The extent to which the states may tax the property or the
shares of national banks is determined exclusively by § 5219
of the Revised Statutes. P.
248 U. S.
482.
The object of the section is to avoid withdrawing the financial
resources of national banks from the reach of state taxation, and
at the same time to protect the banks as federal agencies from
state interference. It therefore, with certain restrictions,
permits the shares of the bank to be taxed to the shareholders,
and, in that aspect treats the ultimate beneficial interest of the
bank and the shareholders as one, subject to but one taxation and
by that method only. P.
248 U. S.
483.
It follows, (1) that the interest represented by shares of a
state bank,
Page 248 U. S. 477
when held by a national bank, can be reached only by a tax upon
the shares of the latter, and is not taxable to the national bank
itself, and (2) that shares of a national bank, when held by
another national bank, are taxable only to the latter as
shareholder, and are not to be included in valuing the share of the
latter when taxing its shareholders. Pp.
248 U. S.
484-486.
175 Cal. 813 reversed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 248 U. S. 480
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Except as to real estate, which is taxed directly in the name of
the owner, all the available resources of banks for the purposes of
taxation are reached under the law of California not by an
immediate levy on the banks as the owner, but by annual assessment
and tax thereon made by the State Board of Equalization against the
stockholders of banks. The state law places the duty upon the banks
to pay the tax assessed against their stockholders, with the
obligation on the stockholders to repay, sanctioned by a right
conferred upon the banks to sell the stock of any stockholder
failing to refund.
The Bank of California, organized under the National Banking Law
and established in San Francisco, commenced this suit to recover
the amount of a tax levied against its stockholders in 1915 under
the law previously
Page 248 U. S. 481
stated, which it had paid under protest, claiming that the tax
was not only unlawful under the state law, but illegal under the
law of the United States governing the right of a state to tax
national banks and their stockholders. The case is here to review a
judgment denying the right to recover on the ground that the tax
had been lawfully exacted under both the law of the state and that
of the United States.
The decision below, insofar as it rested upon the state law, is
binding, and we put that subject out of view. To understand the
contentions as to the law of the United States requires a brief
statement of the tax levied and the particulars in which it is
complained of. The capital of the bank was $8,500,000, evidenced by
85,000 shares of the par value of $100 each. D. O. Mills &
Company was a national bank established at Sacramento and the
California Bank was a stockholder in that bank to the extent of
2,501 shares. The California Bank was also the owner of 1,001
shares of stock in the Mission Bank, a banking corporation
organized under the state law and doing business in San Francisco.
The Board of Equalization in 1915 fixed the value of all the assets
of the California Bank at the sum of $15,775,252.67. The Board
included in the assets making up this amount the stock standing in
the name of the California Bank, both in the D. O. Mills National
Bank and in the Mission State Bank, the first, the Mills National
Bank stock, being Computed as worth $625,546.30, and the second,
the Mission State Bank stock, as worth $121,916.50.
Upon these valuations, the Board assessed the California Bank as
a stockholder in the D. O. Mills National Bank and as a stockholder
in the Mission State Bank for the shares of stock which it held in
those banks, valuing each at the sum previously stated. Besides,
the stockholders of the California National were assessed for the
value of the assets of that bank, including in the amount
Page 248 U. S. 482
the full value of the shares of stock owned by the bank in the
Mills National and Mission State Banks.
The controversy grows out of the asserted illegality of the
two-fold tax levied on the assessments of the California Bank as a
stockholder in the Mills National Bank and in the Mission State
Bank. Its solution depends upon the effect of Rev.Stats. 5219, the
text of which is in the margin.
*
Without considering some modifications made by the Act of
February 10, 1868, c. 7, 15 Stat. 34, which are negligible for the
purposes of the questions before us, the section is but the
reproduction of a provision of § 41 of the Act of June 3,
1864, dealing with the organization of national banks. 13 Stat. 99,
112. The forms of expression used in the section make it certain
that, in adopting it, the legislative mind had in view the subject
of how far the banking associations created were or should be made
subject to state taxation, which presumably it was deemed necessary
to deal with in view of the controversies growing out of the
creation of the Bank of the United States and dealt with by
decisions of this Court.
McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,
17 U. S. 436;
Osborn v.
Bank, 9 Wheat. 738,
22 U. S. 867;
Weston v.
Charleston, 2 Pet. 449.
Page 248 U. S. 483
There is also no doubt from the section that it was intended to
comprehensively control the subject with which it dealt, and thus
to furnish the exclusive rule governing state taxation as to the
federal agencies created as provided in the section. All
possibility of dispute to the contrary is foreclosed by the
decisions of this Court.
People v. Weaver, 100 U.
S. 539;
Mercantile National Bank v. New York,
131 U. S. 138,
131 U. S. 154;
Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U.
S. 664;
Covington v. First National Bank,
198 U. S. 100.
Two provisions in apparent conflict were adopted. First, the
absolute exclusion of power in the states to tax the banks, the
national agencies created, so as to prevent all interference with
their operations, the integrity of their assets, or the
administrative governmental control over their affairs. Second,
preservation of the taxing power of the several states so as to
prevent any impairment thereof from arising from the existence of
the national agencies created, to the end that the financial
resources engaged in their development might not be withdrawn from
the reach of state taxation, but, on the contrary, that every
resource possessed by the banks as national agencies might in
substance and effect remain liable to state taxation.
The first aim was attained by the nonrecognition of any power
whatever in the states to tax the federal agencies, the banks,
except as to real estate specially provided for, and therefore the
exclusion of all such powers. The second was reached by a
recognition of the fact that, considered from the point of view of
ultimate and beneficial interest, every available asset possessed
or enjoyed by the banks would be owned by their stockholders, and
would be therefore reached by taxation of the stockholders as such.
Full and express power on that subject was given, accompanied with
a limitation preventing its exercise in a discriminatory manner, a
power which, again
Page 248 U. S. 484
from its very limitation, was exclusive of other methods of
taxation, and left therefore no room for taxation of the federal
agency or its instrumentalities or essential accessories except as
recognized by the provision in question.
Let us come to consider whether the taxation in question was
sanctioned by the Act of Congress as thus understood. We do so
first from the point of view of the two-fold tax which was based on
the ownership by the California Bank of stock in the D. O. Mills
National Bank, and second as to the taxes which resulted from the
ownership by the California Bank of stock in the Mission State
Bank.
In
Bank of Redemption v. Boston, 125 U. S.
60, it was determined that the stock held by one
national bank in another is governed by the power to tax
stockholders given by the statute. Hence, the circumstance of the
ownership of the stock by the California Bank in the D. O. Mills
National Bank in no way deflects the operation of the statute. This
being the case, as the taxation of the California Bank as a
stockholder in the Mills Bank conformed to the grant of power to
tax stockholders of national banks, it results that the assessment
for taxation made upon that basis was within the state authority,
and was rightly decided so to be.
But the principle upon which this rests inevitably leads to the
further conclusion that the inclusion of the stock ownership of the
California Bank in the Mills Bank as an asset of the California
Bank for the purpose of taxing the stockholders of the latter bank
was a disregard of the provision as to taxing stockholders fixed by
the statute.
Indeed, it is apparent that the use of the power conferred by
the statute to tax the California Bank as a stockholder in the
Mills National Bank and in addition to avail of such stock
ownership for the purpose of taxing
Page 248 U. S. 485
the shareholders of the California Bank, was but to accept the
statute on the one hand, and to exert on the other a power which
could have no existence consistently with the statute. To say that
the two taxes, the one levied on the bank as a stockholder in the
Mills National Bank and the other levied on the stockholders of the
California Bank, were valid because a taxation of different
persons, the California Bank on the one hand and the stockholders
of the California Bank on the other, serves only to emphasize the
plain disregard of the statute which would result from the
enforcement of the taxes in question.
It is undoubted that the statute, from the purely legal point of
view, with the object of protecting the federal corporate agencies
which it created from state burdens and securing the continued
existence of such agencies despite the changing incidents of stock
ownership, treated the banking corporations and their stockholders
as different. But it is also undoubted that the statute, for the
purpose of preserving the state power of taxation, considering the
subject from the point of view of ultimate beneficial interest,
treated the stock interest -- that is, the stockholder -- and the
bank as one, and subject to one taxation by the methods which it
provided.
Again, when the purposes of the statute are taken into view, the
conclusion cannot be escaped that the transmutation of the stock
interest of the California in the Mills Bank into an asset of the
California Bank subject to be taxed for the purpose of reaching its
stockholders is to overthrow the very fundamental ground upon which
the taxation of stockholders must rest.
We do not stop to point out the double burden resulting from the
taxation of the same value twice which the assessment manifested,
as to do so could add no cogency to the violation of the one power
to tax by the one prescribed method conferred by the statute and
which was the sole measure of the state authority.
Page 248 U. S. 486
Coming to consider the tax on the California National Bank as a
stockholder in the Mission State Bank, different considerations are
controlling, since the provisions of the statute and the ruling in
the
Bank of Redemption case,
supra, both in
letter and spirit, apply only to stock ownership by a national bank
in another national bank. It therefore follows that, as the
California National Bank was subject to state taxation as a federal
agency only to the extent authorized by the statute, the taxation
of that bank as a stockholder in the Mission State Bank was without
the scope of the statute, and beyond the power which it
conferred.
But while this is true, it also follows that, as the stock in
the Mission Bank belonged to the California Bank and was part of
its general assets embraced by the comprehensive power conferred to
tax such assets in the absence of some provision of the statute to
the contrary, which as we have seen, was the case with regard to
the stock held in the D. O. Mills National Bank, the assessment of
the stock in the Mission Bank as an asset of the California Bank
against its stockholders was within the scope of the grant given by
the statute, and was therefore valid.
From what we have said, it follows that the court below erred in
refusing to order the refunding of the sum paid for the taxes
levied on the assessment made against the stockholders of the
California Bank for the value of the stock held by that bank in the
D. O. Mills National Bank, and which had been assessed against the
California Bank as a stockholder in the Mills Bank, and further
erred insofar as it refused to decree a refund of the amount paid
for the tax levied on the California Bank as the result of the
assessment on that bank as a stockholder in the Mission State Bank.
In these particulars, therefore, its decree must be, and is
reversed. Our order therefore is
Reverse and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
Page 248 U. S. 487
*
"Nothing herein shall prevent all the shares in any association
from being included in the valuation of the personal property of
the owner or holder of such shares, in assessing taxes imposed by
authority of the state within which the association is located, but
the legislature of each state may determine and direct the manner
and place of taxing all the shares of national banking associations
located within the state, subject only to the two restrictions,
that the taxation shall not be at a greater rate than is assessed
upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of
such state, and that the shares to any national banking association
owned by nonresidents of any state shall be taxed in the city or
town where the bank is located, and not elsewhere. Nothing herein
shall be construed to exempt the real property of associations from
either state, county, or municipal taxes to the same extent,
according to its value, as other real property is taxed."
MR. JUSTICE PITNEY, dissenting.
Pursuant to the constitution and laws of California, the
plaintiff in error, a national banking association located in that
state, was required to pay the following three taxes for the year
1915:
(a) A tax upon the valuation of the shares of its own stock,
assessed against the bank at its own request instead of being
assessed in the names of its individual stockholders. Its shares
are 85,000 in number, of the par value of $100 each ($8,500,000 in
all), and were valued for taxation at the sum of $15,775,252.67, a
valuation which took into account all the assets of plaintiff in
error except the assessed value of its real estate (excluded
pursuant to the provisions of the state constitution). Included in
the estimate were the sum of $625,546.30, the valuation of 2,501
shares of stock of the Mills National Bank held by plaintiff in
error, and the sum of $121,916.52 for the value of 1,001 shares of
the Mission Bank (a state bank), likewise held by plaintiff in
error. It appears that the Bank of California, prior to February 5,
1910, was a state bank, and on that date was converted into a
national association, and, being at that time a stockholder of the
two other banks, was permitted, under § 5154 Rev.Stats. as it
then stood, to continue to be such stockholder after becoming a
national bank.
(b) A tax assessed directly against plaintiff in error as a
stockholder of the Mills National, based upon the valuation already
mentioned of 2,501 shares.
(c) A tax assessed directly against plaintiff in error as a
stockholder in the Mission (state) Bank, based upon the above
mentioned valuation of its 1,001 shares in that bank.
In an action brought by the California National against
Richardson as state treasurer to recover a part of the taxes thus
paid, the supreme court of the state, following its previous
decision in
Bank of California v. Roberts, 173
Page 248 U. S. 488
Cal. 398, denied recovery, and the case is brought here upon the
ground that the state constitution and laws, in conformity to which
the taxes were assessed, are repugnant to § 5219 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States. [
Footnote 1]
This Court now holds that, while the California National was
taxable as a stockholder in the Mills National Bank (
Bank of
Redemption v. Boston, 125 U. S. 60), the
other taxes imposed against plaintiff in error were repugnant to
§ 5219 in two respects: (1) in that the valuation of the Mills
National shares ought to have been deducted from the estimate of
the valuation of the California National shares in making an
assessment against the stockholders of the latter bank, and (2) in
that plaintiff in error, as a national bank, was not taxable at all
as a stockholder in the state bank, and that the tax last mentioned
above was altogether erroneous.
Upon the last point, I understand the case to be controlled by
the decision of this Court in
Owensboro National Bank v.
Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664,
where it was held that § 5219 had the effect of exempting not
only the operations and franchises, but the property of the
national banks from
Page 248 U. S. 489
state taxation, except as to their real estate. There are
weighty considerations to the contrary, which seem not to have been
called to the attention of the Court in that case -- certainly are
not adverted to in the opinion -- but it would serve no useful
purpose to bring them into the present discussion. Therefore I take
it to be settled that, under § 5219, a national bank may not
be taxed by a state with respect to its ownership of shares in
another corporation except shares in another national bank.
The supreme court of California, in the
Roberts case,
173 Cal. 398, 405, held that, since it was decided by this Court in
the case of
Bank of Redemption v. Boston that § 5219
permits the taxation of the shares of a national bank in the hands
of another national bank, a different rule could not be applied to
the taxation of shares in a state bank owned by a national bank
without violating that provision of § 5219, which prohibits
the taxation of national bank shares at a greater rate than is
assessed upon other moneyed capital. But this view seems to me
untenable; it mistakes an exemption accorded to a particular holder
of other moneyed capital for a restriction upon the rate of
taxation that may be assessed upon other moneyed capital as a class
of property. As we held in
Amoskeag Savings Bank v. Purdy,
231 U. S. 373,
231 U. S. 393,
the language of § 5219
"prohibits discrimination against shareholders in national banks
and in favor of the shareholders of competing institutions, but it
does not require that the scheme of taxation shall be so arranged
that the burden shall fall upon each and every shareholder alike,
without distinction arising from circumstances personal to the
individual."
The nontaxability of state bank shares in the hands of a
national bank is attributable to the character of the national bank
as a taxpayer, not to the quality of the state bank shares as an
object of taxation.
And, of course, I agree that the California National was
Page 248 U. S. 490
taxable as a stockholder in the Mills National, it having been
determined in
Bank of Redemption v. Boston, 125 U. S.
60,
125 U. S. 70, that
§ 5219 permits the taxation of a national bank owning shares
of the capital stock of another national bank, by reason of that
ownership, on the same footing with all other shareholders.
This brings us to the point of divergence.
I dissent from the conclusion that the taxation imposed directly
upon the California National by reason of its ownership of Mills
National shares entitled the stockholders of the former bank to
have the estimated value of the Mills shares deducted from the
estimate of their California shares.
I find no suggestion of a right to such deduction in the
language of § 5219. It permits the inclusion of "all the
shares . . . in the valuation of the personal property of the owner
or holder of such shares," and leaves it to the legislature of each
state to determine the manner and place of taxing them, "subject
only to the two restrictions" which are particularly mentioned, and
therefore, by necessary implication, free from all other
restrictions.
The opinion seems to adopt the view that to treat the Mills
National shares as assets of the California National Bank amounts
to imposing a "twofold tax," a "double burden," or "two taxes" upon
a single property interest. But if there are two taxes, it is only
because there are two banks, the stock in each of which is valued
separately because the ownership is separate and distinct.
It is said that § 5219 regards the ultimate beneficial
interest, and treats the interest of the stockholder and that of
the bank as one. I cannot accept this view, for several reasons in
addition to the implied exclusion of restrictions other than those
expressly mentioned in the section.
In the first place, the stockholder and the bank are entirely
different entities, not merely in form but in substance,
Page 248 U. S. 491
and this ought to be sufficient to rebut any inference that
would rest upon an assumed identity in order to raise a limitation
upon the already moderate scope of the scheme of taxation expressly
prescribed.
In the second place, the property interest of the stockholder
is, in a most substantial sense, different from that of the bank.
The bank, if taxable with respect to its property, would be taxable
upon all of its assets, saving any that might be expressly
exempted. But the stockholders are in no proper sense the owners of
the entire assets of the bank. Their interest, so far as they have
any interest in the assets as such, is only in the residue that
remains after payment of all outstanding liabilities. This is
capable of enjoyment in possession only in the rare event of a
winding-up and liquidation of the bank's affairs. Short of this,
and as is true in the particular case of the California Bank, the
interest of the stockholders is almost the opposite of a property
interest in the assets themselves, it being confined to a right to
have those assets employed in the current operations of a going
concern of which they are only part proprietors, with the right to
participate at proper intervals in the gains derived therefrom.
Hence, while "book value" -- that is, the excess of assets over
outstanding liabilities -- may be laid hold of, as it appears to
have been laid hold of in this case, as a convenient mode of
estimating the value of the stock interest, not only is it a matter
of familiar knowledge that such an estimate is a mere
approximation, but it is entirely clear that, both in law and in
the common experience of mankind, the beneficial interest of the
stockholder in the concerns of the bank is very substantially
different from the beneficial interest of the bank in its
assets.
Thirdly, the distinction has been constantly recognized in the
decisions of this Court ever since the earliest establishment of
the national banks. The Court, having in
Page 248 U. S. 492
the year 1862 decided that a state tax, imposed upon a bank
according to the valuation of its capital and surplus as upon the
property of individual citizens, was invalid insofar as it was
based upon an investment in the stocks, bonds, and securities of
the United States themselves exempt from taxation by the state
(
Bank of Commerce v. New York
City, 2 Black 620), and having held two years later
that the same rule must be applied to a state tax imposed against a
bank under another statute which made banks liable to "taxation on
a valuation equal to the amount of their capital stock paid in or
secured to be paid in, and their surplus earnings," etc.
(
Bank Tax Case,
2 Wall. 200), the question was raised in the year 1865, in
Van Allen v.
Assessors, 3 Wall. 573,
70 U. S. 584,
etc., whether under § 41 of the National Bank Act of June 3,
1864, c. 106, 13 Stat. 99, 112, from which the present § 5219
Rev.Stats. is derived, a state possessed the power to authorize the
taxation of shares of national banks in the hands of stockholders
where the capital was wholly invested in stock and bonds of the
United States.
Bank of Commerce v. New York
City, 2 Black 620, and
Bank Tax
Case, 2 Wall. 200, were referred to as calling for
a negative answer, but the Court sustained the tax upon the ground
of the very distinction between the stockholders and the bank that
is now under consideration, the language of the opinion being (pp.
70 U. S.
583-584):
"The tax on the shares is not a tax on the capital of the bank.
The corporation is the legal owner of all the property of the bank,
real and personal, and within the powers conferred upon it by the
charter, and for the purposes for which it was created, can deal
with the corporate property as absolutely as a private individual
can deal with his own. This is familiar law, and will be found in
every work that may be opened on the subject of corporations. . . .
The interest of the shareholder entitles him to participate in the
net profits earned
Page 248 U. S. 493
by the bank in the employment of its capital, during the
existence of its charter, in proportion to the number of his
shares; and, upon its dissolution or termination, to his proportion
of the property that may remain of the corporation after the
payment of its debts. This is a distinct independent interest or
property, held by the shareholder like any other property that may
belong to him. Now it is this interest which the act of Congress
had left subject to taxation by the states under the limitations
prescribed."
In the same case, the Court found in the context of the National
Bank Act most cogent reasons for holding that Congress intended to
permit the states to tax the entire interest of the stockholder,
without regard to the character of the investments held by the
bank. After referring to certain of the provisions of the act
respecting the amount of the capital stock, its division into
shares, and the responsibility of the shareholders for the debts of
the bank, the opinion proceeds as follows (pp.
70 U. S.
587-588):
"In view of these several provisions in which the term shares
and shareholders are mentioned, and the clear and obvious meaning
of the term in the connection in which it is found, namely, the
whole of the interest in the shares and of the shareholders; when
the statute provides, that nothing in this act shall be construed
to prevent all the shares in any of the said associations, etc.,
from being included in the valuation of the personal property of
any person or corporation in the assessment of taxes imposed by
state authority, etc., can there be a doubt but that the term
'shares,' as used in this connection, means the same interest as
when used in the other portions of the act? Take, for examples, the
use of the term in the certificate of the numbers of shares in the
articles of association, in the division of the capital stock into
shares of one hundred dollars each; in the personal liability
clause, which subjects the shareholder to an amount, and, in
Page 248 U. S. 494
addition, to the amount invested in such shares; in the election
of directors, and in deciding all questions at meetings of the
stockholders, each share is entitled to one vote; in regulations of
the payments of the shares subscribed; and, finally, in the list of
shares kept for the inspection of the state assessors. In all these
instances, it is manifest that the term as used means the entire
interest of the shareholder, and it would be singular if, in the
use of the term in the connection of state taxation, Congress
intended a totally different meaning, without any indication of
such intent. This is an answer to the argument that the term, as
used here, means only the interest of the shareholder as
representing the portion of the capital, if any, not invested in
the bonds of the government, and that the state assessors must
institute an inquiry into the investment of the capital of the
bank, and ascertain what portion is invested in these bonds, and
make a discrimination in the assessment of the shares. If Congress
had intended any such discrimination, it would have been an easy
matter to have said so. Certainly so grave and important a change
in the use of this term, if so intended, would not have been left
to judicial construction. Upon the whole, after the maturest
consideration which we have been able to give to this case, we are
satisfied that the states possess the power to tax the whole of the
interest of the shareholder in the shares held by him in these
associations, within the limit prescribed by the act authorizing
their organization."
This distinction between bank and shareholder has been
recognized consistently in the decisions of this Court from that
time until the present. It will not be necessary to analyze the
cases, since the principal ones (
People v.
Commissioners, 4 Wall. 244,
71 U. S. 258;
National Bank v.
Kentucky, 9 Wall. 353,
76 U. S. 359;
Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679,
95 U. S. 687;
Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U. S. 129,
Page 248 U. S. 495
117 U. S. 136;
Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 161 U.
S. 134,
161 U. S. 146;
New Orleans v. Citizens' Bank, 167 U.
S. 371,
167 U. S. 402)
were summarized and quoted from in the opinion of the Court in
Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U.
S. 664,
173 U. S.
677-682, where the distinction was employed to
demonstrate the substantial want of equivalency either in law or in
fact between a tax on the franchise or property of the bank, such
as had been imposed by the state in that case, and a tax upon the
shares of stock in the names of the shareholders, permitted by
§ 5219 Rev.Stats.
The solid basis of the distinction may be further emphasized by
considering the practical effect of according to the stockholders
of the California Bank, in the estimation of the value of their
shares for the purpose of taxation, a deduction of the entire value
of the stock held by this bank in the Mills National. This value,
according to the admitted facts, is $625,546.30, which is about 4
percent of $15,775,252.67, the entire estimated value of the 85,000
shares of California National stock (excluding real estate from the
computation). It is incorrect to take the latter sum as the value
of all the assets of the California National. There is nothing in
the record to show the value of its entire assets, but, as the case
comes before us as on a demurrer to plaintiff in error's own
pleading, and since the $15,775,252.67 represents but the excess of
its assets over its outstanding liabilities, it is reasonable to
assume that the entire assets are much greater, it being evident
that there must be assets to counterbalance all outstanding
liabilities, including especially the amounts due to depositors.
Let us take, for illustration, the very moderate assumption that
plaintiff in error's total assets were four times as much as its
capital and surplus, or say $63,000,000. [
Footnote 2] Of this amount,
Page 248 U. S. 496
the valuation of the Mills National stock is less than one
percent. In other words, applying the theory of the prevailing
opinion, the fact that one percent of its total assets is in the
form of shares in another national bank entitles its own
stockholders to an abatement amounting to four times that
percentage, or about 4 percent, from the valuation of their
stockholding interest in the plaintiff in error's bank. And it is
easy to see that, upon the same theory, if the shares held by one
national bank in another were equal in value to the aggregate of
its own shares, although constitution but a small fraction of its
entire assets, its shareholders would escape taxation altogether,
although participating in the profits of two banking
institutions.
As we have seen, the decisions of this Court establish that,
under § 5219, the holder of shares in a national bank is not
entitled to have the estimate of their taxable value reduced by
reason of the fact that the capital and surplus of the bank are
invested in securities that are exempted from state taxation. It
also is clear that, while the section in terms permits the real
property of the bank to be taxed against it, this does not entitle
the shareholder to an allowance from the assessed value of his
shares by reason of the fact that the bank is thus taxed. It is
true that many of the states, when authorizing the taxation of real
estate against the bank, make an allowance for this by deducting
the value thus taxed when computing the amount at which the shares
shall be taxed; but this is not because of any requirement in the
federal statute. In
Commercial Bank v. Chambers,
182 U. S. 556,
182 U. S. 561,
this Court expressly so held with respect to a claim for a
deduction from the value of national bank shares because of real
estate owned by the bank situate outside of the taxing state. In
People's Natl. Bank v. Marye, 107 F. 570, 579, it was held
that § 5219 contemplates that the tax on real estate may be
imposed independently
Page 248 U. S. 497
of the tax upon the shares of the stockholder (
affirmed upon
another ground, 191 U. S. 191 U.S.
272). And in
Amoskeag Savings Bank v. Purdy, 231 U.
S. 373, we sustained a tax imposed upon a shareholder
under a statute that, while not exempting the real estate of the
bank situate in the same state, allowed no deduction of its value
in the computation of the taxable value of the shares.
It seems to me that to allow a deduction from the taxable value
of national bank shares because the bank happens to hold stock in
another national bank is not only contrary to the clear intent of
§ 5219, but is inconsistent with all previous decisions of
this Court bearing upon the point, especially those that have
denied a similar deduction because of tax exempt securities held by
the bank, or because of real estate taxed against it.
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS and MR. JUSTICE CLARKE concur in this
dissent.
[
Footnote 1]
"Sec. 5219. Nothing herein shall prevent all the shares in any
association from being included in the valuation of the personal
property of the owner or holder of such shares, in assessing taxes
imposed by authority of the state within which the association is
located; but the legislature of each state may determine and direct
the manner and place of taxing all the shares of national banking
associations located within the state, subject only to the two
restrictions, that the taxation shall not be at a greater rate than
is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual
citizens of such state, and that the shares of any national banking
association owned by nonresidents of any state shall be taxed in
the city or town where the bank is located, and not elsewhere.
Nothing herein shall be construed to exempt the real property of
associations from either state, county, or municipal taxes, to the
same extent, according to its value, as other real property is
taxed."
[
Footnote 2]
According to its Report of Resources and Liabilities at close of
business September 2, 1915, plaintiff in error had total resources
of $67,396,982. Report of Comptroller of Currency, 1915, vol. 2, p.
585.