A judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands which
denied the right of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners to
require a Manila street car company to give free transportation to
detectives wearing their badges concealed, and was based wholly
upon a construction of the company's franchise ordinance,
held not subject to review under Jud.Code § 248, before
the amendment of September 6, 1916, (1) as clearly not involving
the Constitution or any statute, treaty, title or privilege of the
United States, and (2) because the value in controversy was not
shown to exceed $25,000.
Writ of error and appeal to review 30 Phil.Rep. 387
dismissed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Memorandum opinion by MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE.
The Manila Electric Railroad & Light Company, the appellee,
operated in the City of Manila a street railway and an electric
light and power plant by virtue of a franchise conferred by an
ordinance adopted in 1902 by the city in the exercise of a power
given it by the local legislative authority.
Page 249 U. S. 263
From the beginning, in giving effect to the provision of the
franchise ordinance requiring that "members of the police and fire
departments of the city of Manila wearing official badges shall be
entitled to ride free upon the cars of the grantee," that
requirement was treated by the grantee as not embracing members of
the detective branch of the police department who did not publicly
wear official badges, although having such badges concealed upon
their persons in such manner that they could be exposed or
inspected when desired.
In 1914, the Board of Public Utility Commissioners, deeming that
members of the detective force not publicly wearing their badges
were entitled to ride free under the provisions of the ordinance,
after notice and hearing to the railroad on the subject, entered an
order directing that members of the detective force be allowed to
ride free under the circumstances stated. The railroad, challenging
the validity of the order, refused to obey it and, availing of the
remedy provided by the local law, invoked the jurisdiction of the
supreme court. In that court, it disputed not only the correctness
of the interpretation which had been given the ordinance by the
Utility Commissioners, but charged that, if such interpretation
were enforced a violation would result of the rights of the company
in particulars stated guaranteed to it by the Bill of Rights
provided by Congress for the Philippine Islands. The court, passing
as unnecessary to be considered all the contentions made by the
railroad but the single one concerning the duty of the company
under the franchise ordinance to furnish the free transportation
ordered, decided that, under the text of that ordinance, the duty
to furnish such transportation did not exist, and therefore set
aside the order of the Commissioners. That body, both by error and
appeal, brought the subject here for consideration.
As the action of the court complained of was taken
Page 249 U. S. 264
before the Act of September 6, 1916, and the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court was invoked before that act went into
effect, our power to review is governed by § 248 of the Judicial
Code. By that section, the authority to review under the situation
here disclosed can depend only upon one or both of two
considerations: (a) whether the Constitution or any statute,
treaty, title, or privilege of the United States is involved, or
(b) whether the value in controversy exceeds $25,000.
Compania
General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Alhambra Cigar Co., ante,
249 U. S. 72.
We are of opinion that the mere construction by the court of the
franchise ordinance, and its consequent ruling that the duty did
not rest on the railroad company to give the free transportation
which the orders of the Commissioners had directed to be given,
afford no ground for bringing the case within the first
consideration, and indeed that the contention that it does is too
unsubstantial, not to say frivolous, to afford any basis for
jurisdiction, and that the same conclusion is inevitably required
as to the second consideration, as the record discloses no ground
whatever for concluding that the Utility Commissioners had any such
pecuniary interest as to bring the case within the statute.
Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.