The Auditor for the Canal Zone has no authority to make
deductions for rent of quarters, and because of absence, from the
salary of the district judge of the Zone, as fixed and appropriated
for by Congress.
Intimated that, but for the character of the proceeding
(mandamus) and doubt as to intent, damages would have been
inflicted on the Auditor under Rule 23, for plain abuse of
administrative discretion in prosecuting this writ of error after
being advised by an opinion of the Attorney General and two
decisions of the courts below of his manifest duty under the
statute respecting the payment of the judge's salary.
241 F. 747 affirmed.
Page 246 U. S. 389
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Congress provided for a district court of the Canal Zone, the
appointment of a judge, and the salary attached to the office. Act
of August 24, 1912, c. 390, 37 Stat. 565, § 8. In due course,
the salary fixed was definitely appropriated for. It is apparent
that some controversy arose as to whether the Auditor of the Canal
Zone had the power to refuse to give effect to the act of Congress
fixing and appropriating the salary by withholding such sum as he
might think was due from the judge as rent for quarters in property
belonging to the United States in the Canal Zone. We say this is to
be inferred because, in 1915, the Secretary of War submitted to the
Attorney General two questions: first, whether the district judge
was entitled to the same privilege as to quarters in the Canal Zone
there enjoyed by other employees of the government, and second, if
not, whether the Auditor had authority to deduct from the salary of
the judge before paying it the sum which he considered due for rent
of such quarters. Reversing the order in which the questions were
asked, the Attorney General came first to reply to the second
question, and said:
". . . without specific authority, no portion of the salary of
an officer of the United States may be withheld.
See 20
Ops. 626 (1893);
Benedict v. United States, 176 U. S.
357. . . ."
While it is apparent that this ruling should have put the
subject at rest, obviously the misconception of the
Page 246 U. S. 390
Auditor as to the nature of his powers prevented that result
from being accomplished, and the Auditor refused to carry out the
act of Congress and deducted from the salary of the judge, fixed by
Congress, not only a charge for rent of quarters, but a sum which
he considered due because of the absence of the judge from the
Canal Zone during a certain period. The judge thereupon commenced
the proceeding which is before us to compel the Auditor to perform
his plain duty under the law and pay the salary without the
deductions. As the result of the action of the Auditor and the
necessity for bringing the suit, the expense was occasioned the
United States of calling a judge from the United States to hear the
cause, and Judge Clayton of the Middle and Northern Districts of
Alabama proceeded to the Canal Zone to discharge that duty. He did
so, stating the reasons which controlled him in an elaborate and
careful opinion making perfectly manifest the error of the action
of the Auditor and his wrong in refusing to observe the ruling of
the Attorney General in the premises. 241 F. 747. From the
consequent judgment directing the payment of salary to be made
without the deductions, the Auditor prosecuted error to the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in which court the judgment
below was affirmed, and it is a further writ of error prosecuted by
the Auditor from this Court to that ruling which brings the subject
matter before us now.
The expense of printing a voluminous record has been occasioned,
and the views of the Auditor have been pressed before us in a
printed argument of more than one hundred pages. We think, however,
that we need not follow or discuss that argument, as we are of
opinion that it is obvious on the face of the statement of the case
that the Auditor had no power to refuse to carry out the law, and
that any doubt which he might have had should have been
subordinated first, to the ruling of the Attorney
Page 246 U. S. 391
General and, second, beyond all possible question, to the
judgments of the courts below. It follows, therefore, that the
prosecution of the writ of error from this Court constituted a
plain abuse by the Auditor of his administrative discretion. In an
ordinary case, the situation would be one not only justifying, but
making it our duty to direct the enforcement of Rule 23 as to
damages. As, however, the judgment is not one for money, but
relates solely to the obligation to perform a manifest public duty,
and, plain as may have been the abuse of discretion committed, we
are fain to believe it involved no intentional disregard of
official duty, we pass that subject by, and our order will be.
Judgment affirmed.