The cash surrender value of a life insurance policy which is
payable to the executors, administrators, or assigns of the
insured, or payable to specified persons with a right in the
insured to change the beneficiaries, is assets subject to
distribution under the Bankruptcy Act.
Cohen v. Samuels,
245 U. S. 50.
Section 2498 of the Georgia Code, 1910, providing that an
insured may assign his life insurance by directing payment to his
personal representative, or to his widow, or to his children, or to
his assignee, and that no other person can defeat such direction
when assented to
Page 248 U. S. 451
by the insurer, does not operate to withdraw the cash surrender
value from his estate in bankruptcy when the assignment was made to
his wife expressly subject to his right to change beneficiaries or
surrender the policy at any time.
236 F. 882 affirmed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1902 and 1905, the bankrupt took out two policies on his life
in the Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, loss under one payable
to his "executors, administrators or assigns," under the other to
his sister and brother, with full power in the assured "while this
policy is in force and not previously assigned, to change the
present beneficiary or beneficiaries." By formal written
instruments dated July 15, 1910, he assigned both policies to his
wife
"if she outlives me, otherwise to may estate, with full power to
the insured to change the beneficiary or surrender this policy to
said company at any time, this to be done by instrument in writing
under his hand and seal to be recorded at the home office of the
company."
While both policies were in the bankrupt's possession, the
trustee demanded them in order that their cash surrender value
might be secured and distributed under Bankruptcy Act July 1, 1898,
c. 541, 30 Stat. 544. The bankrupt defended upon two grounds:
first, that the cash surrender value was not property which could
have been transferred by him prior
Page 248 U. S. 452
to bankruptcy, and second, that the assignment to his wife could
not be defeated by the trustee because protected by § 2498,
Georgia Code 1910, which provides:
"The assured may direct the money to be paid to his personal
representative, or to his widow, or to his children, or to his
assignee, and upon such direction given, and assented to by the
insurer, no other person can defeat the same. But the assignment is
good without such assent."
The circuit court of appeals held both grounds of defense bad.
236 F. 882. As to the first, its ruling accords with the doctrine
recently announced in
Cohen v. Samuels, 245 U. S.
50. In respect of the second, that court declared:
"Nothing in the terms of the statute, especially when they are
considered in the light of the circumstances of its enactment,
indicates that it had any other purpose or effect than to deny to
any one other than the assured himself the power to defeat a
direction by him to pay to his personal representative, or to his
widow, or to his children, or to his assignee, the money payable in
a life policy issued to him. The provision does not purport to make
every such direction by the assured irrevocable by him, or to
invalidate a stipulation in a life policy giving the assured the
right to change the beneficiary at any time during the continuance
of the policy. The statute puts a direction by the assured to pay
to his widow on the same footing as one to pay to his assignee. If
a policy is assigned as security for a debt which the assured pays
during his life, certainly the statute is not to be given the
effect of putting it out of the power of the assured to change the
beneficiary upon the reassignment of the policy to him by the
satisfied creditor. Nothing in its terms justifies giving it a
different operation or effect in the case of a direction to pay to
the widow. We are not of opinion that the provision quoted had the
effect of conferring on the
Page 248 U. S. 453
bankrupt's wife, as the result of her having been named as the
beneficiary, a vested and indefeasible interest in policies by the
terms of which the beneficiaries could be changed by the bankrupt
at any time."
And we approve its conclusion.
Petitioner has not complained here of the action below
concerning a third policy, issued by the New York Life Insurance
Company.
The judgment of the circuit court of appeals is
Affirmed.