1. The fifth section of the Mexican Colonization Law of August
18, 1824, which declares the right of the federal government, for
the defense or security of the nation, to make use of lands for the
purpose of constructing warehouses, arsenals, and other public
edifices, cannot be construed as reserving a power of expropriation
without compensation over land granted under the act to a Mexican
citizen. P.
255 U. S. 485.
Arguello v. United
States, 18 How. 539.
2. The title to tide and submerged lands acquired by the State
of California upon her creation was subject to prior Mexican
grants, and subject to the jurisdiction of the district court,
under the Private Land Claims Act of March 3, 1851, to determine
whether such lands, in any case before it, had been granted by the
prior sovereignty. P.
255 U. S.
487.
3. A decree of the district court construing the boundary calls
of a grant as including tide and overflowed lands adjacent to the
granted upland, and confirming it accordingly, was a valid exercise
of the court's jurisdiction, even if the construction was
erroneous, and is not subject to collateral attack upon the ground
that the Mexican documents, correctly interpreted, confined the
grant to the shoreline. P.
255 U. S. 487.
4. In a suit by the United States to condemn rights deraigned
under a Mexican grant confirmed, surveyed, and patented under the
Act of March 3, 1851,
supra, in which the government
claimed that adjacent tide and overflowed lands, included in the
survey and patent, were not in the original grant or the
confirmatory decree, and did not pass,
held that the
confirmation and patent were conclusive, and that the Mexican map
of the boundaries, which, with the other documents of the grant,
was referred to in the decree of the district court as defining it,
was irrelevant. Pp.
255 U. S.
487-488.
5.
Held, further, that the patent could not be
collaterally impeached by showing from the field notes that the
line including the tide and
Page 255 U. S. 473
submerged lands was not surveyed, and that, considered as a
direct attack, the suit was barred by the limitation Act of March
3, 1891. P.
255 U. S.
488.
6. An expert witness to value in a condemnation case used maps
and drawings to illustrate his conception of the possible uses of
the land.
Held that, if the plan so portrayed was remote
and speculative, the objection went to the weight of his testimony,
and not to such use of the maps and drawings. P.
255 U. S.
488.
7. Under the Act of July 27, 1917, c. 42, 40 tat. 247, providing
for the taking of the "whole of North Island" and for "the
determination and appraisement of any rights private parties may
have in said island," and under the bill in this case following the
act, the government took not merely the upland, but the adjacent
tide and overflowed land as well. P.
255 U. S. 489.
274 F. 230 affirmed.
The cases are stated in the opinion.
Page 255 U. S. 485
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases arise out of a proceeding brought by the United
States under the Act of July 27, 1917, c. 42, 40 Stat. 247, for the
double purpose of ascertaining the rights of private parties in
North Island in the harbor of San Diego, California, and of
condemning the whole of said island for public purposes after the
value of such rights has been fixed and paid into Court. The
proceeding was begun by a bill in equity against the Coronado Beach
Company. In its answer, that Company alleged title to the whole
island, and after a hearing obtained a decree in its favor, subject
to the question of the rights of the United States brought up by
the appeal in No. 525. The case then was transferred to the law
side, the value of the plaintiff's island was assessed by a jury,
and a judgment was entered that, upon payment of $5,000,000 into
Court within thirty days the United States might have a final order
of condemnation. The writ of error in 524 presents the questions
raised in this stage of the case.
The title of the Coronado Beach Company is derived from a
Mexican grant of May 15, 1846, to one Carillo, a Mexican citizen,
the Company having succeeded to his rights. At this point, it is
necessary to mention only that Carillo is given the right to
enclose the land "without prejudice to the crossings, roads, and
servitudes." The grant was under a law of August 18, 1824, by the
fifth
Page 255 U. S. 486
section of which,
"If, for the defense or security of the nation, the federal
government should find it expedient to make use of any portion of
these lands for the purpose of constructing warehouses, arsenals,
or other public edifices, it may do so, with the approbation of the
General Congress, or during its recess with that of the government
council."
Hall, Laws of Mexico 148, § 492. The United States
interprets this as a reservation of power against all persons, as
one of the servitudes to which the Carillo grant was subject, and
as a sovereign right to which it succeeded when the land became
territory of the United States. We cannot accept so broad an
interpretation. We need not repeat the discussion in
Arguello v. United
States, 18 How. 539, wherein it was laid down that
the first eight sections apply wholly to colonists and foreigners.
The decision immediately concerned the fourth section of the law,
but the ground for the construction given to it was that the others
obviously were limited as stated, and that there was no reason for
giving to the fourth a greater scope. Moreover the second section
states that:
"The objects of this law are those national lands which are
neither private property nor belong to any corporation or pueblo,
and can therefore be colonized."
United States v.
Yorba, 1 Wall. 412. It is hardly credible that
section five should have been intended to reserve the right to
displace private owners, and wholly incredible that it reserves the
right to do so without compensation, especially when it is noticed
that, by the law of April 6, 1830, the value of lands taken for
fortification, &c., is to be credited to the states.
Camou
v. United States, 171 U. S. 277,
171 U. S.
284-285; Hall, Laws of Mexico 108, § 291.
The more serious questions arise on the writ of error, and
concern primarily the extent of the grant, the main dispute being
whether the Company owns the tidelands in front of the upland of
the island. Carillo's petition states as its ground that he is in
want of proper land for the breeding of
Page 255 U. S. 487
cattle and horses, and asks the grant for a cattle farm of the
island or peninsula in question, bounded substantially as in the
subsequent grant,
viz.: on the north, by the Estero of San
Diego towards the town, east by the end of the rancho of Don
Augustin Meliso, south by the sea, and west by the bay or anchorage
for ships, as explained by the map which goes with the espediente.
On April 20, 1852, Billings and others then holding the title
petitioned the Commissioners to settle Private Land Claims,
appointed under the Act of March 3, 1851, c. 41; 9 Stat. 631, to
confirm to them this tract of land. The petition was rejected by
the Board, but, on appeal, the title was declared good and
confirmed by the district court of the United States. The decree
stated the boundaries on the north, east, and south as in the
original grant, and "west by the anchorage for ships according to
the documents of title and map to which reference is had." This
decree was filed on January 12, 1857; on May 7, 1867, after an
appeal to this Court had been dismissed, there was a substitution
of Peachy and Aspenwall as parties, and on June 11, 1869, a patent
was issued reciting the decree, a return with a plat of a survey
approved under § 13 of the Act of 1851, and giving and
granting to them the land described in the survey. The Mexican map
is not in the record and is not material, since the plat
accompanying the patent of the United States shows the line marking
the "Anchorage for Ships," which includes the tide lands in
dispute.
The jurisdiction of the decree and the validity of the patent so
far as they cover the tidelands is denied by the United States, a
special reason being found in the fact that California became a
state in 1850, and thereby acquired a title to the submerged lands
before the date of the decree. But the title of the state was
subject to prior Mexican grants. The question whether there was
such a prior grant and what were its boundaries were questions that
had to be decided in the proceedings for confirmation, and there
was
Page 255 U. S. 488
jurisdiction to decide them as well if the decision was wrong as
if it was right. The title of California was in abeyance until
those issues were determined, as the decree related back to the
date of the original grant. The petitioner asked a confirmation of
the tract conveyed to Carillo. The grant to Carillo was bounded
"west by the anchorage for ships" and although it well may be that,
in view of the purpose set out in his petition and the
circumstances, the grant could have been construed more narrowly,
that was a matter to be passed upon, and when the decree and the
patent went in favor of the grantee, it is too late to argue that
they are not conclusive against the United States. It is said that
the field notes, not put in evidence at the trial, show that the
deep water line was not surveyed, but was taken from the Coast
Survey maps. But, however arrived at, it was adopted by the United
States for its grant, and it cannot now be collaterally impeached.
Knight v. United Land Association, 142 U.
S. 161;
San Francisco v. Le Roy, 138 U.
S. 656;
Beard v.
Federy, 3 Wall. 478. It was suggested that the bill
might be regarded as a direct attack upon the patent; but this
probably was an afterthought, and, in any event, the attack would
be too late. Act of March 3, 1891, c. 561, § 8; 26 Stat. 1099;
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co.,
209 U. S. 447,
209 U. S.
450.
A subordinate objection is urged to the admission of maps or
drawings showing the adaptability of the island to a great system
of improvements possible if the Coronado Beach Company owned the
submerged land. It is urged that such improvements were
speculative, remote, and not shown to be commercially practicable.
But the drawings were admitted only to illustrate the opinion of
the witness as to value, and were explained as meaning no more. If
the reasons for his opinion were inadequate, they detracted from
the weight of his testimony, but were not inadmissible on that
account.
Page 255 U. S. 489
Finally, it is contended that the government took only the
upland. But the Act of 1917 provides for the taking of "the whole
of North Island" and for "the determination and appraisement of any
rights private parties may have in said island," and the bill
follows the act and prays that, if the defendant company has any
right to the tract or any part thereof, the right "and the whole
thereof" may be "appraised and condemned." We discover no error in
the proceedings below.
Decree and judgment affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE CLARKE took no part in the decision of this
case.
