there is no attempt to disturb the long maintained
possession of such extensions, whether originally warranted or not.
The only question before us is of the rights of the United States
to fill land that hitherto has been under water. The plaintiff in
error seeks to exclude it by force of what already has been done
and the claims of right that have been made in connection with it.
If the taking possession of land under a deed purporting to convey
more than the portion actually occupied, no doubt, within
reasonable limits, the sovereign power might give to it the effect
of adverse possession of the whole, as against other subjects of
the same power.
Montoya v. Gonzales, 232 U.
S. 375,
232 U. S.
377-378. But the effect of filling in upon the edge of a
stream as against a different power is another matter. Such acts in
themselves import no claim beyond the land thus occupied. Maryland
and the United States are not called upon to scrutinize the
discourse of those in Virginia even if in statutory form. Except so
far as actually occupied, the seizing of the land remains in the
party that has the title.
"One who enters upon the land of another, though under color of
title, gives no notice to that other of any claim, except to the
extent of his actual occupancy."
Hunnicutt v. Peyton, 102 U. S. 333,
102 U. S. 369.
Still more is this true as against independent sovereign
rights.
Finally, on the other hand, the Revised Statutes relating to the
District of Columbia, June 22, 1874, § 1, describe
Page 257 U. S. 66
the District as "including the River Potomac in its course
through the District," which imports an assertion by Congress that
the title of the United States embraces the whole riverbed, and the
jurisdiction of the District over the river seems to have been
exercised without dispute. For cases that have reached the reports,
see Alexandria Canal Railroad & Bridge Co. v. District of
Columbia, 1 Mackey, 217, 225, 226;
Smoot v. District of
Columbia, 23 App.D.C. 266;
Evans v. United States, 31
App.D.C. 544.
It may happen that such filling as is done in this case will
interrupt previously existing access to the waterfront. But that
does not affect the right of the United States to possession of the
land. What other rights, if any, the plaintiff in error may have
does not concern us now.
Judgment affirmed.
