Railroad companies may be required, under the state police power
at their own expense, to make streets and highways crossed by their
tracks reasonably safe and convenient for public use.
Upon this principle, where a village street with business houses
on both sides was intersected by a railroad right of way of which
the central portion only was occupied by roadbed and tracks and was
sufficiently planked for crossing purposes,
held that a
requirement
Page 246 U. S. 435
(under Minnesota Laws, 1913, c. 78, § 1) that a sidewalk be
built to extend the street sidewalk across the right of way on
either side of the planking, along one side of the street where
people must frequently cross, could not be regarded as a arbitrary
or unreasonable requirement depriving of due process or denying the
equal protection of the law.
132 Minn. 474 affirmed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit was brought to compel the railroad companies to build
a sidewalk on the south side of Bunde Street in the Village of
Clara City, Minnesota, where the right of way of the railroad
companies crosses that street. The right of way of the companies is
of the width of 300 feet at the place where Bunde Street crosses
the same. At or near the center of this right of way, the companies
have constructed three railroad tracks. There are business houses
upon both sides of the right of way, and it becomes necessary for
people to cross the same frequently.
The case was decided in the lower court in Minnesota upon
demurrer to the petition in mandamus, and the record contains this
statement:
"For the purpose of the demurrer, it was admitted by relator
that that part of the street in question which is occupied by the
roadbed or tracks of the respondents was and is properly, securely,
and sufficiently planked the full width of the street, such
planking extending
Page 246 U. S. 436
the full length of the ties and between the tracks as in that
particular required by statute; that the sole object and purpose
sought to be attained in and by these proceedings is to compel the
respondents to construct a sidewalk on one side of the street as it
is located across the entire right of way, so that the sidewalk
will connect with the said planking in either direction, but not so
as to include in such construction the building of any sidewalk or
crosswalk along that part of the street now occupied by said
roadbed or tracks, which part is already sufficiently and securely
planked for crossing purposes."
The General Laws of Minnesota contain a provision requiring the
planking of railroad crossings where the same cross a public
street. Section 4256 of the General Statutes of Minnesota. By
amendment of 1913, the following provision was added:
"And a suitable sidewalk shall be constructed by said company to
connect with and correspond to sidewalks constructed and installed
by the municipality or by owners of abutting property, but cement
or concrete construction shall not be required in track space
actually occupied by the railroad ties if some substantial and
suitable sidewalk material is used in lieu thereof."
Laws of Minnesota 1913, c. 78, § 1.
The lower court in Minnesota dismissed the petition, which
judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, and the
railroad company was required to construct the sidewalk at its own
expense. 130 Minn. 480. The court held that the statute was a
reasonable exercise of the police power of the state. The
contention here made is that the statute as thus enforced denies to
the companies due process of law and the equal protection of the
law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal
Constitution.
It is too well settled by former decisions of this Court to
require extended discussion here that railroad companies
Page 246 U. S. 437
may be required by the states, in the exercise of the police
power, to make streets and highways crossed by the tracks of such
companies reasonably safe and convenient for public use, and this
at their own expense. Such companies accept their franchises from
the state subject to their duties to conform to regulations, not of
an arbitrary nature, as to the opening and use of the public
streets for the purpose of promoting the public safety and
convenience. This principle was applied by this Court in
Cincinnati, Indianapolis & Western Ry. Co. v.
Connersville, 218 U. S. 336,
wherein the railroad, because of the extension of a street through
an embankment upon which the railroad was built, was required to
construct at its own expense a bridge across the street. In
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Duluth, 208 U.
S. 583, it was held that a municipality of the State of
Minnesota might require a railroad company to repair a viaduct
constructed by the city after the opening of the railroad
notwithstanding a contract relieving the railroad from making
repairs thereon for a term of years, that the police power of the
state was a continuing one, and could not be contracted away, and
that uncompensated obedience to laws passed in its exercise did not
contravene the federal Constitution. This case was followed with
approval in
St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba R. Co. v.
Minnesota, 214 U. S. 497. In
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. v. Minneapolis,
232 U. S. 430,
this Court affirmed a judgment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota
requiring a railroad company to build, at its own expense, a bridge
required in order to permit a municipality in that state to
construct a canal connecting two lakes within the limits of a
public park. In the opinion in that case, previous decisions in
this Court are collected and reviewed.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in the instant case, held that
the railroad companies might be required to
Page 246 U. S. 438
construct a sidewalk upon the right of way on both sides of the
planked crossing. In the opinion of the court, the sidewalk leading
to the crossing tended to promote the safety and convenience of the
public, and, after discussing the well established authority of the
state to require planking at crossings, as to the additional
requirement to build the connecting sidewalk, said:
"There can be no controlling difference between the requirement
of sidewalk and of planking. Planking is, to be sure, more to
prevent persons in vehicles from injury, or the vehicles or teams
from damage, by being stalled on the crossing. But where a crossing
is much traveled, safety, to say nothing of convenience, may
require a separate space, like a sidewalk, reserved for
pedestrians. There is a peculiar peril to travelers on foot where
many vehicles pass and the attention of the drivers is diverted to
looking out for trains liable to use the crossing. Again, unless a
well defined walk be provided, there is danger of pedestrians
crossing the tracks at places unexpected to those in charge of
trains or cars, not to mention the inconvenience where mud and
impassable conditions compel those on foot to deviate from the
street proper."
"It is said defendant, if obligated to lay a sidewalk across its
right of way, might likewise be required to construct sidewalks
along such right of way where it borders a highway or street. The
sufficient answer is that the statute does not call for anything of
the kind."
"The contention is also that defendant has so much larger right
of way than it needs or occupies for its three tracks that, for the
greater distance the sidewalk, as a safety provision, is out of
place. It is to be assumed that the right of way is such only as is
needed for and devoted to railway purposes, and such as is
rightfully exempt from taxes and assessments because of the payment
of the gross earnings tax. Within its right of way, defendant
Page 246 U. S. 439
may at any time place additional tracks, or change the location
of those it maintains, and, for that reason, it also seems proper
that the safety of the passage for the traveler for the whole
distance should be placed upon the railroad company. The statute
merely prescribes that it shall maintain a sidewalk over its
legitimate right of way to correspond and connect with the walk
maintained under the supervision of the municipality, so as to
afford the pedestrians a reasonably safe and convenient
crossing."
This Court considers a case of this nature in the light of the
principle that the state is primarily the judge of regulations
required in the interest of the public safety and welfare. Such
statutes may only be declared unconstitutional where they are
arbitrary or unreasonable attempts to exercise authority vested in
the state in the public interest. We are not prepared to say that
this statute is of that character, and the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Minnesota is
Affirmed.