The Act of July 2, 1864, c. 225, 13 Stat. 375, § 8,
providing for the purchase for the United States at designated
places of the products of states declared in insurrection at not
exceeding three-fourths their New York market value, was strictly
in addition, as its title declared, to the Abandoned Property Act
of 1863, and not an amendment of that act in the sense of §
162 of the Judicial Code, which gives jurisdiction to the Court of
Claims over claims for property taken under the latter act and
amendments and sold. P.
249 U. S.
328.
The words "addition" and "amendment," as applied to statutes,
may or may not have the same meaning, according to the purpose. P.
249 U. S.
330.
51 Ct.Clms. 111 affirmed.
Page 249 U. S. 324
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 162 of the Judicial Code, enacted March 3, 1911,
provides as follows:
"The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to hear and
determine the claims of those whose property was taken subsequent
to June 1, 1865, under the provisions of the act of Congress
approved March 12, 1863, entitled 'An act to provide for the
collection of abandoned property and for the prevention of frauds
in insurrectionary districts within the United States,' and acts
amendatory thereof, where the property so taken was sold and the
net proceeds thereof were placed in the Treasury of the United
States, and the Secretary of the Treasury shall return said net
proceeds to the owners thereof, on the judgment of said court, and
full jurisdiction is given to said court to adjudge said claims,
any statutes of limitations to the contrary notwithstanding."
To avail herself of that section, Isabel Kouns O'Pry alleged
herself to be the sole surviving descendant and sole heir of John
Kouns and brought this suit in the Court of Claims and for grounds
thereof set forth the following facts:
June 6, 1865, George L. Kouns and John Kouns were owners of 900
bales of cotton in two lots, of which 350 bales had been raised in
Texas and 550 bales raised in Louisiana, and after the cessation
of
Page 249 U. S. 325
hostilities were brought to New Orleans, June 6, 1865. The
cotton was worth the sum of $123,110.
On that date -- June 6, 1865 -- the Act of Congress of July 2,
1864, c. 225, 13 Stat. 375, was in force, § 8 of which made it
lawful for the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the
President, to authorize agents to purchase for the United States
products of states declared in insurrection at designated places at
such prices as might be agreed on with the seller, not exceeding
three-fourths of the market value at the latest quotation in the
city of New York. (The other provisions of the statute are not
necessary to quote.)
The Act of July 2, 1864, was an amendment of the Act of March 3,
1863, entitled "An act to provide for the collection of abandoned
property and the prevention of frauds in insurrectionary districts
within the United States." 12 Stat. 820.
In pursuance of the authority thus conferred, the Secretary of
the Treasury designated, among other cities, the City of New
Orleans as a place of purchase, and by a subsequent regulation
directed that the agents appointed should receive all the cotton
brought to the places designated as places of purchase and
forthwith return to the seller three-fourths of the cotton or sell
the same and retain out of the price thereof the difference between
three-fourths of the market price and the full price thereof in the
City of New York.
The agent appointed at New Orleans was Otis N. Cutler, and, on
the arrival of the Kouns cotton, Cutler, as such agent, took
possession of it and refused to release the same or to allow the
owners to have any custody of it until they paid him one-fourth of
its market value, being the sum of $30,777.50. They paid the same
under protest and it was placed in the Treasury of the United
States, where it remains.
June 13, 1865, the President removed by proclamation
Page 249 U. S. 326
restrictions upon intercourse and trade in products of states
theretofore in insurrection and theretofore imposed in the
territory
east (italics ours) of the Mississippi
River.
Thereafter, the Kounses brought suit in a New York court against
Cutler, which was removed to the Circuit Court of the United States
for the Southern District of New York. The ground of Cutler's
liability was alleged to be that his retention of the cotton and
the exaction of money from them was unwarranted in law. They
recovered judgment, but it was reversed by the Supreme Court of the
United States (
Cutler v. Kouns, 110 U.
S. 720) and a new trial ordered. The suit was then
dismissed.
The loyalty of the appellants is alleged. The Court of Claims
dismissed the suit upon the demurrer of the government . The court
expressed the opinion that the claim did not come either "within
the letter or the spirit of § 162 and the correlative
statutes" and said:
"At the time of this transaction, the Kouns firm could not have
made any disposal of the cotton in question had it not been for the
provision of said § 8, it being insurrectionary territory.
That section prescribed the method and the conditions upon which it
might be sold to the government. The firm complied with those
conditions, and were doubtless glad to do so. We do not think,
where one complies with the law in his transaction with the
government in the sale of cotton and receives all that the law
allows him, he has any valid claim under § 162 of the Judicial
Code."
To fulfill the conditions of necessary parties on account of a
doubt expressed by the court, there was an intervening petition by
Charles Schneidau, assignee in bankruptcy of George L. Kouns. He
adopted the petition of Isabel Kouns O'Pry "and jointly with her
claims as therein prayed."
By order of the court, the petition was amended and
Page 249 U. S. 327
Schneidau made a party claimant. The government's demurrer to
the petition as amended was sustained.
The case is not in broad compass, involving as it does only the
relation and construction of statutes, but it is not easy to state
it briefly. The petition recites, as we have seen, that the Kounses
in their lifetime brought suit against the agent of the government,
Cutler, who had seized the cotton in New Orleans and exacted
payment from them of one-fourth of its value, granting them,
however, the indulgence of paying it in three installments,
respectively, June 12, June 15, and June 20, 1865. They charged
Cutler with an unlawful seizure of the cotton and an unlawful
exaction of the money. They obtained judgment in the Circuit Court,
but the judgment was reversed by this Court,
110 U. S. 110 U.S.
720, and the following is, so far as material, a summary of the
decision in the case:
In consequence of the Act of July 13, 1861, c. 3, 12 Stat. 255,
it was lawful for the President to declare that the inhabitants of
all states in rebellion against the United States were in a state
of insurrection and that all commercial intercourse between them
should cease and be unlawful so long as such condition of
hostilities should continue. And August 16, 1861 (12 Stat. 1262),
the States of Texas and Louisiana were declared to be in like
condition, and intercourse was forbidden between them and other
states and parts of the United States. On April 12, 1862, the City
of New Orleans, however, was occupied by the national forces, and
from that date was excepted from the operation of the
Nonintercourse Act.
In this state of affairs, Congress passed the Act of July 2,
1864, referred to in the petition, § 8 of which authorized the
purchase of products of states declared in insurrection, which
included the cotton in suit, and it was seized by virtue of such
authority and the payments mentioned
Page 249 U. S. 328
exacted. It was contended that the cotton was exempt from such
action by proclamation of the President of June 13, 1865. The
contention was rejected, the cotton not being, as it was said, the
product of territory east of the Mississippi River. It was,
however, further urged that the President's proclamation of June
24, 1865, removed all restrictions as well from products of
territory west of the Mississippi River. To this it was replied
that, upon the arrival of the cotton in New Orleans, the rights of
the government to it became fixed, and that, at such time,
"one-fourth its value was as much the property of the government
as the other three-fourths were the property of the defendants in
error [the Kounses]. No proclamation of the President could
transfer the property of the government to them."
It was hence decided that Cutler "had authority under the law
and regulations of the Treasury Department to exact the money"
which the suit was brought to recover. The defense of the statute
of limitations was also sustained.
It is now asserted that, notwithstanding such decision, a claim
has accrued to appellants by virtue of § 162 of the Judicial
Code upon which they are entitled to recover. It will be observed
by reference to that section that the Court of Claims is given
jurisdiction of claims of those whose property was taken subsequent
to June 1, 1865, under the provisions of the Act of March 3, 1863,
"and acts amendatory thereof," where the property was sold and its
net proceeds were placed in the Treasury of the United States, and
they are directed to be returned upon judgment rendered for the
claimant. Appellants invoke the relief of these provisions by the
contention that the cotton was taken under the provisions of the
Act of March 3, 1863, because the Act of July 2, 1864, was an
amendment to it, and that therefore the provision of § 162 of
the Judicial Code is completely satisfied; in other words, that the
money exacted was taken under the
Page 249 U. S. 329
Act of March 3, 1863 "and acts amendatory thereof." It is
further contended that, the conditions of § 162 being thus
satisfied, it is no answer to say that the seizure of the cotton
was legal, it being the intention of Congress to declare that, even
in such case, "the proceeds should be returned to the owners." And
this contention counsel offers as an answer to
Cutler v. Kouns,
supra, and that Congress, having by § 162 opened the
doors of the Court of Claims
"to claimants whose property was seized after June 1, 1865, they
can no longer be met with the defense that, because the seizure was
lawful when made, there can be no recovery on account of it. To
sustain such a defense would be 'to keep the word of promise to the
ear and break it to the hope.'"
The government opposes the contentions.
The Act of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 820, is entitled "An act to
provide for the collection of abandoned property and for the
prevention of frauds in insurrectionary districts within the United
States." Its first section empowers the Secretary of the Treasury
to appoint a special agent or special agents to collect and receive
all abandoned or captured property in any state or territory in,
insurrection, with an exception not material. Section 2 provides
that the property so received or collected may be put to public use
or sold at public auction and the proceeds thereof put into the
Treasury of the United States. By § 3, a bond may be required
of the agent or agents, who may be required to keep a book or books
of accounts showing those from whom the property was received, the
cost of transportation and proceeds of sale. It is further provided
that the owner of the property may, at any time within two years,
prefer a claim for the proceeds thereof and, upon proof of loyalty,
receive the residue of the proceeds.
It will be observed that the act had a special purpose, and was
directed to the receipt and collection of property
Page 249 U. S. 330
in a particular condition, either abandoned or captured,
recognizing however, that there might be a just claim to it, but
limiting the assertion of the claim to two years after the
suppression of the rebellion.
The Act of July 2, 1864, 13 Stat. 375, describes itself to
be
"An act in addition to the several acts concerning commercial
intercourse between loyal and insurrectionary states, and to
provide for the collection of captured and abandoned property, and
the prevention of frauds in states declared in insurrection."
The act therefore is declared to be an "addition" to preceding
legislation, not an amendment to it. Is an addition the same as an
amendment? We are informed by the dictionaries that, in addition,
the added parts remain independent, and by amendment there is
change, and, it may be, improvement. The words and the processes
they respectively describe may, however, be regarded as roughly or
even accurately interchangeable, and in investigating the meaning
of legislation, we must regard that possibility and resolve a doubt
in the words by the purpose of the legislation. In other words,
whatever the relation of the statutes, their purpose must be looked
to to determine the application to them of § 162. So looked
to, we agree with the government that the purpose of the act of
July 2, 1864, demonstrates the contrary of the contention of
appellants, and that the act was strictly in addition to prior
acts, and not an amendment of the act of March 3, 1863, in the
sense asserted. The latter act applied to a different situation.
The cotton collected under it and to which its provisions applied
might be the property of those innocent of disloyalty, but victims
of the disorder and violence of the times, and the government
constituted itself a trustee for them and gave them the opportunity
at any time within two years after the suppression of the
rebellion, to establish their right to the proceeds, requiring of
them nothing but proof of loyalty and ownership.
United
States
Page 249 U. S. 331
v. Anderson, 9 Wall. 56,
76 U. S. 65;
United States v.
Padelford, 9 Wall. 531;
United
States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128.
The cotton in the present case, unlike that to which the Act of
March 3 applied, was the subject of a business enterprise and,
taken to a market opened by the United States, forces upon the
conditions expressed in the Act of July 2, 1864 -- that is, that
its owners should turn over to the government one-fourth of the
cotton, or its money equivalent, which would immediately become the
property of the United States.
Cutler v. Kouns, supra. The
conditions in the two situations therefore are in broad contrast,
and it could not have been the intention of § 162 to confound
the conditions. The section did no more than remove the bar of
limitation of time to sue that was given by the Act of March 3,
1863. It did not intend to transfer property that had become that
of the United States.
Judgment affirmed.