1. Under the act establishing the Pubic Utilities Commission of
the District of Columbia, a person claiming that an order of the
Commission raising the rates of a gas company infringes his
constitutional rights need not make complaint or appear before the
Commission before bringing suit to have the order declared void. P.
255 U. S.
454.
2. An order of the Commission raising the rates chargeable by a
gas company to private consumers in the District of Columbia
without changing a lower and unremunerative rate fixed by act of
Congress for gas furnished the government and the District
held not to involve any unconstitutional discrimination
against private consumers, or taking of their property without due
process of law, since the United States may fix any rate for itself
and for the District as a condition to the gas company's
establishment in the District, and private consumers are not
compelled to purchase gas. P.
255 U. S.
454.
4 App.D.C. 301, 265 F. 451, affirmed.
Appeal from a decree of the Court of Appals of the District of
Columbia which affirmed a decree of the Supreme Court of the
District dismissing a bill brought by the present appellants for
the purpose of setting aside as unconstitutional certain orders of
the Public Utilities Commission permitting the appellee gas company
to increase its rates to private consumers while leaving them
unchanged as to the government and the District.
Page 255 U. S. 453
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a bill in equity brought by private consumers of gas to
have two orders of the Public Utilities Commission that increase
the rate for gas to private consumers declared void. The first
order, No. 254, March 15, 1918, raised the rate from 75 cents per
thousand feet to 90 cents. The second, No. 314, March 15, 1919,
raised it to not exceeding 95 cents, the orders being made under
the authority of the Act of March 4, 1913, c. 150, § 8, 37
Stat. 938, 974
et seq., establishing the Public Utilities
Commission of the District of Columbia and fixing its powers. The
bill and the appeal to this Court are said to be based upon
paragraph 64, of § 8, 37 Stat. 988. It is alleged that the
orders violate the plaintiffs' constitutional rights because the
rate to be charged to the United States and to the District remains
the statutory rate of 70 cents, and to certain other takers still
less, and that, if the United States and District had paid 90 cents
for the year 1918, the Gas Company would have received a return of
about six percent. It is said that the difference is an unlawful
discrimination, and that the plaintiffs are required to make up the
loss incurred by furnishing the gas to the government and the
District at less than cost. The bill was dismissed by the Supreme
Court for want of equity and because not filed within one hundred
and twenty days after the entry of the order of March 15, 1918, as
required by § 8, par. 65. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decree on the different ground that
Page 255 U. S. 454
a formal complaint and hearing before the Commission were a
condition of the right to sue in the courts. The provision in Par.
67 for the transmission of any new evidence taken in the suit to
the Commission for its further consideration, and other details,
were thought to indicate that the suit was in the nature of an
appeal.
We are unable to agree with the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
Assuming that the bill is based upon the statute, the language of
Par. 64 is that any person interested and dissatisfied with any
order fixing any rate may commence a proceeding in equity. We do
not perceive any advantage in requiring a party to file a complaint
asking the Commission to review a decision just reached by it after
a public hearing, nor do we see such a requirement in the statute.
On the other hand, we see no requirement that the plaintiffs in
equity should have appeared in the original hearing upon the rate.
They are parties to the order equally whether they saw fit to argue
the case to the Commission or not, and when they stand upon
supposed constitutional rights, there seems to be no necessity of
raising the point until they get into court. This suit is not for a
revision of details, but for a decree that the orders are void as
matter of law. That, by reason of their pecuniary interest, the
plaintiffs are persons interested within the statute may be assumed
for the purposes of decision.
Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Diffenbaugh, 222 U. S. 42,
222 U. S. 49;
s.c.,
Peavey & Co. v. Union Pacific R. Co., 176 F.
409, 416-417.
See Detroit & Mackinac Ry. Co. v. Michigan
Ry. Commission, 235 U. S. 402.
On the merits, however, there is no doubt that the decree was
right. We do not wish to belittle the claim of a taker of what for
the time has become pretty nearly a necessity to equal treatment
while gas is furnished to the public. But the notion that the
government cannot make it a condition of allowing the establishment
of gas works that its needs and the needs of its instrument the
District shall be
Page 255 U. S. 455
satisfied at any price that it may fix strikes us as needing no
answer. The plaintiffs are under no legal obligation to take gas,
nor is the government bound to allow it to be furnished. If they
choose to take, it the plaintiffs must submit to such enhancement
of price, if any, as is assignable to the government's demands. We
do not consider whether the Commission has power to raise the price
to the excepted class because, even if it has, the plaintiffs have
no right to require equality with the government, and they have no
other ground upon which to found their supposed right.
Decree affirmed.
