When an assessment for a local improvement is made in accordance
with a fixed rule prescribed by legislative act, the property owner
is not entitled to be heard in advance on the question of benefit.
P.
249 U. S.
68.
Within this principle, an assessment made in accordance with the
rule prescribed by the charter of the City of St. Louis is
legislative in character, since that charter, having been adopted
by direct vote of the citizens under a special provision of the
Missouri Constitution, has, as respects local assessments, all the
force of a legislative act. P.
249
U.S. 69.
St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
149 U. S. 465.
The method of assessing part of the cost of local improvements
according to frontage, as provided in the St. Louis charter, is
unassailable under the previous decisions of this Court. P.
249 U. S. 70.
Gast Realty Co. v. Schneider Granite Co., 240 U. S.
55; s.c.,
245 U. S. 245 U.S.
288.
Objections based on the manner of laying out an improvement
district, and on alleged failure to conform with the city charter,
raise only local questions. P.
249 U. S.
70.
Page 249 U. S. 64
The system of area assessment provided by the St. Louis charter
(
Gast Realty Co. v. Schneider Granite Co., 240 U. S.
55) is not
per se obnoxious to the Fourteenth
Amendment, and becomes so in its application only when the results
are palpably arbitrary or grossly unequal. P.
249 U. S.
71.
269 Mo. 546 affirmed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 249 U. S. 67
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The construction company brought suit to enforce the lien of
twelve tax bills issued on account of the cost of paving a portion
of Broadway in the City of St. Louis. Withnell, plaintiff in error,
is the owner of property assessed, fronting on Broadway, being five
lots in city block No. 2069, five lots in city block No. 2608, and
unplatted property in city blocks Nos. 2620 and 2621.
The validity of the tax bills was affirmed by the Supreme Court
of Missouri.
Ruecking Const. Co. v. Withnell, 269 Mo. 546.
The case is here because of alleged violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the federal Constitution in assessing the lien of
these tax bills upon plaintiff in error's property. The assessment
was levied in accordance with the charter of the City of St. Louis.
An assessment for improving other portions of the street than are
here involved, made under the terms of the St. Louis charter, was
before this Court in
Gast Realty Co. v. Schneider Granite
Company, 240 U. S. 55. In
that case, the assessment was held invalid in part. After being
remanded to the Supreme Court of Missouri, and a second judgment,
the case was again before this Court.
245 U. S. 245 U.S.
288.
The method of making assessments under the charter of the City
of St. Louis, as stated in
Gast Realty Co. v. Schneider Granite
Company, supra, is as follows: one-fourth of the total cost is
levied upon all the property fronting upon or adjoining the
improvement according to frontage and three-fourths according to
area ascertained as follows:
"A line shall be drawn midway between the street to be improved
and the next parallel or converging street on each side of the
street to be improved, which line shall be the boundary of the
district, except as hereinafter provided,
Page 249 U. S. 68
namely, if the property adjoining the street to be improved is
divided into lots, the district line shall be so drawn as to
include the entire depth of all lots fronting on the street to be
improved. . . . If there is no parallel or converging street on
either side of the street improved, the district lines shall be
drawn three hundred feet from and parallel to the street to be
improved; but if there be a parallel or converging street on one
side of the street to be improved to fix and locate the district
line, then the district line on the other side shall be drawn
parallel to the street to be improved and at the average distance
of the opposite district line so fixed and located."
In the
Gast Realty Company case, the area assessment
was held invalid because it assessed a large and disproportionate
part of the plaintiff in error's property. The memorandum appended
to the opinion shows that the foot-front assessment was not
disturbed.
And see the subsequent consideration of the
matter in
Schneider Granite Co. v. Gast Realty Co.,
245 U. S. 288,
supra.
In support of the constitutional objection, it is contended that
the plaintiff in error was not allowed to be heard as to the
validity and apportionment of the assessment, and was therefore
denied due process of law. The charter provision for notice and
hearing is inserted in the margin.
* But whether a
property owner is entitled to be
Page 249 U. S. 69
heard in advance upon the questions of benefit and apportionment
depends upon the authority under which the assessment is made. When
the assessment is made in accordance with a fixed rule adopted by a
legislative act, a property owner is not entitled to be heard in
advance on the question of the amount and extent of the assessment
and the benefits conferred.
French v. Barber Asphalt Paving
Co., 181 U. S. 324;
Embree v. Kansas City Road District, 240 U.
S. 242,
240 U. S. 36
Sup.Ct. 317;
Wagner v. Baltimore, 239 U.
S. 207,
239 U. S.
217-218, and cases cited. We are of opinion that the
assessment made in accordance with the rule of the St. Louis
charter was legislative in character, and required no previous
notice or preliminary hearing as to the nature and extent of
benefits in order to maintain its constitutional validity. The
charter of the City of St. Louis was adopted by a vote of the
people under state constitutional authority. It was under
consideration in
St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
149 U. S. 465.
This Court said:
"As the legislative power of a state is vested in the
legislature, generally that body has the supreme control,
Page 249 U. S. 70
and it delegates to municipal corporations such measure thereof
as it deems best. The City of St. Louis occupies a unique position.
It does not, like most cities, derive its powers by grant from the
legislature, but it framed its own charter under express authority
from the people of the state, given in the constitution. Sections
20 and 21 of Article 9 of the Constitution of 1875 of the State of
Missouri authorized the election of thirteen freeholders to prepare
a charter to be submitted to the qualified voters of the city
which, when ratified by them, was to 'become the organic law of the
city.' . . . In pursuance of these provisions of the constitution,
a charter was prepared and adopted, and is therefore 'the organic
law' of the City of St. Louis, and the powers granted by it, so far
as they are in harmony with the constitution and laws of the state,
and have not been set aside by any act of the General Assembly, are
the powers vested in the city. This charter is an organic act, so
defined in the constitution, and is to be construed as organic acts
are construed. The city is in a very just sense an '
imperium in
imperio.' Its powers are self-appointed, and the reserved
control existing in the General Assembly does not take away this
peculiar feature of its charter."
The same view has been repeatedly declared by the Supreme Court
of Missouri. In
Meier v. St. Louis, 180 Mo. 391, 409, that
court declared, citing its previous decisions, that the charter of
St. Louis, adopted under the constitution, had, as respects local
assessments, all the force of legislative acts.
We reach the conclusion that the attack upon the validity of the
assessment for want of advance notice of hearing as to benefits
must fail.
Regarding the front-foot method of assessment as being
unassailable under the previous decisions of this Court (240 U.S.,
245 U.S.,
supra), we come to consider the area assessment.
Objections based on the manner of laying
Page 249 U. S. 71
out the district, and whether it conforms to the plan outlined
in the city charter are conclusively disposed of by the decisions
of the state court. We have to deal only with the questions raised
as to the alleged denial of the protection afforded by the
Fourteenth Amendment. An examination of the plat made part of the
record, and reproduced in the briefs of counsel, shows that, owing
to the curvatures in Broadway and the relation thereto of
converging and parallel streets, the assessing district laid out in
accordance with the charter is of irregular outline. The lots
assessed are by no means uniform in size, nor is their relation to
the improvement uniformly alike. Some blocks, including some of the
plaintiff in error's, are not subdivided into lots, and are
irregular in shape. But we are not prepared to hold that the
assessment district was so laid out with reference to plaintiff in
error's property as requires this Court to declare the application
of the area rule a denial of due process of law, or of the equal
protection of the laws. That the assessment, owing to the
difficulties of the situation, made inequalities inevitable is
apparent. The supreme court of the state finds, and we are not
prepared to disturb its conclusion, that the property east and west
of Broadway, in the subdivision of the same for the purposes of
assessment, was treated with fairness and with as much equality as
the situation permitted. The attack upon constitutional grounds
because of the system which the charter authorized in making the
assessment can only succeed if it has produced results as to
plaintiff in error's property palpably arbitrary or grossly
unequal. This system has been sustained in many decisions in the
Supreme Court of Missouri, and has long been enforced in practice
in that state. Its application in the instance passed upon in
Gast Realty Co. v. Schneider Granite Co., 240 U.S.,
supra, was found to work so arbitrarily as to require an
avoidance of the area assessment upon constitutional grounds.
The
Page 249 U. S. 72
frontage rule of assessment, now generally in use, has been
frequently sustained by the decisions of this Court. It may and
does in some instances work inequalities in benefits conferred upon
property assessed. In the present case, a calculation found in the
brief of the defendant in error, the correctness of which does not
seem to be challenged, shows that, if the property had been
assessed by the front-foot rule, that of the plaintiff in error
would have had a larger assessment than the one which resulted from
the method employed.
The Supreme Court of Missouri found that no evidence was offered
to sustain the allegations of the cross-bill that the tax bills
were confiscatory or disproportionate to the benefits received, in
that the city escaped paying its just proportion of the cost of the
improvement because of its ownership of property within the
district.
We are not prepared to say that the plaintiff in error, because
of arbitrary legislative action or the abuse of power, was denied
due process of law or the equal protection of the laws in this
assessment.
Affirmed.
*
"No ordinance for the construction or reconstruction of any
street, avenue, boulevard, alley, or public highway of the city
shall be passed unless recommended by the board of public
improvements, as hereinafter provided. The board shall designate a
day on which they will hold a public meeting to consider the
improvement of any designated streets, avenues, boulevards, alleys,
or public highways by grading or regrading, by constructing, or
reconstructing, by paving or repaving the roadway, including
cross-walks and intersections, and shall give two weeks' public
notice, in the papers doing the city printing, of the time, place
and matter to be considered, stating in such notice the kind of
material and manner of construction proposed to be used for the
wearing surface of such improvement, naming more than one kind of
material or manner of construction, if the board deems it advisable
so to do, and also the class of specification and plan for such
work, which specification and plan shall be approved by said board,
and filed in its office. If, within fifteen days after such public
meeting, the owners of the major part of the area of the land made
taxable by this article for such improvement shall file in the
office of the board of public improvements their written
remonstrance against the proposed improvement, or against the
material or manner thereof, the board shall consider such
remonstrance, and if said board shall, by a two-thirds vote at a
regular meeting, approve of the improvement, material, or manner
remonstrated against, they shall cause an ordinance for the same to
be prepared and report the same with the reasons for their action
and the remonstrance to the assembly. If such majority fail to
remonstrate within fifteen days or shall petition the board for the
improvement, said board may by a majority vote approve the same,
and shall cause an ordinance to be prepared and reported to the
assembly therefor."