Within the general terms of the Food & Drug Act (c. 3915, 34
Stat. 768, §§ 7-8), a bottled article labeled "Compound
Ess Grape," but which contains nothing from grapes and is a mere
imitation, must be deemed adulterated, since some other substance
has been substituted wholly for the one obviously indicated by the
label,
viz., "compound essence of grape," and also
misbranded, since the label carries a false and misleading
statement.
In such case, the mere use of the word "compound" is not a
compliance with the proviso in paragraph fourth of § 8 of the
act, since it does not give notice that the article is a pure
imitation, but suggests the contrary.
Reversed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
An indictment containing six counts charged defendant, Schider,
with violating the Food & Drug Act of June 30, 1906, 34 Stat.
768, by delivering for shipment in interstate commerce food
contained in a bottle plainly labeled as follows:
Page 246 U. S. 520
Compound
Ess Grape
---
Jos. L. Schider & Co.
93-95 Maiden Lane, New York.
Each count alleged the article was an imitation of grape essence
artificially prepared from alcohol, water, and synthetically
produced imitation oils, and contained no product of the grape nor
any added poisonous or deleterious ingredient, and that the word
"imitation" nowhere appeared.
The first count further alleged it was
"unlawfully adulterated in that an imitation grape essence
artificially prepared from alcohol, water, and synthetically
produced imitation essential oils had been wholly substituted for a
true grape product, which the article purported to be,"
and the second that it was
"unlawfully adulterated in that an imitation grape essence
artificially prepared from alcohol, water, and synthetically
produced imitation essential oils had been mixed with the said
article so as to reduce and lower and injuriously affect the
quality and strength of the said article."
The third, fourth, fifth and sixth counts in varying ways
further alleged misbranding so as to deceive and mislead in that
the label indicated a true grape product, whereas the article was
not such, but an imitation artificially prepared, one which
contained nothing from grapes.
The trial court sustained a demurrer to each count upon the view
that, properly construed, the Food & Drug Act did not apply to
facts stated.
Pertinent portions of the act follow:
"Sec. 7. That for the purposes of this Act, an article shall be
deemed to be adulterated: . . ."
"First. If any substance has been mixed and packed with it so as
to reduce or lower or injuriously affect its quality or strength.
"
Page 246 U. S. 521
"Second. If any substance has been substituted wholly or in part
for the article. . . ."
"Sec. 8. That the term 'misbranded,' as used herein, shall apply
to all drugs, or articles of food, or articles which enter into the
composition of food, the package or label of which shall bear any
statement, design, or device regarding such article, or the
ingredients or substances contained therein, which shall be false
or misleading in any particular, and to any food or drug product
which is falsely branded as to the state, territory, or country in
which it is manufactured or produced."
"That, for the purposes of this Act, an article shall also be
deemed to be misbranded: . . ."
"First. If it be an imitation of or offered for sale under the
[distinctive] name of another article. . . ."
"Second. If it be labeled or branded so as to deceive or mislead
the purchaser, . . ."
"Fourth. If the package containing it or its label shall bear
any statement, design, or device regarding the ingredients or the
substances contained therein, which statement, design, or device
shall be false or misleading in any particular:
Provided,
that an article of food which does not contain any added poisonous
or deleterious ingredients shall not be deemed to be adulterated or
misbranded in the following cases: . . . Second. In the case of
articles labeled, branded, or tagged so as to plainly indicate that
they are compounds, imitations, or blends, and the word 'compound,'
'imitation,' or 'blend,' as the case may be, is plainly stated on
the package in which it is offered for sale. . . ."
34 Stat. c. 3915, pp. 768, 770, 771.
The obvious and undisputed purpose and effect of the label was
to declare the bottled article "a compound essence of grape." In
fact, it contained nothing from grapes, and was a mere
imitation.
Within the statute's general terms, the article must be
Page 246 U. S. 522
deemed adulterated, since some other substance had been
substituted wholly for the one indicated by the label, and also it
was misbranded, for the label carried a false and misleading
statement.
Defendant relies on the proviso in § 8 which declares
articles of food shall not be deemed adulterated or misbranded if
they are
"labeled, branded, or tagged so as to plainly indicate that they
are compounds, imitations, or blends and the word 'compound,'
'imitation,' or 'blend,' as the case may be, is plainly stated on
the package in which it is offered for sale."
But we are unable to conclude that, by simply using "compound"
upon his label a dishonest manufacturer exempts his wares from all
inhibitions of the statute, and obtains full license to befool the
public. Such a construction would defeat the highly beneficent end
which Congress had in view.
We have heretofore said:
"The purpose of the act is to secure the purity of food and
drugs and to inform purchasers of what they are buying. Its
provisions are directed to that purpose, and must be construed to
effect it."
United States v. Antikamnia Co., 231 U.
S. 654,
231 U. S.
665.
"The legislation, as against misbranding, intended to make it
possible that the consumer should know that an article purchased
was what it purported to be; that it might be bought for what it
really was, and not upon misrepresentations as to character and
quality."
United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co.,
232 U. S. 399,
232 U. S. 409.
And see United States v. Coca-Cola Co., 241 U.
S. 265,
241 U. S.
277.
The stuff put into commerce by defendant was an "imitation,"
and, if so labeled, purchasers would have had some notice. To call
it "compound essence of grape" certainly did not suggest a mere
imitation, but, on the contrary, falsely indicated that it
contained something derived from grapes.
See Frank v. United
States, 192 F. 864. The statute enjoins truth; this label
exhales deceit.
Page 246 U. S. 523
The trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer. Its judgment
is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.