An appeal from the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands
perfected before the Act of September 6, 1916, is governed by
§ 248 of the Judicial Code, which gives this Court
jurisdiction in all cases in which any treaty of the United States
is involved. P.
249 U. S.
75.
Page 249 U. S. 73
A decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippines that the name
"Isabela" is a geographical and descriptive term not subject to
registration as a tradename under the law before or since the
cession of the islands, and that its use as a designation of cigars
and cigarettes was not unfair competition, and that the suit was
not for infringement of a tradename, "La Flor de la Isabela,"
registered under the Spanish regime,
held not to involve
the provisions of the Treaty of Paris of 1898, Art. VIII and XIII,
providing that the cession shall not impair property rights
previously acquired, and that rights of property secured by
copyrights and patents acquired by Spaniards in the Islands shall
be continued and respected. P.
249 U. S. 75.
Ubeda v. Zialcita, 226 U. S. 452,
distinguished.
Appeal to review 33 Phil.Rep. 485 dismissed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
Suit was brought by the appellant, a corporation organized under
the laws of Spain, in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The
complainant set up that, for more than 27 years, it had been
engaged in the business of manufacturing cigars and cigarettes in
the Philippine Islands. That its factory is known as "La Flor de la
Isabela," which name is used upon the packages and containers of
the products manufactured by complainant and on the advertising
matter in its cigar and cigarette business. That on April 5, 1887,
the Kingdom of Spain, as the sovereign authority in the Philippine
Islands, issued to it, under laws then in force, a certificate of
registration and ownership of certain trademarks and tradenames and
label designs therein described and enumerated, including the
tradename "La Flor de la
Page 249 U. S. 74
Isabela," conferring the right upon the complainant to all the
benefits appurtenant thereto, including the right to prosecute for
infringement. That the tradename has been in continuous use solely
by the complainant from the issuance of the Spanish certificate of
registration and ownership to the time of bringing suit, except for
the acts of the appellee. That, by reason of the long continued use
of the phrase "La Flor de la Isabela" to designate its factory and
its products, the said phrase and sundry abbreviations thereof,
when applied to the manufactures of tobacco as a distinguishing
brand or name, had come to have a secondary meaning designating and
denoting that they are the products of its factory. In common
parlance, the name "La Flor de la Isabela" is abbreviated to
"Isabelas" when applied to cigars or cigarettes. That, on or about
the first of June, 1914, the defendant, now appellee, a corporation
organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, engaged in the
manufacture and sale of cigars and cigarettes in Manila and
elsewhere in the Philippine Islands, unlawfully misappropriated to
its own use and benefit the word "Isabelas" in its secondary
meaning as a distinguishing brand or name of its tobacco products.
That the unlawful use of the name "Isabelas" as the distinguishing
brand or name of the products of the defendant is calculated to
deceive the public into the belief that the goods of the defendant
so designated and branded are the goods manufactured by the
complainant, and that the use thereof by the defendant will cause
it irreparable injury. An injunction was prayed against the
defendant, and an accounting sought.
The Court of First Instance found in favor of the complainant
because of its exclusive ownership of the Spanish trademark, and in
favor of the defendant on the question of unfair competition. Upon
appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, that court
found in favor of the defendant upon both issues, and directed a
reversal of the
Page 249 U. S. 75
judgment below. 33 Phil.Rep. 485. Appeal to this Court was
sought and allowed upon the ground that the judgment of the supreme
court was in an action which involved the Paris Treaty of 1898
between the United States and Spain, because it is therein provided
that the property rights of private establishments or associations
having legal capacity to acquire and possess property, and
especially the rights of property secured by copyrights and patents
acquired by Spaniards in the Philippine Islands at the time of the
ratification of the treaty, shall not be impaired, but shall
continue to be respected.
This appeal was perfected before the Act of September 6, 1916,
39 Stat. 726, and is controlled by § 248 of the Judicial Code,
which provided that this Court should have jurisdiction to review,
revise, reverse, modify, or affirm the final judgments and decrees
of the supreme court of the Philippine Islands in all actions,
cases, causes, and proceedings in which the Constitution, or any
statute, treaty, title, right, or privilege of the United States is
involved.
The contention is that the provisions of this treaty were
involved in the decision of the supreme court, thereby authorizing
this appeal.
By the Treaty of Paris of 1898, Spain ceded to the United States
the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands. In Article VIII of
the treaty, it is provided that the relinquishment or cession, as
the case may be,
". . . cannot in any respect impair the property rights which by
law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, of
provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments,
ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having
legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid
territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of
whatsoever nationality such individuals may be."
Article XIII provides that
"the rights of property secured by copyrights and patents
acquired
Page 249 U. S. 76
by Spaniards in the Island of Cuba, and in Porto Rico, the
Philippines, and other ceded territories at the time of the
exchange of the ratifications of this treaty shall continue to be
respected."
Treaties in Force, 1904, pp. 722, 725-726.
It is the evident purpose of these provisions, in view of the
cession of territory made by Spain to the United States, to
preserve private rights of property, and to provide that the change
of sovereignty should work no impairment of such rights.
The Philippine Act of 1902, carried into the section of the
Judicial Code which we have quoted, intended to give this Court
jurisdiction in cases involving rights secured by the Treaty of
1898 and other treaties of the United States. A good illustration
of a case of this character is found in
Vilas v. Manila,
220 U. S. 345,
where certain claims were made against the City of Manila which, it
was contended, survived notwithstanding the cession to the United
States. A writ of error was sued out to a judgment of the Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands denying relief because of its
holding that the Municipality of Manila, after the treaty, was a
totally different corporate entity, and in nowise liable for debts
created under the Spanish sovereignty. Exception was taken to the
jurisdiction, but this Court held that the case involved the Treaty
of 1898, as the question was made to turn in the court below upon
the consequence of the change of sovereignty and the
reincorporation of the city after the substituted sovereignty. Mr.
Justice Lurton, who delivered the opinion of the Court, said:
"This disposes of the question of the jurisdiction of this Court
grounded upon the absence from the petition of the plaintiffs of
any distinct claim under the Treaty of Paris, since, under §
10 of the Philippine Organic Act of July 1, 1902, this Court is
given jurisdiction to review any final decree or judgment of the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands where any treaty of the
Page 249 U. S. 77
United States 'is involved.' That treaty was necessarily
'involved,' since neither the court below nor this Court can
determine the continuity of the municipality nor the liability of
the city as it now exists for the obligations of the old city
without considering the effect of the change of sovereignty
resulting from that treaty.
See Reavis v. Fianza,
215 U. S.
16,
215 U. S. 22."
In this case, no such question is presented. The decision
involved no consideration of treaty rights, nor were the same
discussed in the judgment in the court below. The Philippine
Supreme Court, in determining the issues, held that the name
"Isabela," which appellees were charged with using, was a
geographical and descriptive term, and incapable of registration as
a trademark either under the Philippine Act No. 666 or the law as
it existed under the Spanish regime; that the Spanish tradename, as
registered, consisted of the words "La Flor de la Isabela" and the
trademark of a shield with certain devices thereon. That the action
was not for the infringement of the tradename "La Flor de la
Isabela," but was for the violation of the tradename "Isabela." And
that unfair competition was not shown.
Certainly the treaty, in providing that property rights of this
class should be respected, did not intend to prevent the
consideration by the courts of the nature and extent of the rights
granted, or prohibit the application of laws for the enforcement
and regulation of such property rights when not in derogation
thereof. Philippine Act 666, § 14, Comp. of the Acts of the
Philippine Comm. § 68, itself provides that certificates
issued under the Spanish sovereignty, unannulled under the royal
decree of 1888, shall be conclusive evidence of the exclusive right
of ownership of such trademarks or tradenames.
Reliance is had by appellant to sustain the jurisdiction on the
decision of this Court in
Ubeda v. Zialcita, 226 U.
S. 452. There, suit was brought upon a trademark
registered
Page 249 U. S. 78
under the Spanish regime. The record shows that the appeal was
allowed upon two grounds: (1) that the amount involved exceeded
$25,000; (2) alleged violation of treaty rights in the decision
that the trademark being itself an imitation of earlier trademarks
prevented an injunction in favor of its owner. As to the treaty
claim, this Court said (p.
226 U. S. 454):
"In such a case [the wrongful appropriation of an earlier mark],
the Philippine Act denies the plaintiff's right to recover. Act No.
666, § 9.
See § 12, and No. 744, § 4.
Compiled Acts, §§ 63, 66. It is said that to apply the
rule there laid down would be giving a retrospective effect to
§ 9 as against the alleged Spanish grant of December 16, 1898,
to the plaintiff, contrary to the general principles of
interpretation and to Article 13 of the Treaty of Paris, of April
11, 1899, providing that the rights of property secured by
copyrights and patents shall continue to be respected. But the
treaty, if applicable, cannot be supposed . . . to contravene the
principle of § 9, which only codifies common morality and
fairness. The section is not retrospective, in any sense, for it
introduces no new rule."
Certainly this was far from holding that a right of appeal
existed because a right secured by the treaty was involved.
The present case was decided upon grounds entirely compatible
with continued respect for the trademark and tradename rights
granted by the Spanish sovereignty. It results that, in the sense
of the statute giving a right to review in this Court, no Treaty of
the United States was involved in the decree which it is sought to
reverse.
The appeal must be
Dismissed.